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5TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The ‘unitary charge’ type is one where the private •	
sector is reimbursed by the government either on an 
availability basis or by a shadow toll. This appears to 
have been an innovation by the UK government in the 
early 1990s and was originally known as the Private 
Finance Initiative but the arrangements concerned were 
renamed Public Private Partnerships following a 
change of government in 1997.
FIndIngS And ConCluSIonS
There is no precise and commonly accepted definition of 
PPP.
The interests and objectives of the public and private 
parties in entering into PPPs are diverse. The need to enter 
into PPPs by the public sector has been generally driven 
by a lack of finance, a need for modern technology and/or 
for effective and efficient management skills, and the need 
to transfer risk. PPPs have offered the private sector new 
investment opportunities, new markets and the 
opportunity to form partnerships with the public sector, 
which has in the past enjoyed a monopoly in the provision 
of certain infrastructure facilities. 
The reasons why public sector and private sector entities 
enter into PPPs differ from project to project and country 
to country. Even within one country there are numerous 
forms of partnership, which seem to have evolved on a 
‘whatever works’ basis shaped by the political, regulatory 
and technical constraints affecting the project. 
The drivers of PPP development are a decisive factor in 
shaping the institutional arrangements in each country. 
The major PPP driver is the gap between demand for 
infrastructure development, and a government’s ability to 
meet its funding. In other words, the increased use of PPP 
globally stems from the desire for additionality to the 
public funding capability. This may be a controversial 
conclusion in developed countries such as France, Japan 
and the UK, where governments claim that the value-for-
money benefit is the reason behind the use of PPP, but this 
research report provides some evidence to support the 
claim that a key driver is additionality.
Developing countries are as keen as developed countries 
to promote PPP for additionality reasons, but the 
mechanism by which the funding gap arises is different. 
Developing countries that are experiencing rapid economic 
growth have huge demands for investment in 
infrastructure and public services. Governments in these 
countries are not, however, able to procure enough 
liquidity (capital) to meet the demand for such 
developments through tax impositions, as their national 
wealth is still at a low level. In countries enjoying a virtuous 
cycle of investment–growth–more private investment, 
people believe that investment in infrastructure will 
generate enough income to pay for itself through national 
economic development. This is different from the situation 
in many developed countries where the funding shortage 
comes from the public sector net debt (PSND) constraint. 
InTroduCTIon
In the aftermath of the most significant financial crisis in 
decades, governments are seeking new forms of financing 
to support sustainable public services. This report offers 
an interesting insight into how governments are 
approaching public private partnership (PPP) and private 
finance initiative (PFI) schemes across 10 countries. 
The research includes two European countries with 
‘mature’ approaches to PPPs (France and the UK), and 
eight Asian countries with growing use of PPPs (China, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea 
and Thailand).
The report addresses the following questions.
What are the drivers of PPP promotion as a contextual •	
factor of policy development?
What are their commonalities and differences?•	
How do the contextual differences influence the shape •	
of PPP policy and implementation from the perspective 
of government’s role and the national institutional 
framework?
What are the impacts of accounting treatment on PPP •	
promotion? 
What are the lessons learned from experiences around •	
the world?
SCoPe
The report provides an up-to-date view of developments in 
Europe and contrasts these with the diffusion, evolution 
and translation of practice in the Asian countries. The 
Asian countries themselves vary between two developed 
economies (Japan and Singapore) and six rapidly growing 
countries, including two of the so-called BRIC countries 
(China and India). The report examines the different 
national social, economic and political contexts that affect 
the development and implementation of PPPs, including 
the legal framework, popular project types and accounting 
treatment methods.
The focus of the research is on PPP projects where 
responsibility for the provision of the service remains in 
the public sector, but the finance comes from the private 
sector, including facilities where infrastructure-asset 
ownership reverts to the public sector at the end of the 
concession period. Two distinctive types of scheme were 
found across the countries.
The ‘user pays’ type occurs where the user of a facility •	
pays directly for the use of that facility. This 
arrangement is most commonly known as a concession 
or build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) project. 
executive summary
6The dominant scheme in developed countries is the 
‘unitary charge’ type while the dominant scheme in 
developing countries is the ‘user-pays’ type. As developing 
countries enjoy higher economic growth rates, it may be 
much easier to justify investments in infrastructure. 
All the case study countries have a unit responsible for 
auditing government accounts and evaluating PPP 
implementation, and this can play an important role in 
improving PPP policies. Countries where the value-for-
money criteria are in principle predominant – particularly 
the PSND-constrained countries – are more likely to invest 
money in the evaluation of PPP policies and 
implementations; for example, the UK. Countries where 
value-for-money criteria are less emphasised are likely to 
be reluctant to provide resources for evaluation. 
The acquisition of durable assets requires finance for initial 
investment. This research report seeks to show who 
supplies finance for infrastructure investments and how 
the returns on the investment are reimbursed to financial 
capital suppliers. India and Indonesia support PPPs 
through government grant assistance. Other forms of 
government financial assistance are long-term debts to 
secure financial stability or government-affiliated funds 
established for credit enhancement for PPPs through 
guarantees. Multilateral development banks may also 
provide financial assistance. 
Given that PPP is an enabler of additionality to public 
finances, the accounting treatment chosen is likely to have 
a greater impact on the attractiveness of PPPs in the 
PSND-constrained countries than in other countries, 
because it determines the border between what is on and 
off the public balance sheet. Accounting treatment is not a 
subject of national debate in non-PSND-constrained case 
countries. The issue of the accounting treatment of PPP 
projects is much more relevant in developed countries, 
where a gap in the ability to fund public service demands 
arises from the pressure towards fiscal reform. There, 
whether or not the government commits to long-term 
payment to the private sector and guarantee for credit 
enhancement are deemed to be within the PSND is a 
critical factor in determining the government’s incentive to 
employ private finance for public infrastructure provision. 
The difference in the motives of PPP promotion between 
developed countries and developing countries has a 
substantial impact on the significance of assessments of 
value for money. The value-for-money criteria of PPP is 
defined as the expected reduction of life cycle cost and the 
estimated value of the risk transferred. In Japan and the 
UK, the government must assure the public that PPP is the 
best option for procurement in terms of value for money. 
For the countries where the merit of additionality, rather 
than economic efficiency, is regarded as important, the 
assessment of value for money is not stressed. Value for 
money is not a relevant argument in developing countries 
because governments are more concerned with meeting 
the growing demand for infrastructure than with the 
efficiency of its construction and operation. Therefore, the 
assessment of value-for-money criteria done in developed 
countries is not applicable to the context of developing 
countries. 
Countries that have not developed any guidelines for 
assessing value for money include China, India and 
Indonesia. The vulnerability to manipulation of value-for-
money assessment is also a common issue. The 
experiences in the country cases show that risk allocation 
between the government and the private sector is one of 
the key factors in the success of PPP projects. Many 
countries demonstrate poor practice in that the public 
sector takes on an excessive burden of risk, particularly at 
the early stage of PPP application. Dysfunctions of risk 
transfer can stem not only from contract arrangements 
but also from institutional dynamics.
AreAS IdenTIFIed For FurTher reSeArCh 
This report identifies three areas for further investigation, 
as follows. 
1. The importance of project selection: the country case 
studies suggest that more research is required into the 
strengths and weaknesses of cost–benefit analysis and 
discounted cash flow as investment appraisal tools and 
the extent to which they serve as drivers for 
infrastructure project selection.
2. The issue of additionality has tended to be ignored in 
recent research, compared with research into value for 
money. It raises questions about areas such as the 
conditions under which additionality is genuinely 
achieved. This also leads to the broader issue of 
infrastructure finance; for example, to what extent 
should the principle of partnership be extended to the 
provision of finance in situations where the public and 
private sectors both put in finance almost as joint 
venture partners? There are issues of accountability 
and viability around these types of initiative; for 
example, under what conditions do guarantees and 
government-backed loans deliver significant public 
policy benefits? 
3. Questions need addressing as to how countries are to 
fund the resources to develop their infrastructure so 
that it is an enabler of, rather than a constraint on, 
economic growth, and how to ensure that economic 
growth is sustainable in environmental terms.
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BACkground To The reSeArCh
ACCA commissioned Manchester Business School, working 
with the Graduate School of Management at Kyoto 
University, to investigate the diffusion of public private 
partnerships (PPPs) around the world. Two European 
countries with ‘mature’ approaches to PPPs (France and 
the UK) were selected along with eight Asian countries 
with growing use of PPPs (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korean and Thailand). The aim 
was to gain an up-to-date view of developments in Europe 
and then to contrast these with the diffusion, evolution, 
and translation of practice in the Asian countries. The 
latter vary between two developed economies (Japan and 
Singapore) and six rapidly growing countries, including two 
of the so-called BRIC countries (China and India). The full 
list of contributors is given in the appendix.
The SCoPe oF The reSeArCh
Figure 1.1: The scope of the research
The research was concerned with the cases where 
responsibility for the provision of the service remains in 
the pubic sector but the finance comes from the private 
sector, including facilities where ownership of the 
infrastructure asset reverts to the public sector at the end 
of the concession period. This is distinct from both 
privatisation, where the whole responsibility for service 
delivery and ownership of the infrastructure assets that 
enable it are moved to the private sector, and sale-and-
lease-back arrangements, such as estates outsourcing, 
where assets are permanently transferred. 
The develoPmenT oF PPPS
Historically, public infrastructure has been created mainly 
by the public sector, using traditional procurement 
methods such as design–bid–build and ‘design and build’. 
Further, public finance has been used to award contracts 
to private sector contractors. The public sector entities 
awarding the contracts have been in charge of the actual 
provision of services to the public once the projects have 
been developed. Thus, in the past, the private sector’s role 
was limited to designing and constructing facilities. 
As governments faced the challenge of stretching scarce 
public funds to meet the increasing demand for new and 
modern infrastructure facilities while also performing the 
other duties expected of modern welfare governments, the 
need to engage the private sector in providing the 
infrastructure for public services arose for a variety of 
reasons. In developing countries, the key reasons were the 
lack of public funds and the need for modern technology 
and efficient management skills. For developed nations, 
allocation of project risks was the key reason. Thus, public 
private partnership (PPP), under which the public sector 
entities could work with private sector entities in 
developing, managing and providing public services to the 
people, became the popular option for many countries. 
In the 1980s, governments considered two alternative 
mechanisms for engaging the private sector: total 
privatisation of public facilities and PPPs (Ford and 
Zussman 1997). The former enables governments to 
transfer to the private sector the total responsibility for 
developing, managing, and providing public services. The 
latter enables governments to invite private sector entities 
to finance and develop infrastructure projects without 
losing state control over the regulatory aspects of service 
provision, including the pricing of the services provided by 
the infrastructure facility (Gunawansa 2000, Savas 2000, 
Abdul-Aziz 2007). Over time, the total privatisation of 
public infrastructure facilities at prices heavily subsidised 
by the governments became politically controversial. 
Further, governments were hesitant to subject certain 
facilities to total privatisation for reasons such as national 
security. Thus, PPP became the popular option.
1. Introduction 



















According to the dictionary definition in Webster, a partner 
is ‘one of two or more persons contractually associated as 
joint principals in business’. The same dictionary defines 
‘partnership’ as a legal relation existing between two or 
more persons contractually associated as joint principals 
in a business. According to Duhaime’s Legal Dictionary, a 
‘partnership’ is an organisation in which two or more 
persons carry on a business together. Thus, it is not 
difficult to conclude that a public private partnership is a 
contractual arrangement in which a public sector entity 
and a private sector entity come together to do business. 
Nonetheless, as noted by Khanom (2009), there is no 
precise and commonly accepted definition of PPP. The 
difficulty arises as a result of the diverse interests and 
objectives of the public and private parties when entering 
into PPPs. For the public sector, as noted earlier, the need 
to do so may arise for one or more of the following 
reasons: lack of finance, the need for modern technology 
and/or for effective and efficient management skills, and 
the need to transfer risk. For private sector entities, PPPs 
offer new investment opportunities, new markets and the 
opportunity to work with the public sector, which has in 
the past enjoyed a monopoly in provision of certain 
infrastructure facilities (Gunawansa 2000). 
The needs of both public and private sector entities when 
entering into PPPs can differ from project to project and 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This is another reason for the 
absence of a common definition of PPP. For example, the 
needs of a cash-strapped developing country entering into 
a PPP to develop a project to provide clean water or 
electricity to its citizens will be different from the 
requirements of a developed country in considering a PPP 
for developing an airport or a highway. 
One definition of PPP as embraced by the Canadian 
Council for PPP is:
A cooperative venture between the public and private 
sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best 
meets clearly defined public needs through the 
appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards.
In the UK, Her Majesty’s Treasury (1998) defines PPP as:
An arrangement between two or more entities that 
enables them to do public service work cooperatively 
towards shared or compatible objectives and in which 
there is some degree of shared authority and 
responsibility, joint investment of resources, shared risk 
taking and mutual benefit.
In Singapore, the Ministry of Finance (2004) has defined 
PPP in these terms:
PPP refers to long-term partnering relationships between 
the public and private sector to deliver services. It is a 
new approach that Government is adopting to increase 
private sector involvement in the delivery of public 
services.
In India, the Department of Economic Affairs of the 
Ministry of Finance (2005) defines PPP thus:
The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Project means a 
project based on contract or concession agreement 
between a Government or statutory entity on the one side 
and a private sector company on the other side, for 
delivering an infrastructure service on payment of user 
charges.
The Canadian definition focuses on the cooperative 
venture between the public and private parties and the 
appropriate allocation of resources and risks. This 
indicates that PPPs are looked at as ‘partnering’ 
arrangements between parties with equal bargaining 
power. Similarly, the UK definition focuses on compatibility 
between the parties and the sharing of responsibilities, 
risks, resources and profits. 
The Singapore definition focuses on PPPs as a long-term 
relationship between public and private sectors that 
enables the public sector to involve the private sector in 
providing services to the people. This definition does not 
give any indication as to the real need for the public sector 
to enter into PPPs. Further, in Singapore, PPP is also seen 
as a way of bringing in specialist private sector expertise to 
stimulate an exchange of ideas and bring more 
international players into the domestic market (KPMG 
2007).
The Indian definition focuses on the fact that the 
government gives a concession to the private sector to 
develop a project and provide services in return for 
payment of user charges. The public sector’s engagement 
in the partnership is limited to the granting of the 
concession, owing to financial constraints and lack of 
modern technology. The private sector is required to 
finance and develop the project and offer services in return 
for payments. 
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TyPeS oF PPP
This focus on the notion of ‘partnership’ tends, however, to 
obscure different types of partnership arrangement. Even 
within one country there are a number of forms of 
partnership, which seem to have evolved on a ‘whatever 
works’ basis shaped by the political, regulatory and 
technical constraints around the project. In practice, this 
variety can be categorised in two distinctive types that are 
of particular interest across these different country cases.
The ‘user-pays type’ occurs where the user of the facilities 
pays directly for the use of the facility – the classic 
example here is a toll road, or turnpike. This arrangement 
is most commonly known as a concession or build–own–
operate–transfer (BOOT) project. Its origins lie in 17th-
century France and Louis XIV’s attempts to build the 
infrastructure of the nation.
The ‘unitary charge type’ occurs where the private sector 
is reimbursed by the government either on an availability 
basis or by a shadow toll. This appears to have been an 
innovation by the UK government in the early 1990s as it 
tried to square major public spending cuts with a 
commitment to maintaining public services, particularly in 
health. This arrangement was originally known as the 
Private Finance Initiative in the UK but such projects were 
renamed public–private partnerships with a change of 
government in 1997.
We will see in the following chapters how important it is to 
understand the differences between these two types of 
PPP.
The reSeArCh meThod
At the start of the research in February 2010, the research 
team agreed with the sponsor a model chapter structure 
for each of the national teams to follow. First drafts of the 
country case studies were then prepared in advance of a 
workshop, held in Kyoto in September 2010. At the 
workshop each case study was presented and discussed in 
the round. It rapidly became clear that the final report 
based on ten country cases covering all the points in the 
model structure would be a very large document indeed, 
and one that would inevitably contain much repetition. It 
was decided, therefore, to ask the authors of each country 
case to limit their contributions to around 6000 words and 
to request that they focused on what they believed to be of 
most interest in their particular country. So, for example, 
the Indian case presents viability gap funding, while the 
South Korean case explores the issues around minimum 
revenue guarantees. Drawing on the second drafts of the 
country cases, a cross-case analysis was then prepared 
which draws out some of the key contrasts and 
commonalities across the ten countries. This is 
complemented by a theory chapter because it did not 
seem appropriate to include a literature review in any of 
the country cases, as these aim to provide a more 
descriptive account, thereby developing an empirical base 
for future inductive theorising.
The country cases are rather variable in content, but the 
advantage of this is that they focus on the issues of 
importance in the debate in each country, rather than 
reflecting the interests and issues in the UK debate, which 
the original model structure tended to do. The standard of 
English is also rather variable because the majority of 
authors are not writing in their mother tongue. In order to 
improve consistency in writing style and presentation, all 
twelve chapters have been edited by our editor, and the 
chapter on France was translated from the French by the 
principal investigator. It should be emphasised, though, 
that the chapters have been edited, not rewritten. In the 
interests of retaining authorial voice we have not 
attempted to bring the English of all chapters up to the 
standards expected of a native speaker. Nevertheless, it is 
hoped that they remain clear enough to allow 
understanding.
FurTher reSeArCh
This work has ranged broadly and covered many aspects 
of the topic. It is appropriate to reflect on what has been 
found and to suggest some lines of enquiry for further 
research on the private finance of public infrastructure. 
One topic where no further research is suggested is on 
value for money. This has been extensively explored, 
particularly in the UK, and it would seem conclusive, after 
drawing on a wide body of research including that 
conducted by the UK’s National Audit Office, and earlier 
work sponsored by ACCA, that only in rare cases can there 
be high confidence that a private finance alternative (PFA) 
offers greater value for money than a Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC). The theoretical and empirical reasons 
for this are explored in Chapters 2 and 13. Moreover, value 
for money in the sense used in the UK is of little interest to 
countries with rapidly growing economies as the costs of 
doing nothing are relatively high owing to the lost 
economic growth incurred if infrastructure is not provided. 
While such countries still need to allocate the funds 
available to the most valuable projects, this is a matter of 
choice between projects, not a choice of how to fund a 
chosen project.
This point suggests the next area for research. The 
importance of project selection suggests that much more 
research is needed into the strengths and weaknesses of 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and discounted cash flow 
(DCF) as investment appraisal tools and the extent to 
which they serve as ‘an engine not a camera’ (MacKenzie 
2008) for infrastructure project selection. Whether their 
growing deployment amounts to a ‘financialisation’ or 
‘accountingisation’ (Broadbent et al. 2008) of 
infrastructure funding or reflects a growing dependence on 
tools and techniques derived from engineering to support 
business decision making remains to be explored. 
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This research agenda is rendered more urgent by the UK 
government’s new commitment to rank order all capital 
projects from a zero base using CBA (Financial Times 
4 June 2010).
If the aim is to provide positive net present value, the 
question remains about how the project is to be funded. 
This turns us back to the issue of additionality, which has 
tended to be ignored in recent research, compared with 
value for money, narrowly defined. Under what conditions 
is additionality genuinely achieved, as opposed to the 
pseudo-additionality inherent in the UK’s Private Finance 
Initiative? This would appear to be a much easier question 
to answer in a place such as China rather than, say, France, 
owing to the much larger ‘infrastructure gap’ in the former.
Funds providing additionality come from the private sector 
and so much more research is needed into the somewhat 
opaque world of infrastructure finance – Freud’s account 
(2006) of its birth does not inspire confidence. There are 
now a substantial number of specialist infrastructure funds 
deploying the world’s savings to finance infrastructure 
projects, yet the sector still lacks appropriate expertise 
(Palter et al. 2008). Page and his colleagues (2008) 
provide only a tentative start here, and, as suggested in 
Chapter 5, these flows of funds for infrastructure 
investment need to be placed in the context of the massive 
global flows of capital that characterise the world.
The cases of India, Indonesia, and South Korea, in 
particular, suggest that further research is required into 
situations where the public and private sectors act more as 
joint venture partners by both contributing finance to the 
project. The first step along this road is to underwrite the 
deal by offering guarantees – something that the UK (with 
the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) and France are not averse to, 
but that is much more widespread in developing countries. 
This can, of course, generate significant moral hazard as 
the South Koreans have found. This approach can be taken 
further by the public sector’s participation in the provision 
of finance. The UK government took a step down this road 
in 2009 by establishing HM Treasury’s Infrastructure 
Finance Unit, but in the end only the Greater Manchester 
Waste PFI used public funds to close a deal. In many areas 
of Asia, what the Indians call viability gap funding is seen 
as an important element of public policy for infrastructure. 
A further extension of this approach is the establishment 
of public sector infrastructure funds as in the Indonesia 
Infrastructure Guarantee Fund and Korea Infrastructure 
Credit Guarantee Fund, which can offer guarantees to the 
private sector. Similarly, the Fond Commun de Titrisation 
(FCT), currently under discussion in France, would allow 
the state to guarantee loans made to projects once the 
construction phase has been completed. In the UK, a 
‘Green Investment Bank’ (a national initiative to fund 
investments aimed at greening the economy) and ‘tax 
increment funding’ schemes (the latter being where local 
authorities borrow against increased future tax receipts to 
fund investment) are currently under consideration. There 
are wide issues of accountability and viability around all 
these types of initiative that are worthy of rigorous 
scrutiny. The fundamental question is: under what 
conditions do guarantees and government-backed loans 
produce significant public policy benefits?
A final question returns the discussion to its starting point 
– how are countries to fund the resources to develop their 
infrastructure so as to enable rather than constrain 
economic growth? Time has added a further clause to this 
question: how are governments to fund the massive 
additional infrastructure investments (eg in new types of 
power generation and public transport) required to ensure 
that economic growth is sustainable in environmental 
terms? In some cases, provision can be left to a regulated 
private sector but where this is not possible for either 
political or economic reasons, some kind of partnership 
between the public and private sectors is the only way to 
replenish the empty coffers of the state, if there is no 
political appetite for raising taxation levels significantly or 
slashing welfare benefits even more. The concession – 
Colbert’s solution in 17th century France – has been widely 
adopted, but is very difficult to implement in its pure form 
in the more developed economies, and many developing 
countries lack the confidence of investors to commit to it 
without additional support from the state. In the UK, US 
and France, these questions are under active consideration 
as the models examined in this research have 
demonstrated their limitations. For instance, in the UK the 
former Labour government established Infrastructure UK 
within HM Treasury and, most recently, the Major Projects 
Authority has been established within the Cabinet Office. 
Similarly, developing countries are continually 
experimenting with new forms of private finance while 
learning from their mistakes. As demonstrated in these 
cases, the search for creative solutions to filling the 
‘infrastructure gap’ goes on. 
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InTroduCTIon
The use of private finance as the source of capital for the 
provision of public infrastructure has both a long history 
and wide application. Yet it remains contentious on 
grounds of both policy and practicality. This chapter will 
review the extensive and growing literature on the use of 
private finance that articulates these contentions. It 
thereby provides the theoretical complement to the 
descriptive reports in the country chapters and the cross-
case review. This account starts with an attempt to define 
clearly what is meant here, without entering into the 
nuances of various arrangements for privately financing 
infrastructure projects. Once the relevant terms have been 
defined, there follows an evaluation, in some detail, of the 
three issues that underlie the question of whether public 
infrastructure should be procured using private finance: 
value for money, public values, and additionality. The aim 
is to show how all the other aspects of the debate resolve 
into these three issues, and the evidence leads to the 
conclusion that private finance can only rarely offer value 
for money and that the benefits of additionality can be 
realised only under quite tightly defined conditions. 
The lIghThouSe ProBlem
The definition of ‘private finance’ need not detain us long. 
In the absence of state ownership of profitable productive 
assets or trading companies, all finance is essentially 
derived from private economic activity. Public finance, 
therefore, is the case where the state captures a 
proportion of the wealth generated through private 
economic activity by taxation, by selling licences, or by 
borrowing from private financiers. The state then invests 
the funds raised on its own account. Private finance, on 
the other hand, is the case where the private sector, at 
state instigation, provides funds directly for a specific 
investment; this is also known as project finance because 
the loan is secured on the asset being created by the 
project. The loan may then be repaid directly through the 
returns generated by that investment, or indirectly through 
public funds.
Arriving at a clear definition of public infrastructure is, 
perhaps, more difficult. Neo-classical economists talk of 
public goods, by which they mean those goods and 
services where consumption by one person does not 
reduce supply and no potential consumer can be charged 
a fee. This means that while the good or service might 
provide a benefit, private sector investors will not supply 
because they cannot reap a return. The recommendation 
is that if the service or good is socially desirable then 
collective provision is required and that this is best done 
by government. The ‘lighthouse’ is the classic example of a 
public good cited in the economics textbooks (Coase 1974) 
because it provides a general benefit (avoidance of rocks) 
for all shipping, yet it is impractical for the lighthouse 
keeper to charge each passing ship a fee for its services. 
Modern technology overcomes the fee-collection problem 
but, as Samuelson notes (cited Coase 1974), this does not 
necessarily undermine the insights derived from the 
discussion of the lighthouse problem. It is also the case 
that, even if a fee could feasibly be charged, it may be 
more beneficial to the economy as a whole not to do so. In 
other words, there may be goods and services for which 
fees could feasibly be charged yet where there are 
considerable, broader public welfare benefits in not 
charging, if the cost of service provision would lead to 
significant under-consumption by those who cannot afford 
the fees. In these circumstances, therefore, government 
provision is preferred. Education is a widely accepted 
example here. Where fees are charged, their aim may be 
more to ration consumption than to recoup the full cost of 
provision. Thus, the broad definition of public goods is the 
outcome of political debate within the nation state and the 
analysis in this report will accept the current definition in 
any particular national context.
Economists are also rather uncertain regarding their 
definition of infrastructure. Research on the contribution of 
infrastructure to economic growth has tended to define 
infrastructure as publicly owned capital assets, largely on 
the basis that this is what can be measured (Gramlich 
1994). This would appear to be theoretically justifiable by 
the neo-classical position on public goods. Nonetheless, 
most contemporary commentators would not concern 
themselves with ownership issues in defining infrastructure 
but focus on its enabling role for other economic activity 
(OECD 2006; Helm et al 2009) and, therefore, its central 
role in economic development. While the perception of the 
importance of what might be called ‘classic infrastructure’ in 
the shape of transportation, energy and telecommunications 
assets is widely recognised, it is reasonable to extend the 
definition to other assets such as those buildings and 
information systems that support the delivery of health 
care. In this report infrastructure assets are defined as 
those fixed investments that enable the delivery of goods 
and services to customers. They are complements to fixed 
assets such as production equipment, often serving to 
house or connect that equipment. Public infrastructure is 
therefore the infrastructure required for the supply of 
public goods and services.
It is worth reiterating the point that Coase (1974) makes in 
criticism of neo-classical economists who tended to 
conflate the public provision of a service with the public 
finance of the infrastructure that enables that provision. He 
finds that many lighthouses in the UK were in fact built 
and operated privately on the basis of leases from Trinity 
House. Trinity House was (and still is) a charitable 
foundation dating from 1514 and licensed by the Crown to 
levy ‘Light Dues’, operate lighthouses, and provide other 
services related to commercial shipping. It now functions 
under the auspices of the UK Department of Transport. 
When the leases fell in, Trinity House took ownership of the 
lighthouses, so in modern terms the system was one of 
shadow tolling using hypothecated taxation for running 
costs and private finance to supply the infrastructure, in 
the shape of the lighthouse. Attempts to ‘nationalise’ 
Trinity House during the 19th century were resisted on the 
grounds that is would lead to inefficiency and waste 
because the current system actively engaged ship owners 
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in the operational oversight of lighthouses, producing a 
downward pressure on port fees that the public sector 
would be unable to replicate. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this brief 
review.
There is a class of capital assets that enables the •	
production of goods and services, rather than 
producing those services directly – this is called 
infrastructure.
A relatively large proportion of this class of assets has •	
the character of a public good and so is subject to 
market failure if left entirely to the private sector to 
provide – this is called public infrastructure.
It does not follow necessarily that the state should •	
finance, construct, or operate these assets – the most 
appropriate means of supply is a pragmatic choice 
within public policy.
This report uses the descriptor private finance of public 
infrastructure for the object of enquiry for two reasons. 
The first is that it captures the conclusions from the 
exercise in definition; the second is that the widely used 
alternatives such as public–private partnerships (PPP) or 
private finance initiatives (PFI) are flexible in application 
(Hodge and Greve 2007) and can become loaded with 
normative expectations.The rest of this chapter is an 
attempt to review the implications of Coase’s insight into 
the relationship between public infrastructure and private 
finance. This review cannot be comprehensive, because of 
the large volume of literature that has been developed in 
the area over the last 20 years, and so it will focus on the 
three main themes in these debates – value for money, 
additionality (Hall 1998) and public values. Much of the 
literature will also be drawn from debates over the use of 
private finance in the UK, simply because this is where the 
switch from the public to private finance of public 
infrastructure has been most pronounced. Arguably, the 
rapid development in the UK since 1984 has been without 
precedent internationally. It is probably the most 
aggressive programme of the private finance of assets for 
the delivery of infrastructure for public services over the 
last 30 years. The report will not address the broader set 
of issues concerning which infrastructure provision should 
be within the public sector – that is, it will not cover the 
debates around nationalisation and privatisation where 
provision switches from public/public to (regulated) 
private/private. Much of the literature also presumes that 
private finance of public infrastructure is a good idea and 
focuses on implementation issues (c.f. Akintoye and Beck 
2009; Kwak et al. 2009). The aim here is to respond to the 
evidence in the country chapters that suggests that a net 
benefit, compared with other ways of financing 
infrastructure, cannot be presumed and to focus the 
review on the debates around the net benefits of private 
finance. In any case, the implementation literature largely 
identifies issues common to all infrastructure projects in 
terms of project governance and management, which need 
not be a concern here.
AddITIonAlITy 
The principal driver for additionality is the policy constraint 
on public sector borrowing. As Spackman (2002) suggests, 
these constraints have both a macroeconomic and 
administrative dimension. Clearly, any economic entity is 
constrained in its investment activity by its ability to raise 
capital, which limits its ability to initiate infrastructure 
projects. In principle, any portfolio of projects that 
promises a net positive return adjusted for risk would be 
worth investment. In practice, there are competing claims 
on the public purse for expenditure that is closer to 
consumption rather than investment. This means that the 
macroeconomic constraint tends to be at the level of 
public expenditure as a whole, defined as public sector net 
debt (PSND), rather than at the level of the investment 
portfolio. In practice, the macroeconomic constraint is 
expressed through the perceptions of those from whom 
the government wishes to borrow – principally private 
financiers and sovereign wealth funds – in terms of their 
confidence in the ability of the government to repay 
(Keynes 1963). The administrative dimension addresses 
this issue of confidence by establishing prudential rules for 
PSND that impose constraints on public expenditure and, 
hence, on the amount of public funds available for 
infrastructure investment. An example of such an 
administrative rule is the application to euro zone 
countries of the Maastricht criteria that annual public 
sector net borrowing (PSNB) should not exceed 3% of 
GDP, and net debt (PSND) should not exceed 60% of GDP. 
One way of relieving the PSND constraint is for the 
government to raise income. This is done principally 
through taxation, but privatisations have also been 
important at key junctures. This way forward is subject to 
electoral constraints and having something to privatise. 
It follows that policy constraints mean it is likely that there 
is insufficient public finance available for investment in all 
viable infrastructure projects. Additionality is the provision 
of private capital, additional to that available from public 
sources, for investment in public infrastructure. One way 
round the administrative constraint is to define the 
investment as being outside the calculus of the PSND by 
defining the asset as being off the public-sector balance 
sheet. In effect, this allows governments to raise more 
investment capital than the prudential administrative 
constraint allows. Where such administrative techniques 
simply shift the capital cost from the capital account to the 
revenue account through the payment of unitary charges, 
as in the UK’s PFI, then such administrative techniques 
ease only the administrative constraint rather than the 
macroeconomic constraint because returns on capital 
come from public funds through the life of the contract. As 
shown by Ball and his colleagues (2002), a switch to 
private finance based on a unitary charge only increases 
public sector investment in the short term under most 
assumptions. Where the investment in the public good 
generates additional revenues through increased private 
economic activity, however, the macroeconomic constraint 
is also eased. This is usually achieved in concession-type 
private finance where capital is repaid through tolls, but it 
is also the logic behind arrangements such as tax-
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increment funding, whereby government agencies borrow 
against future additional tax revenues to be generated by 
the investment. One implication of this analysis is that 
private finance based on a unitary charge is unlikely to 
provide additionality because it is either aimed at welfare, 
as in the case of healthcare, or the investment returns are 
too far in the future to provide adequate returns on capital, 
as in education.
vAlue For money
The issue of value for money has been at the heart of 
much of the debate about private finance. Value is an 
elusive word and has been since the 14th century, long 
having two intertwined meanings: value as a measure of 
worth and value as an explicitly held belief (Ramirez 1999). 
The next section will consider value as an explicitly held 
belief; here the focus is on value as a measure of worth. 
The value of infrastructure investment has long been 
assessed through appraisal techniques that attempt to 
calculate the net present value of a ‘flow out’ of 
expenditures and a ‘flow in’ of income, and any project 
where the inflow is greater than the outflow can be 
described as value for money. Thus, any infrastructure 
project that provides a net benefit can be funded, but in 
the context of scarcity of capital only a proportion of those 
should be funded, and the concept of value for money 
captures those projects that should be funded on the basis 
of higher relative returns on investment. The burden of the 
value-for-money critique of private finance is that it 
reduces the returns, and hence value for money, for 
investment in public infrastructure.
The principal reason for this is that private finance is more 
expensive than public finance. Table 2.1 shows the typical 
costs (defined as weighted average cost of capital: WACC) 
of different kinds of infrastructure finance as a percentage 
point uplift on direct public funding in the UK as of 2010.
Table 2.1: WACC for different infrastructure funding types 
Type of funding UK funding example
Indicative 
percentage 
point uplift for 
WACC
Public funding Flood defence 3.913%
Government 
supported
Network Rail (company limited 
by guarantee)
+0%–1.25%





Unitary charge as in Private 
Finance Initiative (where public 
sector takes demand risk)
+2.0%–3.75%
Unregulated 
markets – demand 
based
User pays, for example a 
concession (where the private 
sector takes the demand risk)
+3.5%–7.0%
Source: Infrastructure UK 2010: Table A.1
In principle, the uplifts are the perceived cost of the 
additional risk taken on by the private sector on behalf of 
the public sector. These can be seen in the greater uplifts 
for infrastructure where the private sector takes the 
demand-related risk for the use of the infrastructure 
facility. These are for AAA-rated government debt. Where 
the public authority is not AAA rated, then the cost of 
public funding will be higher and may tip the balance of 
advantage towards private funding for unregulated 
projects. One interesting inference from this table is that 
there may be value-for-money advantages in simply 
privatising the public agency within an appropriate 
regulatory environment rather than keeping the agency 
within the public sector and using private finance. A 
second inference is that the funding costs of finance that is 
based on unitary charges would appear to be anomalous 
because the public sector retains the demand risk in that 
case while the regulated utilities take the demand risk in 
regulated markets, yet interest rates are lower for the 
latter. It should be pointed out that, in theory, the public 
sector should be adding the same uplifts to its cost of 
capital because they are related to the risks of the project, 
not to the creditworthiness of the final user (Jenkinson 
2003). In practice, however, the government tends to act 
as a self-insurer and spreads its project risks.
In practice, the debate around value for money in the 
evaluation of privately financed projects has come down to 
a debate over the public sector comparator (PSC). The 
purpose of the PSC is to ensure that the use of private 
finance gives value for money compared with the use of 
public finance. This is done by calculating a notional cost 
of using public finance (the PSC) and comparing it with the 
private finance alternative (PFA). Given the higher cost of 
private capital, as shown in Table 2.1, the default case will 
always be that the public finance option is better value for 
money for a project that is viable in terms of its base case 
net present value (NPV). In order to achieve greater value 
for money for private finance, additional factors need to be 
taken into account in the calculation. The principal way in 
which this has been done is to calculate the NPV of the 
risk transferred to the private sector supplier compared 
with using traditional procurement, in a complex process 
that compounds the inherent issues in investment 
appraisal (Heald 2003; Broadbent et al. 2008; Coulson 
2008). 
There is a broad critique of this approach, which draws on 
the work of Keynes and Knight on uncertainty (Froud 
2003; Broadbent et al. 2008), which arguably is correct. 
The critique here, however, focuses on the argument that 
even within the terms of conventional appraisal techniques, 
the PSC approach is flawed. The usual presentation of the 
PSC against the PFA presents two-point estimates with the 
latter lower than the former owing to the value of the risk 
transferred. In fact, best practice is to use the central 
estimate complemented by a lowest (with 5% probability) 
possible and highest possible estimate – a technique 
known as three-point estimating. These three points can 
then be used to generate a probability distribution using 
Monte Carlo simulation (Partnerships Victoria 2003; 
Merna and Lamb 2009). It follows that there will be a 
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degree of overlap between the probability distributions for 
the PSC and PFA depending on the difference between the 
central estimates. Where the curves overlap, the PFA is 
more expensive than the PSC.  The closeness of many 
PFAs to PSCs – sometimes the difference is less than 1% 
(eg Froud 2003; Shaoul 2005; Khadaroo 2008) – suggests 
that this overlap will be quite large. In the case of the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) Main Building refurbishment 
(National Audit Office 2009b) the difference was 0.0001%, 
rendering the chance that the PSC would be less than the 
PFA at around 50%. In addition, adjustment to the PFA, 
outside the probability calculus, for the loss of public 
sector flexibility and for transaction costs that are 
identified by HM Treasury (2006) but not costed in the 
methodology would shift the PFA to the right, thereby 
increasing the probable size of the overlap.
The Special Purpose Vehicles’s (SPV’s) response to the 
probability of a worse-than-expected outcome is to provide 
a contingency in its estimates and, hence, in its bid for the 
project (the public sector client would also normally do 
this but the PSC methodology explicitly excludes doing so). 
In effect, the public sector client is buying an insurance 
policy from the SPV for the project – the price of the 
premium being the difference between the base cost and 
the unitary charges paid to SPV. The mechanism to ensure 
that this premium is not excessive is competition between 
the SPVs for the project, but this is problematic (National 
Audit Office 2007) as many invitations to tender only 
attract two bidders, and changes are often made to the 
PFA once a preferred bidder has been accepted. There is, 
therefore, a significant risk that the public sector is paying 
too high a premium for the risk transferred even though 
there does appear to be cumulative evidence that the 
privately financed projects do perform better in this 
respect than publicly financed ones (National Audit Office 
2009b, Raisbeck et al 2010). 
How high is this premium? A European Investment Bank 
(EIB) analysis (Blanc-Brude et al 2006) found that the cost 
at tender stage of DBFO roads was 24% per kilometre 
more than conventionally procured roads and that the bulk 
of this premium was the pricing of the project execution 
risk passed to the SPV. These figures are little different 
from those quoted for the overrun on publicly financed 
projects. Shaoul and her colleagues (2006) arrive at a 
figure of 25% by a different method and report (2008) a 
similar figure for hospitals. It is not clear why an 
arrangement which makes it certain that the public sector 
will pay the costs of the risks on the project (via the 
transfer premium) is better than one where it faces only 
the probability of paying for the risk event should it occur 
and where it could give itself the opportunity of improving 
its own performance to mitigate risk. If the EIB analysis is 
correct it suggests that the SPV is providing no additional 
risk-management capability; rather, it is simply being paid 
to take the hit of the risk event should it occur. If the 
analysis by Shaoul and her colleagues (2006) of the 
relatively high profitability of DBFO contracts is correct, 
the premium being paid for the risks transferred is far too 
high. 
PuBlIC vAlueS
Infrastructure projects inevitably bring values into 
confrontation with each other, and this is typically 
addressed through procedures for regulatory consent and 
stakeholder management (Winch 2010). Two debates have 
developed around the specific issue of private as opposed 
to public finance. One set of arguments aligns itself with 
the neo-classical position that public goods should be 
provided by the public sector, and that any movement of 
that provision to the private sector is a fundamental attack 
on the principle of public services. For instance, Shaoul 
(2005; 2009) argues, inter alia, that the private finance of 
hospitals:
transfers wealth to the private sector through the •	
unitary charge payments, rather than recycling it within 
the public sector 
achieves financial viability for the hospitals concerned •	
by changing the provision of services in the local 
healthcare economy.
uses discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques that are •	
inherently about profit maximisation rather than the 
effective delivery of public services. 
Arguably these criticisms are based on some 
misunderstandings, such as those outlined below. Public 
finance for capital investment is raised by taxes on, and 
loans from, the private sector and returns that wealth to 
the private sector as profits are made on the provision of 
the new facilities by supplier companies. Similarly, much of 
the running cost of the facility is spent with the private 
sector. Moreover, pension funds – and many of these are 
for public sector employees – are major players in the 
provision of private finance. For instance, the Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Plan has a significant investment in 
High Speed 1 (OTPP 2011) while the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) is also an active 
infrastructure fund investor (Page et al. 2008). 
Any major investment by a public sector agency will 
change the local economy that provides those services 
– for instance, a publicly financed hospital will be justified 
in part by the savings made by closing inefficient and 
poorly located services and such closures may face local 
opposition. The history of the NHS has long been one of 
centralism rather than localism and this is not inherent in 
the use of private finance rather than public finance. While 
it is true that discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques were 
developed for the valuation of stock options and then 
applied to capital budgeting, the basis of investment 
appraisal in the public sector is cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA), which attempts to value non-monetary costs and 
benefits to provide the income and outgoing flows before a 
DCF analysis is applied (Partnerships Victoria 2003). 
Cost-benefit analysis was developed by public sector 
engineers in France and the US specifically for public 
sector investment appraisal precisely so that public services 
(initially flood control) could be delivered effectively. The 
research presented here fully supports Shaoul’s 
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conclusion (2005) that it is important to ‘evaluate public 
policy decisions in terms of the distribution of resources to 
different social groups’. Nonetheless, as the discussion of 
the lighthouse problem by Coase (1974) shows, the public 
and private are deeply intertwined and we suggest that it 
is not possible in the contemporary capitalist economy to 
separate spheres of capital into public and private in a way 
that neo-classical economists suggest and that ‘taxpayers, 
workforce and patients’ are participants in the process, on 
both the public side, as users of public services, and on 
the private side, as savers through their pension funds. 
Moreover, any evaluation of infrastructure investment on 
the basis of need requires an investment appraisal method 
for choosing projects. CBA is certainly not without its faults 
(see Self 1970; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003 for trenchant 
critiques), but Shaoul does not suggest any alternative 
investment appraisal method. Those currently working on 
CBA (Vickerman 2008) are trying to include more social 
criteria in the investment appraisal. CBA was developed 
precisely because need should be the criterion for 
investment in public services, rather than lobbying by 
relatively powerful interest groups. More research into 
these issues is certainly needed; but arguably such 
research should be done without preconceptions about 
how public services should be financed.
The second set of issues concerns accountability for public 
expenditure and the argument that the commercial nature 
of private finance deals threatens accepted standards of 
public accountability (Asenova and Beck 2010; Forrer et al. 
2010). Accountability in the government domain can be 
broadly divided into the political and managerial 
(Broadbent and Laughlin 2003). Political accountability is 
derived from Burke’s notion that elected politicians are 
representatives not delegates and ‘deeply answerable’ for 
their actions at the ballot box. Managerial accountability is 
orientated towards process rather than outcomes; agents 
are expected to be answerable for their actions directly to 
principals. This is typically achieved through ensuring 
transparency in decisions so that those legitimately 
interested in and responsible for the conduct of public 
affairs can scrutinise how decisions led to actions. There 
appear to be two reasons for the diminished public 
scrutiny of private finance – the first is that commercial 
confidentiality is a legitimate ground for withholding 
information from the public and the second is that many 
SPVs are closed companies with minimal reporting 
obligations to Companies House (Shaoul et al. 2006).
Under such information constraints, the role of public 
audit bodies becomes more important. The UK’s National 
Audit Office (NAO) has come under some criticism for its 
lack of scrutiny of private finance deals (Pollock and Price 
2008) and its tendency to legitimate public policy 
(Broadbent and Laughlin 2003). Nonetheless, it can be 
argued in the NAO’s defence that it has been much more 
active than other national audit bodies, and that it has at 
times been publicly forthright, such as when its responsible 
officer described many value-for-money calculations as 
‘pseudo-scientific mumbo jumbo where financial 
modelling takes over from thinking’ (Financial Times 2002). 
It also operates on the widely accepted principles that 
managerial accountability should not trump political 
accountability and so the NAO should not criticise policy, only 
the execution of policy, and that it should favour innovation in 
public affairs. Within these constraints, since 1997 the NAO 
has produced the most authoritative body of research on 
the outcome of private finance policy, and this has provided 
the evidence base for the continual adjustment of policy by 
HM Treasury (National Audit Office 2009b).
ConCludIng ThoughTS
This analysis of the recent research literature on the use of 
private finance to solve the lighthouse problem over the 
last 20 years has concluded that additionality can be 
achieved only in very constrained circumstances where 
there is a large enough market for direct payment of tolls 
for the services rendered by the infrastructure. It further 
suggests that such markets are difficult to identify in 
developed countries, as shown by the Channel Fixed Link 
(Anguera 2006) and M6 toll (Campaign for Better 
Transport 2010) in the UK. Additionality is more likely to 
be of benefit in developing countries where typically the 
capital comes from outside the country and the economic 
stimulus is relatively larger. Value for money is difficult to 
establish convincingly, owing to the higher costs 
associated with private finance and the high premium 
payable for risk transfer, and there are important 
accountability issues around the commitments made to 
providers of private finance. As will be shown in Chapter 
13 of this report, about the UK, it is difficult to identify any 
net benefit from using private finance for public 
infrastructure over anything but the short term. 
Does this mean that neo-classical economists were correct, 
and that Coase’s example of Trinity House is merely 
idiosyncratic? In other words, should public goods be 
financed only by public finance? The problems here are the 
constraint on public borrowing due to the need to maintain 
the confidence of the private sector lenders and the constraint 
on public income because voters display little appetite for 
higher taxes. For nearly 30 years, the UK government has 
been attempting to ease these twin constraints by using 
private finance. While the use of user-pays concessions 
was only innovative in the UK context, the development of 
unitary-charge-funded infrastructure under the rubric of 
the Private Finance Initiative was an innovation of global 
importance which has diffused widely. The UK has 
undoubtedly acquired more infrastructure earlier by using 
private finance and this has stimulated economic growth. 
It has led, however, to something of an overhang of debt in 
the shape of commitments to unitary charges stretching 
some 30 years into the future and constraints on the 
flexibility of public bodies in using their infrastructure. It 
appears that much – but not all – of this investment was a 
form of pseudo-additionality facilitated by accounting rules 
and it remains difficult to identify many cases where, with 
hindsight, value for money was achieved by using private 
finance. This suggests that private finance tempted the UK 
into an overinvestment in infrastructure, particularly where 
that infrastructure was used for welfare such as in health. 
The search goes on for more appropriate forms of 
infrastructure funding.
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What are the impacts of accounting treatment on PPP •	
promotion? 
What are the lessons learned from experiences around •	
the world?
The cross-case analysis has been conducted according to 
the following steps. Firstly, as PPP encompasses too broad 
a range of concepts and institutional arrangements, it was 
judged unproductive to cover all classes of PPPs. This 
study, therefore, focuses on a specific class of PPPs – the 
private finance of public infrastructure as defined in 
Chapter 2. Secondly, drivers of PPP introduction and 
promotion in each country are carefully examined, 
revealing an interesting distinction between the developed 
countries and developing countries which is not identified 
clearly in the existing literature. Thirdly, the relevance of 
the difference in PPP drivers for policy and institutional 
development in each country is examined in terms of 
government’s role, typical project schemes, national 
governance of PPP, accounting treatment and value for 
money assessment. Finally, the lessons from the 
problematic or controversial cases are addressed. 
vArIeTy oF PPP deFInITIonS And The FoCuS oF ThIS 
STudy
Every country covered in the study was found to have 
promoted policies related to the concept of PPP, although 
PPP does not have a rigid definition commonly agreed 
round the world. Nevertheless, it seems to be common 
among many countries that the PPP concept broadly 
encompasses new methods of procuring infrastructures 
and public services with greater involvement of the private 
sector. 
According to Hodge and Greve (2007), the greatest divide 
is between those researchers who view PPPs as a tool of 
governance and those who think it is a ‘language game’ 
(Teisman and Klijn 2001; 2002). The former view is rather 
clear. The latter view means that the language of PPPs is a 
game designed to ‘cloud’ other strategies and purposes. 
Both views of PPPs are relevant to our study. Regarding 
PPP as a language game would imply that policymakers 
conveniently use it to blur their true intention and to 
manipulate their policies in favour of undisclosed 
objectives. This ‘language game’ view of PPP necessitates 
even more careful examination of the performance of PPP 
implementation based on the empirical studies. 
As there is no agreed definition of PPP, the definition below 
will be used for the purpose of this study. This definition 
follows the common view of PPP as an organisational and 
financial arrangement. For analytical purposes, this study 
focuses upon a specific type among various types of PPP 
defined by two dimensions. The first dimension is 
provision of service: who is responsible for provision of the 
final service to the nation? The second dimension is 
finance: who provides financial capital to develop 
infrastructures or public assets? Figure 1.1 in the Introduction 
(see page 7) shows the field of PPPs defined in this study. 
Under PPPs, services must be provided by the public 
InTroduCTIon
A number of countries are promoting policies to develop 
infrastructure and, thereby, to provide public services 
under the name of PPP. Extensive use of the term ‘PPP’ 
implies that these countries are expecting potential benefit 
from a new way of managing and governing organisations 
that produce public services. Yet history indicates that 
there has always been some degree of cooperation 
between the public sector and the private sector 
(Wettenhall 2003; 2005). In principle, PPP means the 
greater involvement of the private sector in public service 
provision with the aim of achieving value for money by 
making the most of the private sector’s resources and by 
exploiting its incentive towards profit despite its higher 
cost of capital. In practice, few, among not only 
policymakers but also academicians, agree on what a PPP 
actually is (Hodge and Greve 2007). In Chapter 2 the 
domain of the present research was carefully defined as 
the private finance of public infrastructure; the issues will 
be explored below in the variable terms used in the current 
debates.
Given the recent enthusiasm towards PPP widely observed 
around the world, it may be conjectured that there exists a 
shared interest between countries in this area. On the 
other hand, owing to the broadness of the PPP concept 
and the social and political context specific to each 
country, actual implementation practice can vary country 
by country. Our aim in the study is to identify the 
commonalities and the differences of PPP concept and 
implementation around the world. The collection edited by 
Hodge and Greve (2005) shares a common interest with 
the research presented here, in that they have tried 
drawing empirical lessons from the experiences taking 
place around the world going by the name of PPPs. Hodge 
and Greve (2005) edited a collection of papers on the 
experience of PPP in Western countries, reviewing the 
public welfare implications of PPP, and raising questions 
about longer-term value for money and democratic 
accountability. In contrast to their study, this study 
includes a total of 10 country cases – four from developed 
countries and six from rapidly developing Asia Pacific 
countries. As is seen in later chapters, the experiences of 
developing countries suggest that PPPs there may be 
different from those in developed countries. All those 
differences arise from differences in social, economic and 
political contexts. This study involved a careful 
examination of such country-specific contexts as they 
affect the implementation practice of PPPs, including legal 
framework arrangements, popular project types, and 
accounting treatment methods. To summarise, this chapter 
aims at answering the following questions.
What are the drivers of PPP promotion as a contextual •	
factor of policy development? What are their 
commonalities and the differences?
How do the contextual differences influence the shape •	
of PPP policy and implementation from the perspective 
of government’s role and the national institutional 
framework?
3. Cross-country case analysis 
Masamitsu Onishi and Graham Winch
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sector in the sense that the public sector is responsible for 
providing service against national requirements. Of course, 
the private sector company in effect provides an 
intermediate service. Even so, under the PPP scheme, the 
private sector is responsible for providing the intermediate 
service to the public sector under the PPP agreement with 
the government, while the final responsibility to the nation 
for providing public services remains with the government. 
The private sector’s responsibility is clearly defined in the 
contract between the public and the private sectors.
The other ingredient of the PPP concept focused upon in 
this study is finance. The specific focus is on the class of 
infrastructure projects where the whole or part of the 
financial capital invested in infrastructure comes from the 
private sector, whether the private sector – at state 
instigation – provides funds directly for a specific 
investment (project finance) or funds a portfolio of projects 
through a strategic partnership or an infrastructure 
investment bank. 
The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to crystallise the 
nature of private finance for public capital formation 
through a comparison of 10 country cases. Each country 
case is seen as a result of a huge-scale experiment of 
private finance endeavour. The comparative study 
identifies ideas of ‘what we share’ and ‘where we differ’ at 
a conceptual and implementation level by the buzz word 
‘PPP’. Thus the comparative study helps us to understand 
substantial factors for the success of private finance.
There are several names for project scheme types relevant 
to PPPs: PFI, DBFO (design–build–finance–operate) and 
BOT (build–operate–transfer), for example. Moreover, a 
certain name used for a project scheme in one country 
does not necessarily mean the same when used for a 
project scheme in another country. For example, the 
concept of PFI originated from UK. In the UK, PFI 
designates a specific contractual arrangement between 
public and private sector players, where the government 
reimburses the special project vehicle directly through the 
unitary charge as explored in Chapter 13. A PFI in Japan 
does not, however, necessarily mean a government-pays 
scheme such as those in the UK. In Japan, the term PFI is 
used more generically for a PPP that encompasses various 
new institutional and contractual arrangements between 
the public and the private sector. 
Even before the term PFI gained popularity around the 
world, the term BOT had become popular in South East 
Asian countries for what is called a ‘concession’ in UK and 
France, in that users pay the service fee under this scheme. 
These examples of variety in terminological definition 
suggest that simple comparisons of definitions between 
countries may be useless because the same word could be 
defined differently from one country to another. Therefore, 
apart from ad hoc use of those terms, we need a 
framework that enables different types of institutional and 
contractual arrangements around the world to be 
compared. This is why the term ‘private finance of public 
infrastructure’ is used in Chapter 2.
PPP drIverS: vAlue For money or AddITIonAlITy?
First of all, drivers of PPP introduction and promotion in 
each country were investigated. Drivers of PPP are a 
decisive factor for institutional arrangements in each 
country. One of the findings from the 10 country case 
studies is the fact that the major PPP driver is a gap 
between demands for infrastructure developments and 
governments’ ability to fund these developments. In other 
words, it may be that the recent enthusiasm towards PPP 
around the world commonly comes from the desire for 
additionality (as defined in Chapter 2) to the public 
funding ability. And this proposition is, we suggest, 
supported by the country cases that follow this chapter. 
This proposition may be controversial particularly in 
developed countries such as the UK, France and Japan, 
where the governments officially claim that the value-for-
money benefit justifies use of the PPP. 
Developed countries such as the UK, France and Japan 
have already reached a mature level in infrastructure 
development and public welfare services. At the same 
time, they are suffering from a heavy burden of public 
deficit and so fiscal reform is given top priority as national 
policy. At the same time, those developed countries are 
experiencing the emergence of an aging society where tax 
revenues are expected to decrease and social service 
expenditures, particularly for the medical and health 
sector, are expected to increase in the future. The 
budgetary imbalance eventually leads to a shortage of 
financial resources that governments can deploy for 
infrastructure development and public service provision. 
Each case from the developed countries exhibits evidence 
to support the additionality driver for PPP. In the UK, the 
number of private finance projects is very sensitive to the 
changes of rules that have an impact on the public sector 
net debt (PSND) constraint. The number of private finance 
projects soared when the Ryrie rules that privately 
financed projects should count against the PSND were 
fully relaxed in 1992. This does not imply that the value-
for-money criteria are irrelevant, but that the main driver 
has been additionality. 
The Japan case shows that the weaker growth trend in the 
number of private finance projects was observed when the 
obligation of payment for service provision to a contractor 
under the contract liability was counted as public debt 
following the adoption of a new accounting rule for local 
governments in 2008. The French case also implies that 
PPPs benefit from a considerable advantage in the context 
of budgetary constraint, as the Eurostat ESA 95 (European 
System of Accounts) does not count investments as public 
sector assets or register them on the public sector balance 
sheet if the private partner bears the construction risk and 
either the risk of availability or the risk linked to demand. 
Thus, the motive for PPP use in developed countries 
comes principally from a shortage of public funds for 
infrastructure investment. Nonetheless, voters may not 
appreciate being charged for public services for which 
governments have previously borne financial responsibility. 
For example, tolls for motorways in Britain are not 
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common, and there is popular resistance to the M6 toll. 
Another example of such resistance is the case of the Skye 
Bridge, where the concession scheme failed due to the 
political pressure against the toll charge for the bridge 
following devolution of responsibility to the Scottish 
Parliament. Owing to such political constraints in 
developed countries, a dominant type of PPP is the one 
whereby the government pays service fees to the private 
contractor in the form of a unitary charge. 
Although developing countries are as keen as developed 
countries to promote PPP for additionality reasons, the 
mechanism by which the funding gap arises in developing 
countries is different from that in developed countries. 
Developing countries experiencing rapid economic growth 
are facing strong needs for infrastructure and public 
services. Governments in these countries are not, however, 
able to procure enough finance to meet the demand for 
such infrastructure through tax impositions, because their 
national wealth is still at a low level. In countries enjoying a 
virtuous cycle of investment–growth–more private 
investment, people believe that investments in 
infrastructure will generate enough income through 
national economic development. That is different from the 
case in many developed countries, where the funding 
shortage comes from the PSND constraint. It implies a 
difference in the context of this urgent need for public 
services between developed countries with a mature level 
of infrastructure and with a heavy burden of fiscal deficit, 
and developing countries enjoying higher economic 
growth.
The clear distinction in the mechanism of a funding gap 
turns up in different institutional arrangements for private 
financing for public services. As pointed out above, the 
dominant scheme in developed countries is the 
‘government pays’ type. By contrast, the dominant scheme 
in developing countries is the ‘user pays’ type. As 
developing countries enjoy higher economic growth rates, 
it may be much easier to justify investments in 
infrastructure, even if the government decides to collect 
user charges. The ‘user pays’ type of PPP is dominant, 
therefore, in private financing for public infrastructure in 
those countries. 
As far as the countries covered in the study are concerned, 
Singapore is the only country where the government is not 
completely positive about promoting PPP. As was 
mentioned earlier, given the hypothesis that the motive for 
PPP promotion arises from the lack of resources in the 
public sector, Singapore exhibits quite interesting evidence 
to support the argument that a funding gap in the public 
sector finances will be a major driver of PPP. For the 
Singapore government, PPP is not an attractive option for 
infrastructure development as it has large capital reserves 
and typically a budget surplus. The need or ability to raise 
capital is a less pressing concern in Singapore than 
elsewhere. Although we see some experiences of PPP in 
Singapore, the use of PPP is of interest for Singapore only 
as a procurement method for seeking better value for 
money and, hence, is little used. 
The China case also supports the additionality proposition. 
This additionality driver has an explicit impact on the 
different attitudes towards promotion of PPP held by the 
central level of the government and those held at the local 
level. China is a capital surplus country, but these 
surpluses are retained at the national level. The local 
authorities are typically constrained in their ability to raise 
funds owing to their relative inability to impose taxes and, 
therefore, they are keener to promote PPP implementations 
than the central government is. This suggests that what 
drives local government to open up the infrastructure 
market to the private sector is the pressure of inadequate 
fiscal resources. 
A similar tendency is observed in Japan as well. Japan 
exhibits a unique system, similar to the infrastructure fund 
system, which enables the government to mobilise a huge 
scale of private capital. The Japanese government owns 
the postal service company, which also provides postal 
savings accounts. The postal service company of Japan is 
one of the largest financial institutions in the world in 
terms of the amount of capital it holds. As the Japanese 
government has the authority to decide where the postal 
deposits are to be invested, it developed the FILP (Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme) for developing national 
expressway networks and port terminals. A special 
accounting system was developed for these national 
expressway and port terminals, which was operated by the 
government agency. In principle, loans by the FILP have to 
be recovered by user fees but, in practice, the bond is 
backed by the government. Therefore, this system is 
regarded as one of the types of infrastructure fund in the 
sense that FILP’s credit was backed by the government. 
Overall, financing ability for infrastructure matters in any 
country, but how it matters is different in PSND 
constrained countries and non-PSND constrained 
countries. This clear distinction is a decisive factor in the 
shape of PPP implementation practice in each country. 
ConTexTuAl dIFFerenCeS And The role oF 
governmenT
The acquisition of durable assets requires financial capital 
for initial investment. The relevant questions are: 
Who supplies financial capital for infrastructure •	
investments (method of capital mobilisation)? 
How are the returns on the investment reimbursed to •	
financial capital suppliers (method of reimbursement)?
As discussed in the previous section, there is a clear 
distinction between developed countries and developing 
countries which has a contextual impact on financing 
arrangement for PPPs. Countries experiencing rapid 
economic growth confront immediate needs for 
constructing new infrastructure to enjoy further economic 
growth opportunities. In such countries, ‘user pays’ 
projects are predominant. Neo-classical economic theory 
implies, however, that large-scale initial investment for 
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public goods is not provided efficiently in the laissez-faire 
market – see Chapter 2. In addition, the setting of user 
charges for public services can be politically controversial. 
PPP projects in developing countries usually require 
government grant assistance to encourage the private 
sector to provide infrastructure and utilities, because the 
cash flow from user fees is generally insufficient to cover 
the initial investment as the level of fees chargeable to 
users is politically constrained. A scheme whereby all the 
capital is provided by the private sector may not be 
economically feasible. PPPs supported by government 
grant assistance are called VGF (viability gap funding) 
schemes in India and Modified BOT schemes in Indonesia. 
As well as budgetary grant assistance, there are several 
forms of governmental financial assistance for the private 
sector. One form of assistance is the provision of long-term 
debt to secure financial stability for PPP projects, which 
typically have long project terms. As such long-term debt 
is rarely provided by the private financial institutions, 
many countries have government-affiliated funds or banks 
that have been established solely for infrastructure 
developments and public service provisions. There are 
institutional arrangements in country cases such as the IIF 
(Indonesia Infrastructure Fund) in Indonesia, and IIFCL 
(India Infrastructure Finance Company Ltd) in India, which 
exist to maximise the ability to fund PPPs. Those long-term 
capital funds play a role in supplying additional liquidity to 
the private sector as well as in enhancing the credit status 
of projects. The government provides indirect support 
through such funds. For example, IIFCL in India enjoys tax 
exemption for issuing bonds.
The other form of government assistance method in 
developing countries is the government-affiliated fund 
established solely for credit enhancement of PPP-type 
projects, such as IIGF (Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee 
Fund) in Indonesia, and KICGF (Korea Infrastructure Credit 
Guarantee Fund) in South Korea. 
Such financial assistance does not necessarily come only 
from the government. In developing countries, multilateral 
development banks such as the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank play a similar role. The discipline of 
those players is rather complex as their decisions are 
influenced by the global diplomatic context. Support can 
also be given through land acquisition and free use of 
public land, as in Thailand, which has an impact equivalent 
to direct financial assistance. All those arrangements are 
provided as the minimum basis for making PPP projects 
economically viable. 
These government assistance arrangements imply two 
roles for governments. In financing infrastructure, 
governments have not only an ability to provide capital for 
investments (credit supply) but also an ability to bear 
project risks that could be a source of disincentives to 
private sector participation (credit enhancement). 
Developing countries tend to have insufficient liquidity to 
meet their growing demand for infrastructure. But they 
have an ability to provide reasonably priced insurance 
services, at least in comparison with those available in the 
private market. Guarantee funds observed in South Korea 
and Indonesia play an important role in providing 
incentives for private participation in infrastructure 
projects by taking project risks away from the private 
sector.
nATIonAl governAnCe FrAmeWork oF PPP 
PolICIeS
Policy development and improvement
The national governance framework is important as it has 
a significant impact on PPP policy development. Greater 
clarity is required in articulating the interest groups at 
play, the extent of their influence, and the payoffs (Hodge 
and Greve 2007). A specific single unit is responsible for 
national PPP policy development in most of the countries 
other than Thailand and China, though some of them are 
very new (eg 3PU in Malaysia, formed in 2009). Countries 
with special organisational units for PPP policy are more 
likely to adopt a top-down approach for PPPs across 
government, and experience a need for clearer separation 
of policy advocacy from the stewardship responsibilities 
for public funds. Countries that lack such organisational 
units tend to have a bottom-up approach to PPPs with 
room for greater local experimentation (Hodge and Greve 
2007). 
Another important organisational arrangement is an 
independent unit or agency responsible for evaluating PPP 
implementations. Such an evaluation unit can play an 
important role in improving PPP policies. Every country 
has some kind of auditing unit for government accounts. 
Countries where such auditors require rigid business cases 
based on the value-for-money criterion – particularly the 
PSND constrained countries – are more likely to invest 
money in the evaluation of PPP policies and 
implementations. Conversely, countries where the value-
for-money criterion is less emphasised are likely to be 
reluctant to provide resources for assessment works. This 
is discussed further in the French case in Chapter 5.
Although this research did not investigate directly how 
much resource was invested in evaluation activities, the 
richness in both quality and volume of the reports of the 
National Audit Office (NAO) in the UK is exemplary. As the 
UK is championing the contemporary private finance 
model, the NAO plays an important role as a knowledge 
centre for PPP policy globally and this has influenced 
private finance policy around the world. Many of the most 
relevant reports are cited in Chapter 13 on the UK. 
Nonetheless, evaluation reports can be vulnerable to 
manipulation to render them consistent with ideological 
policies. The cases of the UK and Japan show that reports 
on value-for-money assessment confront persistent 
critiques arising from this suspicion of manipulation. 
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Accounting treatment
Given that PPP is an enabler of additionality to public 
finances, as defined in Chapter 2, accounting treatment is 
likely to have a greater impact on the attractiveness of 
PPPs in the PSND-constrained countries because it 
determines the border between what is on and off the 
public balance sheet. The evidence from the country cases 
is that accounting treatment is not a subject of national 
debate in non-PSND constrained countries.
In European countries, adopting ESA 95 is mandatory. This 
provides a risk-based criterion for determining whether an 
asset procured by PPP is on the public balance sheet or 
not. Investments are not counted as public sector assets or 
registered on the public sector balance sheet if the private 
partner bears the construction risks and either the risk of 
availability or the risk linked to demand. Recent 
international pressure to adopt the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) brings a more severe control 
test into the assessment of whether an asset is on or off 
the balance sheet. Expansion of private finance for public 
infrastructure started in UK, when the Ryrie rules under 
which private finance counted against the PSND were 
abolished. The generally agreed accounting principles 
(GAAP), which adopt a risk test for inclusion of an asset on 
a public balance sheet, supported the rapid expansion of 
private finance after 1992. The UK government’s current 
position seems to be ambivalent by claiming that 
accounting treatment is not the same as statistical 
treatment (NAO 2009). It has therefore adopted the IFRS 
as an accounting treatment rule and ESA 95 as a statistical 
rule. 
The PSND-constrained countries in Asia, such as Japan 
and South Korea, are confronting a similar dilemma to that 
faced by European countries. Japan implemented a 
standardised accounting rule for local governments in 
2008 in which a long-term commitment to payment by 
local governments under PPP is included in the PSND. But 
the commitment does not necessarily apply to central 
government and to the government-affiliated organisations 
such as national university agencies. In addition, whether 
or not all local governments are implementing the 
standardised method is uncertain. Overall, lack of clarity in 
accounting treatment seems to remain in the PSND-
constrained countries, which could threaten PPP 
promotion in the future. 
The issue of the accounting treatment of PPP projects is 
much more relevant in developed countries where a lack of 
funds for meeting public service demands arises from the 
pressure towards fiscal reform. In short, whether the 
government’s commitment to long-term payment to the 
private sector and guarantee for credit enhancement are 
deemed to be within the PSND or not is a critical factor in 
determining that government’s incentive for employing 
private finance for public infrastructure provision. 
vAlue For money ASSeSSmenT 
The difference between the motives for PPP promotion in 
developed countries and those in developing countries has 
a substantial impact on the significance of the value-for-
money assessment. In the UK and Japan, the government 
must assure stakeholders that PPP is the best option for 
procurement in terms of value for money. The value for 
money of PPP is defined as the expected reduction of 
life-cycle cost and the risk transferred. To ensure that PPP 
is the best option, an assessment of value for money is 
mandatory in the business case appraisal. Value for money 
is evaluated by comparing a public sector comparator 
(PSC) against a private finance alternative (PFA). Because 
there is no official statement that PPP adoption is allowed 
in order to relax the PSND constraint, value for money is, 
in effect, the only official reason for justifying PPP 
adoption.
Reports of ex-post value-for-money assessment are 
regarded as suspicious by many professionals in the 
PSND-constrained countries. In Japan, ex-post evaluation 
reports of value for money have shown a manifest cost 
saving on the basis of which the government has claimed 
the success of PPP for the decade. But there is a 
persistent view that this cost saving was an effect of 
abandoning collusive bidding, which had been the 
traditional business custom of the construction industry in 
Japan (Reeves 2002). In the UK, NAO reports support the 
view that PFI is expensive compared with conventional 
procurement methods in terms of cost of capital, flexibility 
and transaction costs. Also the critique claiming that the 
positive reports were generated by the limited group of 
accounting firms making profit by promoting PPP is 
persuasive – see Chapter 13 for details. This implies that 
we need to be careful to understand the validity of auditing 
reports by allowing for the political background of PPP 
policy developments. 
For the countries where the merit of additionality rather 
than economic efficiency is regarded as most important, 
the assessment of value for money is not stressed. For 
governments of developing countries such as Indonesia, 
raising sufficient public funds to satisfy the growing 
demand for infrastructure is not realistic. Therefore, 
assessments of value for money done in developed 
countries is not applicable to the developing countries 
context. 
Value for money is not a relevant argument in developing 
countries because governments are more concerned with 
meeting the growing demand for infrastructure rather than 
the efficiency of its construction and operation. Countries 
that have not developed any guidelines for value for money 
assessment include China, India, and Indonesia. Although 
the Malaysian government has defined value for money in 
PPP, it has yet to come up with a formal and detailed 
mechanism for determining it. Value for money 
assessment is an issue in national accountability for public 
decisions, which is associated with the national political 
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system. The China case suggests that in a centralised 
authority regime where national policy is paramount, 
government officials have a strong influence on the 
preliminary evaluation process, but civil society, including 
professionals and academics, does not.
leSSonS leArned From FAIlure CASeS
dysfunctions of risk transfer 
Government participation is almost always essential to 
make a project economically viable in developing 
countries, but experience in the country cases shows that 
risk allocation between the government and the private 
sector is one of the key factors for the success of PPP 
projects. Many countries demonstrate poor practice in that 
the public sector takes on an excessive burden of risk, 
particularly at the early stage of PPP application. For 
example, in China, foreign investors would usually request 
a guarantee of a fixed or at least minimum return, but this 
guarantee reduces the motivation of these investors to 
improve operational management. In South Korea’s case, 
although the Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) played a 
significant role in attracting private capital for 
infrastructure development, it caused a serious moral 
hazard problem in the business case. Because the private 
companies are always subsidised by the government when 
they make a deficit, competitive bidders base their bids on 
excessively high demand forecasts in order to make them 
viable. Eventually, the government’s growing financial 
burden triggered criticism from civic groups, and MRG was 
abolished in 2006.
Dysfunctions of risk transfer can stem not only from 
contract arrangements but also from institutional 
arrangements. In Malaysia’s case, the funding of PFI 
projects comes from the government-owned pension fund 
and a government-linked bank, suggesting that the 
Malaysian private sector does not bear any credit risk for 
projects under the PPP scheme. In reality this is not 
private finance, but public finance. In China, during the 
second PPP boom period at the start of the 21st century, 
the major players in the PPP market were state-owned 
enterprises which have been criticised for their relatively 
low operational and managerial efficiency, which largely 
eliminates the advantages of PPP model (Ke et al. 2009). 
But in the case of China, state-owned enterprises have a 
definite advantage against foreign enterprises in that they 
can handle country-level risks such as political and legal 
risks. 
Table 3.1: Summary of two types of additionality-
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Application areas Hospitals, schools, 
prisons, roads
Roads, water treatment 
and disposal, electric 
power
VFM assessment Likely to be strict Unlikely to be strict, or 
ignored 
Table 3.1 summarises our review of the country cases so 
far. Singapore is excluded from the table as it is a non-
PSND-constrained country with a high capability for public 
fund raising. Singapore is purely interested in the value for 
money benefit of PPPs rather than additionality, but in 
practice is not at all active in promoting PPPs. We suggest 
that these two points are linked, as value for money is 
difficult to identify with private finance. These findings 
suggest that what is called PPP may not be pure private 
finance because PPP projects are in effect guaranteed by 
the government. Although it should be acknowledged that 
this is somewhat different from the typical private 
financing model in terms of appropriate risk transfer to the 
private sector, it cannot be asserted that this scheme is 
actually not good practice. The fact of the existence of 
government-backed schemes under the name of PPP itself 
is symptomatic of the inherent disadvantages of private 
finance – interest rate premia and transaction costs – and 
the advantages of public finance as shown in Table 2.1. 
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Sectors of application
The UK has a wide variety of PPP application sectors, and 
its experience includes failure cases, which are highly likely 
to occur in other countries as well. The UK experience 
shows that the performance of ‘government pays’ (ie PFI) 
type PPP varies from sector to sector. One typical case 
that has been regarded as a failure is that of PPPs for 
information technology, where the basis of a contract 
needs to be easy to change owing to rapid technological 
change. Hospital cases in UK face difficulty in the flexibility 
of their PPP contracts, which lock the hospitals into 
relatively high facility management (FM) costs in areas 
such as building maintenance. In Japan, where a major 
part of PPP projects are focusing on FM, the opinion is 
growing that value for money – particularly in terms of cost 
saving – is rarely achieved because there is less potential 
for technological innovation in FM than in IT. To 
summarise, sectors where the contractual basis needs to 
be easily changed, and the major focus is FM with less 
technological innovation, conditions are likely to be difficult 
for PPP. 
ConCludIng ThoughTS
The country cases, including both developed and 
developing countries, show that:
additionality to public-funded investment is the •	
principal motivation for PPP use and it is common to 
all countries
whether the government is constrained by the PSND •	
constraint is a decisive factor of the contexts that 
influence the shape of PPP policy and implementation.
In developed countries where extensive and sophisticated 
infrastructures are already in place, the growth rate of the 
economy is typically lower than in developing countries. 
This implies that the marginal return of investments in 
infrastructure for the government is relatively less 
compared with that for developing countries. Even so, 
infrastructure is still essential for securing the national 
wealth and vitalising the national economy. In particular, 
infrastructure development, in the context of growing 
international competition, is a key component of national 
strategies for global competitive advantage. 
PPP use in the developed countries seems to raise a deep 
question of infrastructure financing. Every PPP-promoting 
country around the world has enjoyed the benefit of 
additionality to public funds. PPP has apparently played a 
role in expanding the public sector’s capacity to raise 
funds for acquiring public assets. Therefore, the PSND-
constrained countries are using PPPs as a ‘mega-credit 
card’ with which to pay for infrastructure deals (Hodge and 
Greve 2007). Just as with a credit card, however, the 
interest rates have been relatively high and at some point 
the debts have to be paid off.
Despite the attractions of the additionality benefit, no 
theoretical foundation to justify PPP use based on this 
seems to have been proposed so far. Generally, the PSND 
is politically constrained in order to discipline the public 
budget. Official acknowledgement of the additionality 
benefit may cause a dilemma, because once the 
government admits it, the PSND limit does not make 
sense. On the other hand, it becomes difficult for national 
governments to ignore the pressure for IFRS adoption. 
Global attitudes toward IFRS adoption in the future will 
have a strong impact on the future attractiveness of 
private finance schemes in the PSND-constrained 
countries.
By contrast, the non-PSND constrained countries are 
enjoying the additionality benefit with less constraint and it 
does not create controversy, even without rigid justification 
processes for the use of private finance. Those countries 
are less likely to implement value-for-money assessment 
criteria in making comparisons with traditional 
infrastructure procurement methods. A critical difference 
from developed countries is that developing countries have 
difficulty in funding infrastructures in their own right 
through traditional procurement. Therefore, private finance 
is the only way to acquire national infrastructure to 
support economic growth. One of the most significant 
initiatives common among developing countries is the 
establishment of special funds for the sole purpose of 
developing infrastructure. Financial assistance from those 
government-affiliated funds plays a role in supplying 
liquidity as well as reducing the credit risk borne by the 
private sector. It can be called the ‘leverage effect’ of the 
governmental fund. Overall, countries enjoying higher 
economic growth rates will tend to find the use of private 
finance sustainable because affordability issues will only 
exist in the short term and so it will remain a key policy of 
national development. 
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InTroduCTIon
China’s experience with adopting the privately financed 
procurement of public service facilities originated in the 
urbanisation process and the tremendous economic 
growth that created the huge demand for infrastructure 
such as roads, ports and power generation facilities. At the 
same time, supplementary investment from the private 
sector was encouraged because of the government’s 
budget concern. Public private partnership (PPP) 
implementation is driven by demand in this fast-
developing country but there is a lack of clear regulatory 
definitions, a legislative framework and value-for-money 
(VFM) evaluation systems.
The nATIonAl deBATe on PPP
Generally speaking, PPP is identified as an innovative tool 
for financing major infrastructure projects and has a huge 
potential for the future. PPP financing models, attracting 
foreign and private capital in the development of 
infrastructure facilities, are welcome by the Chinese 
government, especially by local government. PPP is not, 
however, a panacea or a ‘quick fix’ solution for delivering 
project financing and realisation. The debate lies in 
whether the adoption of PPP would authorise private 
investors to charge a premium for providing a public 
service that used to be free under traditional procurement 
methods (Wang 2006). PPP projects often require 
extensive expertise input, have high preliminary cost, and 
require lengthy deal negotiation, which may not offer a 
good return to all parties and, as a result, the deal may not 
materialise in the beginning or may fail in the end (Chan et 
al. 2010). Private sector consortia may not be experienced 
enough and financially capable of taking up the 
infrastructure projects owing to a lack of relevant skills and 
experience (Ke et al. 2009a). More importantly, the 
adoption of PPP has put the legislative framework under 
pressure. In China, the PPP regulatory system, including 
cost auditing, tariff regulation, and definition of scope of 
responsibility and remit of relevant regulatory agencies, 
has not been set up in time. This has led to a great deal of 
resistance from the conservative wing of the government 
and has slowed down some of the key reform projects 
(Zhang 2009).
The relATIonShIP BeTWeen PrIvATISATIon PolICy 
And PPP
The Chinese government has adopted piecemeal and 
multiple approaches to privatising its state-owned 
enterprises, such as privatisation by share issue, sales to 
outsiders, joint ventures with foreign firms, and 
management buy outs (Guo et al. 2008). Privatisation 
started in the 1980s at local government level, even 
though it was not officially encouraged by the central 
government at that time. Large-scale privatisation began in 
the 1990s, when many state-owned enterprises were 
deeply in debt. The Chinese Communist Party’s 15th 
Congress in 1997 gave a green light to privatising state-
owned enterprises nationwide; local governments were 
granted ownership of state-owned enterprises and were 
allowed to sell these assets (Gan 2009). Privatisation is 
usually carried out as part of the reform of state-owned 
enterprises or assets with the objective of improving their 
productivity and efficiency. In the construction and 
operation of infrastructure, private participation is allowed 
and encouraged in order to reduce pressure on the 
government’s budget but there is no literature, to the best 
of the authors’ knowledge, that shows that the Chinese 
government has privatised any infrastructure project. 
Since the legal and institutional framework for privatisation 
and PPP are only partially in place (Guo et al. 2008; Ke et 
al. 2009a) and, more importantly, since these two reform 
methods have been introduced with different objectives 
and in different areas, there is only limited a relationship 
between privatisation and PPP policies.
ForeIgn InFluenCe on The nATIonAl deBATe
The first boom phase of private participation in 
infrastructure development in China began in the 1990s. 
Foreign investors were the major players during this period 
and they usually charged higher fees and preferred 
operating projects in the more developed regions of China. 
Therefore, in the 1990s, even in the state-approved pilot 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects such as the Laibin B 
power plant, the Chinese government took over too many 
risks owing to the lack of BOT experience (Wang and Ke 
2009). Most foreign investors would usually request a 
guarantee of a fixed or even minimum return. This 
guarantee would reduce the motivation for foreign 
investors to improve the operational management. To solve 
this problem the General Office of the State Council issued, 
on 24 October 2002, the ‘Notice on Relevant Issues 
Concerning the Appropriate Handling of the Existing 
Projects Guaranteeing the Fixed Return of Investments by 
Foreign Parties’. Thereafter, existing projects with an 
agreed fixed rate of return from local government were 
forced to be handled by modifying relevant contracts, 
selling shares to local government, transferring projects 
back to local government or even terminating contracts 
taking into account the particulars of the project 
concerned (Wang 2006). In these cases, the Chinese 
government was accused of breaking its written promise in 
the concession agreements. This experience during the 
first phase of PPP in China led foreign investors to lose 
confidence in the Chinese government. Domestic state-
owned enterprises are now the principal players in the 
second boom phase of PPP in China which began at the 
start of the 21stcentury.
hISTory oF PPP evoluTIon
As mentioned above, the PPP approach was adopted to 
relieve the pressure on the government’s budget for 
infrastructure development. It was first introduced, for 
example, in the Shajiao B power plant, and developed by 
local governments in the mid-1980s around the same time 
as the privatisation process began. After 1996, several 
state-approved pilot BOT projects were awarded in order 
to promote BOT on a larger scale, such as the Laibin B 
power project and the Chengdu No. 6 water project. Since 
then, the involvement of private investors in infrastructure 
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development has shown dynamic growth. At the end of the 
1990s, responding to the adverse influence of the Asia 
financial crisis, the central government invested large 
amounts of treasury bonds in infrastructure projects, and 
was determined to clean up the unregulated or illegal 
projects that had led to the end of the first phase of the 
private investment boom (Shen et al. 2005). During the 
turn of the 21st century, infrastructure shortages limited 
economic growth and at the same time imposed great 
budgetary pressure on the Chinese government. As a 
result, the second boom phase of private investment has 
appeared to participate in infrastructure development.
Apart from the change in the key players in the provision 
of PPP as explained earlier, the major change in the 
evolution of PPP from the first to the second phase was 
the improvement of the PPP legal framework. The Chinese 
government’s current view is that it should encourage and 
support private investors to participate in infrastructure 
development and public service supply, to promulgate 
progressively a number of regulations for private 
investment in public utilities, to adopt international 
contractual practices and to work out an equitable risk-
sharing scheme (Ke et al. 2009a).
Table 4.1 lists the documents issued by the central 
government for promoting and guiding the private 
investment through PPP. These reflect several 
improvements with regard to PPP implementation, in 
enlarging the group of PPP key players from solely 
foreigners to all investors, widening the PPP implementation 
concession from the previous BOT model, and providing 
more operation procedures. In particular, the ‘Several 
Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging and Guiding 
the Healthy Development of Private Investment’ issued in 
May 2010 further widened the scope for private 
investment, including railway, water conservancy, 
petroleum gas, telecommunication, land control, 
exploration and development of mineral resources, 
national defence and technology industries, policy-related 
housing, medical and health industries, and education and 
welfare services. Private enterprises are also allowed to 
establish financial institutions and participate in the 
reform of state-owned enterprises. These new Opinions 
will no doubt further promote the use of PPP.
Nonetheless, the opinions, notices and decisions listed in 
Table 4.1 are considered to lack a strong legal force, which 
may be a potential risk where they conflict with existing 
laws and regulations such as those regarding public land 
ownership. Some of the earlier documents issued by the 
State Council and various ministries take into account 
mainly their own responsibilities and are therefore incomplete. 
Furthermore, a myriad of regulatory procedures and charges 
at municipal, provincial and national levels affect the 
promotion of PPP, especially during swings in macroeconomic 
control measures. The State Development and Reform 
Commission (SDRC) completed a feasibility study on PPP 
legislation in May 2008 and drafted PPP legislation in 
infrastructure development, taking into account previous 
PPP practices. The draft legislation was submitted in May 
2010 (State Development and Reform Commission 2010).
Table 4.1: Central government documents related to PPPs 
in China
Year Document title
1994 Local administrative measures on the concession of 
municipal public utilities in Huherhaote and Hainan
1995 Circular concerning the issues of absorbing foreign 
investment through BOT
1995 Circular concerning the issues of the approval and 
administration of experimental foreign-invested concession 
projects
2000 Temporary provisions of the Ministry of Construction on 
utilizing foreign capital in municipality public utilities
2001 Several opinions of the State Development and Reform 
Commission concerning the promotion and guidance of 
private investment
2001 Local administrative measures on the concession of 
municipal public utilities in Jilin and Dalian
2002 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the 
relevant issues concerning the appropriate handling of the 
existing projects guaranteeing the fixed return from 
investments by foreign parties
2002 Opinions of the Ministry of Construction on accelerating the 
marketization of urban utilities 
2003 Local administrative measures on the concession of 
municipal public utilities in Beijing, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Hebei, 
Chengdu, etc
2004 Administrative measures on the concession of municipal 
public utilities
2004 Decision of the state council on reforming the investment 
system
2004 Sample document for the franchised operation of urban 
water supply, gas supply and waste disposal
2004 Local administrative measures on the concession of 
municipal public utilities in Ji’nan, Guizhou, Shanxi, Xuzhou, 
etc
2005 Several opinions of the State Council on encouraging, 
supporting and guiding the development of individual and 
private economy and other non-public sectors of the 
economy
2005 Local administrative measures on the concession of 
municipal public utilities in Tianjin, Dongguan, Gansu, 
Qingdao, Xinjiang, etc.
2006 Sample document for the franchised operation of urban 
heat supply and waste-water disposal
2006 Local administrative measures on the concession of 
municipal public utilities in Hu’nan, Shanxi, Hefei, Wuhan, 
Shenzhen, Beijing, etc.
2007 Local administrative measures on the concession of 
municipal public utilities in Shanghai (draft)
2008 Research reports of PPP legislation in infrastructure 
development
2010 Draft of PPP legislation by SDRC (unpublished)
2010 Several opinions of the State Council on encouraging and 
guiding the healthy development of private investment
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InSTITuTIonS And CAPABIlITy oF The PPP mArkeT
Figure 4.1 illustrates the numbers of PPP projects each 
year in China according to the World Bank PFI database 
and clearly shows the two booming phases of private 
investment in Chinese infrastructure projects. China’s 
infrastructure market has been opened to private investors 
except for some special sectors such as important 
railways, ports and airports. The greatest opportunities 
have been seen in toll roads and municipal utilities, 
including water, power, environment and city gas. The 
investment responsibility for the sectors with the greatest 
opportunities are undertaken by local governments while 
the central government is responsible for key railway 
projects and other special sectors. This observation shows 
that the local government level is more suited to promoting 
PPP implementation than is central government. The most 
important incentive for local governments to open the 
infrastructure market to private investors is the pressure of 
inadequate fiscal resources (Chan et al. 2009). 
Figure 4.1: Private investment in infrastructure 
development in China (World Bank 2009)
There are three typical potential players in the PPP 
market: foreign enterprises, state-owned or holding 
enterprises, and domestic private enterprises. As 
mentioned earlier, foreign investors, the major players 
during the first phase, usually charged more than 
domestic investors and preferred operating projects in 
more developed regions, while state-owned enterprises, as 
the principle players during the second phase, had 
relatively low operation and management efficiency, which 
largely restrained the advantages of the PPP model (Ke et 
al. 2009b). Foreign enterprises may be the more efficient 
in operation and management but are the least familiar 
with Chinese culture. State-owned enterprises have the 
strongest relationship with the government and the best 
understanding of political and legal risks. At present, 
state-owned and state-holding enterprises have the major 
market share in most infrastructure sectors, such as water, 
solid waste disposal, city gas, toll roads, power, urban 
railways, intercity railways, ports and airports, while 
domestic private enterprises and foreign investors are only 
active in certain sectors but with smaller market share, 
such as water, city gas, and toll roads, which have 
appreciable revenues.
There are a few domestic enterprises that have ventured 
into foreign countries via the PPP model. The first BOT 
project implemented by a Chinese enterprise was a power 
plant contract signed in the early 2000s in Cambodia 
which has not, however, been very successful from the 
lender’s viewpoint. The first BOT project implemented by a 
Chinese enterprise in a foreign country and regarded as 
successful was a power plant contract in Indonesia signed 
in 2003. In recent years, more and more Chinese 
enterprises have become interested in venturing into 
foreign infrastructure development through PPP. For 
example, some state-owned companies are preparing to 
tender for overseas high-speed railway projects and one 
company was awarded a project in Laos in 2010. There is 
still a long way to go for Chinese enterprises to be 
successful in PPP infrastructure development in foreign 
countries, in particular because they have not gained 
sufficient expertise and experience in doing such projects 
in countries where the legal, financial, social, and culture 
systems are totally different from those in China.
Although there is no specific government programme to 
support PPP activities, the Chinese government has issued 
related regulations on promoting private investment and 
improving conditions in the financial market. On 
9 November 2008, the Chinese government announced a 
relaxation of credit conditions, a reduction in taxes and the 
start of a massive infrastructure spending programme, in a 
wide-ranging effort to offset adverse global economic 
conditions by boosting domestic demand (Chinese 
Government 2008). Out of the 4 trillion RMB stimulus plan 
as announced by the Chinese government, only 1.18 
trillion RMB was to come from central government and the 
rest would have to be topped up by either city 
governments and/or the private sector (State Development 
and Reform Commission 2009). This might provide a great 
opportunity for private investment as most local 
governments still suffer from severe budget pressure, 
especially as the central government is now trying to cool 
down the overheated real estate sector, which will further 
reduce the local government’s income from selling land.
emergIng modelS
There are significant differences between the PPP business 
models in different sectors because of financial self-
liquidating ratios, operating processes and other project 
characteristics.
In the water sector, the difference between sewage 
treatment and water supply is the financial self-liquidating 































































































cannot be covered by the waste-water tariff collected, but 
the tariff for water supply would usually be able to offer an 
appreciable return to the investors. Therefore, most water 
supply plants in China adopt the model of so-called 
‘Plant-pipeline bundle’ which means that the water 
companies collect a tariff from end-users. Local 
governments usually procure the sewage treatment plants 
by means of BOT or transfer-operate-transfer (TOT), and 
leave investment in and operation of the waste-water 
pipeline network to the government. Sewage treatment 
companies usually collect fees from local governments 
according to their treatment volume, irrespective of how 
much the government charges the end-users of waste-
water treatments.
BOT is the most popular model for toll roads, where 
private investors directly collect the tariff from users. This 
‘user pays’ mechanism means that operators of toll roads 
in China carry the risk of traffic volume and of toll revenue. 
The tariff is regulated by the provincial authority for road 
transportation and should be adjusted according to the 
operation cost. In most past cases, however, there has 
been a failure to adjust the tariff according to the 
concession agreement (Zhang 2009). There are also many 
projects in which the returns of investment are 
unreasonably high owing to unfair concession agreements 
signed by local governments. As a result, the central 
government decided in June 2011 to investigate all toll 
road projects and regulate, if necessary, unreasonable 
concessions. In addition, joint ventures between public and 
private sectors are rarely observed in toll road projects.
In the railway sector, the most critical issues are the lower 
project financial self-liquidating ratio and unclear 
subsidiary and profit mechanisms. These issues make 
private participation much more difficult, except in the 
case of some dedicated lines with independent tariff 
settlements. The Ministry of Railways unlike other 
ministries has avoided the popular reform. The railway 
sector is the least open to private investors. The same 
difficulties have been seen in urban railway development. 
Huge investment requirements and the imposition of low 
fares owing to public welfare concerns greatly reduce the 
possibility for private investors to obtain a reasonable 
financial return from the construction and operation of 
railways. Some pilot projects, such as the Beijing Metro 
Line 4 and Shenzhen Metro Line 4, have encountered 
troubles and the city governments have had to subsidise 
them with a large sum of money, even though Hong Kong 
MTR Company’s expertise has been introduced. Under 
current Chinese land law, local governments are not 
allowed to grant the land around subway stations to the 
investors without competitive tendering. Hence, the 
integration of land use and transportation development 
could not be achieved. This should have provided a large 
amount of floor space to support a higher intensity of 
urban activities and in turn increased the ridership of the 
transit railways. More importantly, the integration could 
also have allowed the investors to gain profit from real 
estate development so as to compensate partially for the 
construction cost. 
In light of the current legal framework, two common 
business models are adopted, i.e. ‘subsidise in build-
operate-transfer’ (SBOT) and ‘build-subsidise in operation-
transfer’ (BSOT). In a SBOT project, the government would 
be responsible for subsidising the construction work, while 
in a BSOT project, the government would provide a 
subsidy during the operation period. The key to these two 
solutions is the improvement of the financial self-
liquidating ratio by the government by undertaking part of 
the cost or providing part of the revenue.
Municipal solid waste treatment is a sector without a 
polluter-pays system or is just about to introduce a 
polluter-pays system in China, and thus it relies 
traditionally on governmental fiscal input. For the private 
investment procurement, a BOT model is usually adopted. 
As with waste-water treatment plants, project companies 
obtain their service tariff from local governments rather 
than from end-users. This means investors in a solid waste 
treatment plant find it easier to collect fees but may face 
directly the default risk of local governments.
The revenue of a city gas project consists of the connection 
charge and commodity charge, where the connection 
charge is applicable when a user applies for access to the 
pipeline network, and the commodity tariff means the 
price of gas throughput on the transmission network. The 
connection charge was first introduced in Guangdong at the 
end of 2006 (Zhang 2009) but its legality is controversial. 
Nonetheless, given the lack of governmental fiscal support 
for the construction of a pipeline network, it may be 
reasonable and necessary to charge for connection.
relevAnT orgAnIzATIonS For nATIonAl PPP 
governAnCe
As presented in Table 4.1, the State Council, State 
Development and Reform Commission (SDRC) and the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
(MoHURD) (formerly the Ministry of Construction) have 
issued several regulations and related documents on PPP. 
Provincial governments have also issued some guidance. 
There is no organisation at national level in China 
specifically responsible for PPP projects, such as 
Partnerships UK or the National Council for Public Private 
Partnerships in the US. Most PPP projects are usually 
managed at provincial or municipal level, provided that 
they follow sector ministries’ guidelines or regulations. To 
explain the different government agencies involved in a 
PPP project, the following section takes the Chengdu No. 6 
Water Plant as an example to illustrate the approval and 
registration processes. For more detailed information on 
the government agencies involved in the Chengdu No. 6 
Water Plant, please refer to Chen (2009).
The Chengdu No. 6 Water Plant is a pilot BOT project 
promoted by central government and, thus, has received 
attention and strong support from the central government 
from the very beginning. The State Planning Commission 
(now the SDRC) and the State Administrative Bureau of 
Foreign Exchange provided letters of support. Chengdu 
Municipal Government (CMG) strongly supported the 
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project and took on the responsibility for obtaining the 
required approvals from the central government before the 
bidding stage. A BOT Coordinating Committee, made up of 
officials from different bureaus and departments from the 
CMG, was established to assist with coordinating the 
acquisition of the approvals as presented in Table 4.2. It 
took the CMG around one year to advance the project to 
the invitation for bidding stage. This was considered to be 
very fast by China’s standard (Chen 2009). 
The complexity of the approvals systems in China for a 
PPP project could be significantly simplified and 
accelerated if a ‘one-window’ system were adopted (United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization 1996).
PuBlIC ACCounTABIlITy
Despite the frequent use of PPP in China, guidance for 
assessing value for money has not been developed. This 
may be mainly because China is still transforming from a 
planned economy to a market economy and government 
officials care more about the need to develop 
infrastructure than about the efficiency of its development 
and operation.
As China is a country with a centralised authority, its 
political system could be another key factor affecting the 
preliminary evaluation process. Government officials make 
their decision mainly on the basis of their own judgements 
or preferences and civil society, including professionals or 
academics, has almost no say on the final decisions.
Consequently, although feasibility studies and evaluations 
of PPP projects are conducted, information relevant to 
appraisals, project details and post-implementation issues 
is not publicised usually. This kind of information is 
regarded as commercially sensitive by the company, or as 
official secrets by the government, which makes the 
evaluation of PPP and especially quantitative research 
more difficult.
Table 4.2: main approval processes for the Chengdu no. 6 
Water Plant Project
No. Approval Approval authority
1
Approvals for establishment and operation of the project 
company
1.1 Approval for project company 
establishment
Chengdu Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation
1.2 Pre-registration of project 
company
State Administration of 
Industries and Commerce
1.3 Business-opening registration 
and operating licence
State Administration of 
Industries and Commerce
1.4 Foreign exchange registration Chengdu Branch of State 
Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE)
1.5 Taxation registration Local Taxation Administration
1.6 Fiscal registration Local Fiscal Administration
1.7 Customs registration Customs
1.8 Approvals on labour 
administration
Labour Administration of 
Chengdu
2 Approvals for project financing
2.1 Approvals of financial 
agreements
State Development and 
Reform Commission, SAFE and 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation
2.2 Foreign debt registration Chengdu Branch of SAFE
2.3 Registration for foreign 
security
Chengdu Branch of SAFE
2.4 Registration of mortgage 
raised on water plant facilities
Chengdu Administration of 
Property, Chengdu Land Use 
Authority, and Chengdu 
Administration of Industries 
and Commerce
2.5 Audition and approval of loan 
repayment




Several PPP guidance documents have been issued by 
MoHURD and local governments as shown in Table 4.1. 
According to these guidelines, such as Clause 8 in 
‘Administrative Measures on the Concession of Municipal 
Public Utilities’ by MoHURD, a public bidding process is 
required for selection of a private investor. A typical 
procurement procedure is shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Typical bidding procedure for selection of PPP 
investors
The current Tendering and Bidding Law in China is 
incompatible with the nature of PPP procurement of 
infrastructure. Procurement of PPP projects differs from 
that of engineering and construction works as the former 
in most cases comprise financing and long-term operation 
in addition to engineering and construction works while 
the latter is confined to engineering and construction 
works only. Several contradictions exist, therefore, between 
the bidding procedure for PPP projects and the Tendering 
and Bidding Law, and these contradictions constitute 
potential obstacles to PPP projects. For instance, 
according to the Tendering and Bidding Law, the investors 
are not allowed to negotiate with the government on key 
issues such as the tender price. There is a requirement for 
at least three potential bidders, which may not be 
appropriate for infrastructure sectors such as urban 
railways. Practices in mainland China indicate that 
infrastructure PPP projects should adopt some more 
appropriate competitive procedures for the selection of 
private investors (Zhang 2009). For PPP models with a 
high degree of standardisation, such as the ‘build-transfer’ 
(BT) and ‘operate &maintenance’ (O&M) schemes adopted 
in projects with high financial attractiveness, an open 
competitive bidding would be appropriate. For PPP models 
with a lower degree of standardisation such as the joint 
venture arrangements used in projects with lower financial 
attractiveness, a direct bid offer or a competitive 
negotiation would be more suitable.
At present, there are two types of administrative 
arrangement commonly used for PPP project bidding. The 
first one is to set up a separate tendering office formed of 
officials and professionals. The rules and regulations related 
to the tender process are formulated jointly by relevant 
government departments, that is, the Construction 
Commission, Planning Commission, Fiscal and Auditing 
Bureau, Industrial and Commercial Administration Bureau, 
and other relevant departments, with the Construction 
Commission representative as the leader of this office. The 
second one is to employ a qualified (registered) tendering 
agency and entrust it with the whole process. Evaluation 
criteria normally fall into price and non-price factors as 
pre-set in the invitation to tender. Taking the Laibin B Power 
Plant project (Wang and Ke 2009) for instance, a two-part 
set of evaluation criteria were used as follows: an electricity 
tariff (60% weight in the evaluation) and financing proposal, 
technical proposal and operation, maintenance and 
transferral (OMT) proposal (40% weight in the evaluation). 
In the evaluation, of the 40% total weight of the latter group, 
the financing proposal accounts for 60%, while the technical 
proposal and OMT proposal account for only 20% each.
ConTrACT
The MoHURD issued three sets of PPP contract samples 
for municipal water supply, pipeline gas and solid waste 
projects in 2004, and another two sets of contract 
samples for municipal waste-water treatment and heat 
supply projects in 2006. These contract samples may 
assist local governments who are not familiar with PPP in 
negotiating and signing contracts with private investors. 
Nonetheless, they are considered to be unfair since most 
risks are transferred to the private partner. For example, 
according to the contract sample, the project company of 
a waste-water treatment project is required to submit 
guarantees for the whole project lifecycle, including a 
tender guarantee to safeguard its responsibility in the 
bidding, a performance guarantee to ensure that the 
construction will be completed in time, and a maintenance 
guarantee to secure favourable operation. The proposed 
guarantee system will reduce the risk for local government 
but impose great financial pressure on the investors and 
reduce the attractiveness of the project to private partners.
It is worth noting that these contract samples list some 
project output indicators that would facilitate the 
government’s monitoring of the project performance. But 
the MoHURD failed to provide corresponding quantitative 
values for these indicators. Instead, each ministry has its 
own industry-specific standards. For example, the Ministry 
of Health has developed the health standards for the water 
sector. For the private investor, this means accepting the 
risk that industry regulations may change, whereupon the 
private sector partner could be forced to upgrade the 







Finance within given period
Concession agreement
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FInAnCIAl ProCuremenT
Various equity providers may be involved for normal 
structured PPP projects. There will usually be a ‘special 
purpose vehicle’, ie a project company whose equity is 
contributed by one or more investors. The project 
company then borrows money mainly from commercial 
banks who will compete with each other for the leading 
arranging role (Managed Lead Arranger) to arrange the 
debt. Due diligence and the negotiation process with the 
consortium will begin in order to agree the debt amount, 
repayment structure, interest margin, syndication fee, etc.
Domestic banks have great liquidity and low borrowing 
cost, and are thought to be the best option. Hence, they 
are in fact the main debt provider for domestic PPP 
projects. International banks are considered more 
expensive and often have more concerns. They find it 
difficult to take the leading role in domestic PPP project 
financing activities, and yet are usually approached by 
companies ‘going abroad’. Even so, loans from ADB or the 
World Bank have also been seen in some of the local PPP 
projects such as the Chengdu No. 6 Water Plant.
ConCluSIonS
China’s fast economic growth has resulted in huge 
demand for infrastructure development. PPP was 
implemented in China during two booming phases in the 
1990s and the 2000s owing to the government’s budget 
concern. The key players in the first phase were foreign 
investors, while in the second phase local investors 
dominated, especially state-owned or holding enterprises. 
PPP has been mainly implemented in China in the road, 
water and power sectors and has been expanded gradually 
to solid waste, gas, rail and public services. There are 
different PPP models in China but BOT has been most 
prevalent, especially in the 1990s. PPP implementation in 
China has experienced some difficulties owing to the lack 
of PPP expertise and the inadequate national-level legal 
framework and regulations in the 1990s. Since then, 
several ministries and about 20 local governments at 
provincial or municipal level have issued relevant 
regulations or policies but there is still no national-level 
legislative framework and no national level organisation 
specifically dealing with PPP, presenting legal uncertainty 
and approval risks, etc, to investors. Although PPP has 
been successfully implemented in many projects in 
different sectors, there is still much room for improvement, 
especially in the project evaluation, procurement and 
decision-making processes, public accountability, financial 
market and the fair risk-sharing mechanisms in the 
concession agreement, such as tariff adjustment.
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InTroduCTIon
The current status of Partenariats Publics Privées (PPP) in 
France is paradoxical. On the one hand, France has for a 
long time used traditional forms of private finance such as 
concession and délégation de service public (DSP) 
(Bezançon 2004); on the other hand, new forms of private 
finance closer to the British model of the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) are being implemented in France but more 
slowly and with difficulty. These new forms of private 
finance are, in particular, embodied in the contrat de 
partenariat (CP) created in 2004 and later modified by 
legislation in 2008. The CP was preceded by a whole 
variety of sector-specific contractual forms. All these 
contractual forms (or all the most recent ones) conferred 
on a private consortium the complete responsibility for 
financing, designing, construction and exploitation of a 
building and its associated services by means of a 
payment by the public authority for the whole period of 
the amortisation of the private investment. These are 
global contracts of long duration with private financing but 
public payment. They are also incentive contracts, the 
remuneration of the private partners being subject to their 
achieving performance objectives.
Nevertheless, by September 2010, six years after the 
launch of the CP, only 73 contracts had been signed – 56 
by local authorities for a total €1.5 billion and 17 by 
central government for a total of €1.75 billion. The majority 
of the contracts were worth under €30m although, 
according to the experts, the minimum necessary 
investment for this type of contract to be viable is €50m. 
The CP has not, therefore, yet attained the success 
predicted by its promoters. 
The reserve demonstrated by public clients and then, after 
the economic crisis, by the private operators, contrasts 
with the much wider use of concessions and DSPs. This 
contrast between old and new forms of PPP is 
characteristic of the French situation and demands 
attention along three main lines of enquiry.
First is the heterogeneity of the contractual forms that can 
be grouped under the generic term of PPP. It seems sensible 
to distinguish them because they are based on different 
conceptions of both the relations between public authorities 
and private operators, and the contractual engagements 
that bind them. This enquiry, therefore, focuses on the 
legal reasons for the feeble development of CP in France.
Second is the changing context in which these new 
contractual forms are located and the nature of the public 
policies that promote them. Reference to the specificities 
of the national context and its positioning in the 
international context is important. In the French context, it 
indeed seems as if the movement towards new forms of 
private finance is related less to the logic of privatisation 
than to the logic of the financialisation of public 
procurement. One of the consequences of financialisation 
is a profound challenge to public law. This enquiry 
therefore focuses on the economic and financial reasons 
for the limited development of CP in France.
Finally, lessons can be drawn from the first experiences of 
PPP, in particular the role of evaluation in the development 
of new forms of contract.
neW FormS oF PPP And The legAl dImenSIon: 
From legAlITy To legITImACy
The first obstacle that promoters of PPPs face in 
implementing the new CP contract is that there were no 
equivalent legal contracts for public procurement before 
2004. Prior to this, public procurement was dominated by 
conventional methods and DSP, which includes 
concessions and affermage (a leasing arrangement).
DSP is currently defined by a law of 2001 and involves the 
granting of a contract to a private operator to supply a 
public service and to charge users directly for that service 
– an example is the supply of mains water. The aim of DSP 
is the management of the public service itself in the form 
of the final service to the consumer. This is distinct from 
the CP, which is not concerned with final services but 
intermediary services – usually called ‘facilities’. This 
leaves it open for the public authority to choose to 
delegate the final service or to deliver in-house. 
The concession is one form of DSP in which a public 
authority – the concessor – delegates the contract to 
finance public infrastructure to a private concessionaire. 
Concessionaires are then reimbursed by the users. This 
type of arrangement is very well established in France in 
the form of the infrastructure concession, which has been 
used since the 17th century for roads, canals, and bridges. 
The public service concession appeared at the beginning 
of the 20th century. Traditionally, the concession was 
considered to be an ad hoc contract which was not aligned 
with standard forms of public procurement.
A public procurement contract is a contract made to meet 
the public authority’s needs. One of the main principles of 
procurement contracts is that of the separation of the 
various services required by the public authority – for 
instance a separation of construction and maintenance 
contracts. Each project has to be submitted to formal 
competition in a competitive tender or through other 
authorised procurement routes, such as the one 
authorised under the new European code in 2006 – 
competitive dialogue. Payment for the services procured is 
by the public authority and it is not allowed to delay the 
payment, which has to be made during execution of the 
contract. This is the main difference from DSP and 
concessions, where users pay.
So, until the 2004 order there was no intermediate 
contract between the DSP and the public procurement 
contract. These existing legal categories differ from the 
new forms of finance in CP on some crucial points, such as 
their objectives, modes of payment, the risk allocation 
regime, the principle of separation between the different 
services and the forbidding of the postponement of 
payment. Thus, the missing piece in the legal framework 
for private finance concerned arrangements for complex, 
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global, long-term contracts with public payments spread 
through the life of the contract. 
A similar type of contract had been attempted towards the 
end of the 1980s in the form of Marché Public d’Entreprise 
Travaux Publics (METP). Some authorities argue that this 
has influenced CP, but after its widespread use for projects 
such as secondary schools, when central government 
delegated responsibility for these to the regions, they were 
banned in the mid 1990s. This was partly for political and 
partly for legal reasons. The Conseil d’Etat (the Council of 
State, the supreme public law court) continually requalified 
the contracts and forbade the principle of postponed 
payment for services. So the METP approach, which was 
similar to that which had triumphed in the UK, created an 
atmosphere of legal uncertainty around this type of 
contract.
In SeArCh oF legAlITy
The concept of private finance progressed after 2002 
under the influence of many factors, such as the end of the 
cohabitation government in the elections of May 2002, 
which meant that the same party now had both the 
presidency and a majority in parliament; the development 
of European regulation; and the reform of the budgetary 
law. At first, particular sectoral measures were taken in the 
areas of domestic national security, justice, and defence 
acquisition. All these laws covered real estate and facility 
management for central government services.
Beyond these sectoral measures, the government and 
parliament searched for a more general tool or mechanism 
that could be used by both central and local government, 
as happens in many other countries. With this in mind, 
legislation in 2003 gave general authorisation to the 
government to issue orders (ordonnances) about the 
measures required to create new types of global, long-
term private finance contracts. To date, two of these have 
been promulgated – one in the field of health, called the 
Baux Emphytheotiques Hospitaliers (BEH), and a general 
one formalising the Contrat de Partenariat. With the latter, 
private finance received, for the first time, a legal and 
functional definition.
mISSIng legITImACy: ConTrACT derogATIon 
Private finance thereby gained a legal basis, but without 
winning the necessary political, professional or institutional 
legitimacy.
Politically, the contract is still the subject of much debate. 
On the one hand, it is acclaimed for all the advantages it is 
supposed to bring: budgetary savings, better maintenance, 
more regular facility management, higher quality of 
services and better cost control. On the other, it is decried 
as a budgetary trick with the risk of much more onerous 
obligations at the end of the day. It is also decried as a 
contract that externalises some activities that contribute to 
public services and as one that threatens employment in 
the public sector. In fact, on this last point, the public 
authorities are likely to take care with the tasks 
externalised under CP, which are likely to be dominated by 
building maintenance rather than soft services.
Concern about a lack of legitimacy is also widespread 
among the professions. The fears come first from the 
architects, who worry that the transfer of the client 
functions on the project (maîtrise d’ouvrage) to the private 
sector operator places design under the constraints of 
private interests and that this will be manifest itself in 
poor-quality architecture. Small and medium-sized 
enterprises also fear that the very onerous requirements 
placed on those wanting to bid for global contracts create 
barriers to entry which will prevent them from competing, 
and that this will profit the large corporations.
Institutionally, there is also little consensus. In its decision 
in 2003, the Constitutional Council judged that the 
principles of private finance defined in law, on which the 
government relied for its CP order, seriously infringed the 
current legislation for public procurement. The global 
character of the contract is opposed to the public 
procurement law of 1985 (loi MOP Maîtrise d’Ouvrage 
Public), which governs the relationship between the public 
client, and the architects and engineers responsible for 
design, client advice, and the control of the project (Maître 
d’Œuvre) – see Campagnac (2000) for a discussion of this 
legislation. This law forbids the client from renouncing its 
responsibilities for the project in matters such as design 
and finance. So, the position of the Constitutional Council 
is that CP contracts have to be restricted to situations 
where their use can be based on general arguments, such 
as urgency, in the event that delay would cause significant 
problems, or complexity, where the public client does not 
have the capability to establish the financial and legal 
arrangements. 
In other words, the CP contract is legal only if there is a 
derogation from normal procurement law. The 
consequence of this is to introduce into the procurement 
process a special preliminary step intended to justify the 
use of CP on the grounds of either urgency or complexity. 
According to the grounds selected, the procurement 
approach alters; it is only in the case of complexity that 
the process leads to ‘competitive dialogue’ under the EU 
procurement directives.
The criteria for interpretation remain a source of legal 
uncertainty, particularly after an Orléans administrative 
court judgment in 2008 cancelled the first CP contract to 
be concluded. This was to build and operate a secondary 
school in Villemandeur (Loiret), signed in July 2006 
between the Département and Sogea Construction. Its 
cancellation was motivated by the argument that the delay 
was due to the shortcomings of the public authority in 
managing the school project, which implies a very strict 
test of urgency. This decision caused trauma in the 
professions and reinforced the sense of legal uncertainty 
in the use of CP.
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ChAngeS In ConTexT And PuBlIC PolICy
The victory of the new President of the Republic in 2007 
initiated a change of context for PPPs. Shortly after his 
election, Nicholas Sarkozy, in effect, relaunched the PPP 
policy, which he judged too timid. These changes worked 
in two phases:
the normalisation of the CP in the judicial landscape •	
taking into account the reforms introduced in 2008
the attempt to make its use more widespread by •	
presenting it as a means of generating growth at a time 
of crisis.
These two developments were accompanied by a 
redefinition of the debates, in which the financial and 
budgetary dimensions associated with this type of contract 
became more important than the judicial ones.
vAlue For money AS A CrITerIon For elIgIBIlITy
The first task was to include the CP within the normal 
arrangements of public procurement, and this was 
undertaken in 2008. Prior to the passing of this law, earlier 
legislation, introduced in 2007, had tried to revise the 
2004 rules. In particular, it tried to relax the urgency 
criterion, to make the use of private finance more secure 
legally, and to ensure fiscal neutrality between the different 
forms of private finance and the different modes of public 
procurement. This also meant that the PPP would be 
exempt from some taxes that the public client does not 
normally pay.
Nonetheless, it is the integration of the value-for-money 
criterion that is the main issue for the future regulation of 
PPPs, and was the object of the reforms contained in the 
law proposed in 2008. It proposed two main changes:
It added a third criterion in the preliminary appraisal of •	
an advantageous balance compared with normal public 
procurement, giving more emphasis to the economic 
analysis.
It created a presumption of urgency for some sectors •	
until the end of 2012, which meant they would not have 
to provide their reasons for using private finance.
The law was referred to the Constitutional Council by the 
socialist (opposition) members of parliament. In its 
decision the Council agreed the third (value-for-money) 
criterion but refused the urgency presumption because it 
limited the necessary preliminary appraisal and limited 
judicial control over the nature of the claimed urgency. In 
conclusion, it declared the suppression of the urgency 
criterion to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
violated constitutional requirements such as equity, 
protection of the public domain, and good use of public 
money. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the third criterion 
opened the way for the wider use of private finance on the 
economic criterion of value-for-money.
PPPS In The eConomIC CrISIS
The economic crisis that erupted in 2007 gave private 
finance a new role, that of being a means to reflate the 
economy more generally. The President of the Republic 
announced an economic stimulus in December 2008 
aimed at creating employment. A counter-cyclical role is 
expected from investments in railways, fluvial and 
maritime works, and urban transport, as well as the 
universities and research centres, all aimed at sustaining 
economic activity and employment. From this perspective, 
private finance in its various forms (including concessions) 
can accelerate investment for community benefit and 
allow sharing of risks between the public and private 
sectors.
To date, government support for PPPs has had three main 
elements:
a budget for state guarantees of €10 billion•	
a budget for long-term loans of €8 billion drawn on •	
funds managed by the public savings bank, the Caisse 
de Dépôts
a new law passed in 2009 to accelerate construction •	
programmes generally as well as public and private 
investments, including several measures to reduce the 
difficulties private interests face in signing public PPPs 
in the current financial context. The law, therefore, 
allows a proportion of the funding to come from the 
public sector, although not from within the special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) that embodies the PPP. This 
allows private companies to receive the same subsidies 
as publicly owned ones under the 1985 procurement law.
Another current initiative is the ‘great loan’ launched by 
the President in December 2009 on the basis of a report 
by two leading government figures. This loan is expected 
to be for €35 billion, with €22 billion leveraged from the 
financial markets. There are plans to invest €60 billion, in 
total, in four priority sectors: higher education and 
research (with additional funding for the university estates 
development programme Plan Campus), industry and 
SMEs, renewable energy, and the digital economy.
The ShIFT oF The deBATe ToWArdS eConomIC And 
FInAnCIAl CrITerIA 
The mobilisation of CP for economic reflation has changed 
the possible obstacles. The legal obstacles are now less 
important, while those associated with financial issues 
have a growing importance. Projects launched using 
private finance have both to assure budget availability and 
to respond to the increased demands of finding finance 
capital in a time of crisis. 
On the first point, PPPs benefit from a considerable asset 
in the context of budgetary constraint because Eurostat – 
the European statistics office responsible for national 
budgets – does not requite debt to be on the public sector 
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account if the risks are divided between the parties in 
certain ways. Thus, the investments are not counted as 
public sector assets or registered on the public sector 
balance sheet if the private partner bears the construction 
risk and either the risk of availability or the risk linked to 
demand. The rationale of Eurostat is to take into account 
the risk analysis and the party that takes responsibility for 
it. If those risks are taken by the private partner then the 
arrangement will be off-balance sheet; if on the other 
hand, those risks are taken by the public partner, then they 
will be counted on its balance sheet. The main issue in the 
treatment of the different arrangements is to determine 
whether the partnership contract is on the public balance 
sheet or not. One of the sources of interest in private 
finance for public authorities is whether it allows the 
equivalent debt to avoid being taken into account on the 
Maastrict criteria.
The crisis imposes another constraint on the public 
authorities in the form of the heightened requirements of 
the financiers. In effect, the socioeconomic return on 
infrastructure projects is reduced, thanks to greater 
uncertainty in expected demand, greater costs of 
mobilising their own funds, reinforced prudential 
constraints, and greater aversion to long-term 
engagements. The crisis of liquidity translates into a 
diminution of syndicated offers and a reduction in the 
number of suppliers. Projects find it even more difficult to 
raise finance, because the margins required by the private 
operators are at a higher level today than before the crisis.
The debates on the use of CPs as a tool for reflating the 
economy have not, however, found a consensus among 
experts. For instance, according to Paul Lignères (a lawyer 
associated with Linklaters) the proposed legislation of 
2007 and the government plan to support infrastructure 
projects are really effective because they increase the level 
of trust in the private markets, as is shown by some 
projects that have succeeded in being financed at this new 
juncture (tram/train in La Réunion, which was abandoned 
in June 2010; the Charles de Gaulle airport express; LGV 
Tours-Bordeaux). Paul Ligneres does not hesitate to speak 
of a ‘dazzling success’ in this area.
This view is not shared by François Lichère (Professor of 
Law at Aix Marseille University and consultant for lawyers 
in the practice of writing PPP contracts). For him, PPP is 
designed to run during favourable economic conditions 
because the financial risk is borne by SPVs, which borrow 
90% of their funds. The measures included in the 2007 
legislation have simply allowed the relaunch of earlier 
projects such as the Vincennes Zoo, which had been 
blocked since 2006, rather than initiating new ones. Such 
reservations are shared by some bankers, who have 
observed that the only projects delivered during 2009 
were prisons, which have been criticised for their 
functionality and quality. For the moment, though, there is 
no attempt to step back and to assess the ‘real’ efficacy of 
PPPs in terms of investment and operation costs.
The PPP mArkeT In FrAnCe: A lImITed, SegmenTed 
And heTerogeneouS mArkeT
It is observable, first, that the change in public policy has 
not really changed the situation. The PPP market, and even 
more that for the CP, remains a relatively limited market. In 
January 2008, PPPs under negotiation or confirmed by 
the Mission d’Appui aux Partneriats Public-Privé (MAPP 
– part of the Ministry of Finance) represented a total 
investment of around €10 billion for the hospital sector 
and €0.6 billion for the prison sector. By September 2010, 
only 74 CPs, strictly defined, had been signed and 
delivered or were in the process of delivery. This is also a 
market that is highly segmented by the type of client 
(central or local government), by sectoral domain of 
activity, by form of contract deployed, or by governance 
structure. 
Taking the type of client first, although local authorities 
had signed 56 contracts, three-quarters of the total, 
central government leads on the total value of contracts 
signed, with €1.75 billion across 17 contracts against €1.5 
billion for all local authority projects. Turning to sectors of 
activity by total investment by central government, these 
are spread across the principal ministry domains – 46% 
for health; 14% for justice (courts and prisons); 12% for 
youth and sports; 9% for infrastructure; and around 4% 
for defence. The distribution is very different for local 
government where, by number of contracts, 48% are for 
urban infrastructure (mainly street lighting and road 
maintenance); 19% for information systems and 
telecommunications infrastructure, 3% each for cultural 
and sporting facilities, energy, and waste treatment, and 
only 1% for transportation and housing.
Thus, the market is limited and segmented: PPPs also 
constitute a very heterogeneous market whether by size of 
project or the diversity of the contractual arrangements 
that the projects can use. PPPs can be used as much for 
small projects – such as the refurbishment of a school or 
the modernising of a town’s lighting – as for more 
financially consequential projects such as the Lille 
Stadium. The smallest project is for the public lighting of 
Auvers-sur-Oise, which was the first contract signed by a 
local authority. According to the Director-General of 
Services for the town, the use of the CP has allowed the 
town to bring half its public lighting up to the required 
standards in a schedule of eight months while spreading 
the payment over six years. The largest project financially 
is promoted by the French Canals Authority (Voies 
Navigables de France) for the construction of the Seine-
Nord Europe canal connecting Le Havre to the Benelux 
canal network and the Rhine. PPPs are also used for the 
buildings for major government projects, such as 
administrative centres, barracks, prisons and hospitals, as 
well as major infrastructure projects. They are also used 
for urban networks and energy projects, such as street 
lighting and district heating by local authorities. 
In general, regional governments (the middle tier of French 
government) have not been attracted by the new CP. There 
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are diverse reasons for this, including the scepticism of 
certain elected representatives about the necessity for 
using CPs, the possibility of using alternative solutions and, 
in particular, the existence of financially attractive offers 
from the Caisse des Dépôts. 
This heterogeneity is reinforced by the diversity of 
contractual forms, which vary from one sector to the other. 
Certain PPPs do not take the form of CPs; rather, they use 
forms such as BEH for hospitals or Autorisations 
d’Occupation Temporaire (leases with or without the 
option to purchase), as in the case of a number of police 
barracks. Thus, for hospitals, the majority of projects have 
taken the form of BEH, for instance in Caen, Annemasse-
Bonneville, Metz, Arras and Evreux. On the other hand, a 
number of projects, such as in Perigueux, Angouleme, and 
Ales, have used the CP, particularly for old peoples’ homes 
and energy centres but only eight CPs had been signed in 
the health sector by the end of 2008.
For major projects, CP is in competition with the well-
established concession. Public authorities may also prefer 
DSP. Lille chose a CP for its stadiums, while Le Mans used 
DSP. Reims chose CP for tramways while Mulhouse 
preferred DSP. Moreover, among the current PPP projects, 
only a small number have achieved a signed contract. For 
example, of 135 potential projects identified by the end of 
2007, and for which calls for tender had been published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union, 25 have 
actually signed contracts, and half are in the process of 
being awarded. Almost three years later, in the summer of 
2010, there were 383 projects in total, of which 73 were 
signed or in the course of delivery, 95 were in the process 
of award, and 215 in the process of feasibility studies, 
including preliminary evaluation.
The greAT WeAkneSS oF ex-PoST evAluATIon In 
FrAnCe
The second observation is that it is very difficult to obtain 
a synthetic view of the eventual benefits or challenges of 
PPPs. There is a severe lack of ex-post evaluation. The 
types of report produced in the UK by the National Audit 
Office do not exist in France. The Cour des Comptes has 
been able to analyse the experience of this or that sector 
during the last few years so as to criticise the additional 
costs of PPP, as it did in its 2008 Annual Report with 
regard to two specific PPPs – the Information Centre of the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Centre for Diplomatic 
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also 
announced its reservations during the scrutiny of the draft 
legislation on PPP. Thus, it has been able to denounce the 
additional constraints on the national budget in the future 
through the commitment of public expenditures to repay 
inviolable credit obligations. Nonetheless, the Cour has not 
yet developed a considered overall analysis of the subject.
The evaluation reports are typically different in France 
from those in the Anglophone countries. The early 
institutionalisation in the US or, in a different way, in the 
UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, contrasts with 
the situation in France. The institutionalisation of 
evaluation proves to be difficult in France, with a history of 
failures (Perret 2001). Today, however, it is on the agenda 
in the context of administrative reform and the new public 
management. To explain this tardiness different arguments 
have been advanced about the intrinsic weaknesses of 
evaluation methodologies (Nioche and Poinsard 1984); 
their heterogeneity, and their feeble impact on public 
policy (Trosa and Perret 1992); or even the incompatibility 
between the spirit of evaluation and the ‘state sciences’ 
such as those that have been developed in France that are 
linked with the training of the public corps of engineers, 
economists, inspectors participating in the production of 
knowledge; and the incompatibility of the mode of 
selection of elites and an openness to evaluation (Leca 
1993). The first report of the Mission d’Evaluation et 
Contrôle (which has similar value-for-money 
responsibilities to the UK NAO) argued that those countries 
where evaluation finds an echo and a legitimacy are those 
where the ‘political culture’ gives great weight to the 
interests of taxpayers. This is not the case in France owing 
to the structure of the relatively ‘painless’ fiscal system, 
which rests largely on indirect taxes (Perret 2001). All the 
same, the countries with an interest in evaluation are also 
those that grant a weak legitimacy to state intervention 
and those that demand proof of the effectiveness of the 
state’s actions.
SPeCIFICS oF PrelImInAry evAluATIon: BeTWeen 
eConomIC rATIonAlITy And legITImATIon
The introduction in 2004 of a process of preliminary 
evaluation in the CP displays more of the approach of new 
public management. It involves, in effect, the preliminary 
justification of the decision to resort to this new contract 
by comparing it with other tools for public procurement. In 
France, this exercise has for some time displayed a specific 
requirement for assuring the eligibility of the project 
against the judicial criteria of urgency or complexity 
imposed by the Constitutional Court in 2003. It is once 
this juridical step is taken that a proper comparative 
analysis can be undertaken to ensure the greatest 
economic efficiency of the CP in comparison with 
traditional public procurement.
It was only with legislation in 2008 that the economic 
issues in the preliminary evaluation took over from the 
juridical issues. At the same time, the CP moved from 
having the status of a derogation outside statute to 
forming part of the normal statutes of administrative law. 
The comparative analysis now forms a decisive phase of 
the evaluation. It rests on the total cost, the allocation of 
risks, and the financial model. It presumes the 
identification of the accounting, budgetary and fiscal 
aspects through a number of possible processes – the 
identification of the economic parameters of the proposed 
operation; the identification and mitigation of the risks, 
and comparative financial simulations. The sophistication 
of the processes necessitates that the public authority be 
assisted by a financial consultant in order to be able to 
develop the risk matrix and the financial clauses of the 
project contract, and to aid it in the analysis of the 
financial structure and the budgetary situation. 
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Certain authors have emphasised that public clients have 
displayed a concern to move beyond a tool that is too 
exclusively financial and to seek to integrate criteria of 
socio-economic utility that are used, for example, as the 
basis of public decision-making for infrastructure 
(Bougrain et al. 2005). Preliminary evaluation does not, 
however, avoid the risk that during the comparative 
evaluation the choice of contract serves as a justification 
for itself through the logic included in the methods of 
evaluation.
The CenTrAl role oF mInISTerIAl AgenCIeS In The 
ProCeSS oF evAluATIon
The fourth observation is that there are central 
government agencies that act as task forces and have 
responsibility for the design of the framework and 
methods of evaluation. The Mission d’appui aux PPP 
(MAPP 2011) has published an Operational Guide for PPP 
(Bergère 2007). MAPP occupies a central place in the 
preliminary evaluations – it is the principal organisational 
expert – and was created in 2004 to develop the CP. 
Originally, its principal mission was to provide help for 
local governments engaged in the preparation of CPs, and 
the use of MAPP was not obligatory, but it is now 
obligatory for all the projects launched by central 
government and by national corporations. MAPP is also 
the origin of the modelling tool for cost and risk for the 
comparative analysis between CP and conventional 
procurement governed by the MOP law of 1985. MAPP 
also intervenes at the end of the contract award process 
with the Directorate of the Budget before the CP is signed, 
working jointly to understand its impact on the public 
finances and the sustainability of the budget. Finally, MAPP 
is responsible for analysing the feedback on experience 
with the CP in order to be able to propose developments in 
the regulations. This expert organisation can be said to be 
both judge and jury in the process of preliminary 
evaluation because it is involved in the design, production 
and use of evaluation methods, as well as receiving 
feedback on the CP.
MAPP occupies a cross-sectoral role in the process of 
evaluation; other expert organisations have also been 
created with more sectoral responsibilities – whether 
under the Ministry of Justice in the form of the Agence 
publique pour l’immobilier de la justice (APIJ 2011); or 
under the Ministry of Health with the Mission d’Appui á 
l’investissement Hospitalier (MAINH 2011). This 
organisation, in particular, was responsible in 2005 for 
developing a methodology guide for the BEH. We need 
also to mention l’Institut de la gestion Déléguée (IGD 
2011), which is a not-for-profit foundation created in 1996. 
It is an independent think tank and its objective is to 
promote the quality and efficiency of public services. In 
fact it is very close to the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées 
(Claude Martinand, vice president of the Corps is IGD 
president) and to the Ministry of Construction and 
Transport. It works on construction, transport and urban 
services. The difference between the IGD and the other 
organisations is that it is not responsible for feedback.
The FIrST FeedBACk From exPerIenCe
The feedback is essentially that made by the various 
expert organisations, public and sectoral, already 
mentioned. In France, more general and synthetic 
evaluation reports on the results achieved by the first PPPs 
are not available. Taking the example of the MAINH in the 
health sector, two series of lessons can be drawn. The first 
refers to the learning gained during the first wave of PPP 
projects, essentially those using BEH. The second refers to 
the actual experience in the health domain in relation to 
PPPs. The balance sheet of the first evaluations appears to 
be mixed (Berehouc 2009).
For the first wave of feedback, a dozen projects have been 
analysed in detail by the MAINH (cf the review in 
Campagnac 2009a). They involved two logistics projects, 
six hospital and accommodation building projects, and two 
major projects. These are representative of the first wave 
of PPPs launched in 2003 and 2004 and signed in 2005 
and 2006. They all benefited from public spending 
forecasts in Plan Hôpital 2007. The evaluation focuses on 
the competitive dialogue process. 
The balance sheet is neither black nor white and shows, 
moreover, a process of learning.  For the projects realised 
under the auspices of Plan Hôpital 2007, the client had 
developed a prescriptive approach rather than one 
orientated towards performance objectives. The client had 
difficulty in rejecting modifications to the project after the 
selection of preferred bidder. Within the private sector 
there was little innovation and a market with little 
competition dominated by the large construction 
corporations.
This first assessment also identified the restricted range of 
maintenance services that have been outsourced. All the 
private sector partners criticised this range, which varied 
during the competitive dialogue process owing to both an 
underestimation of costs earlier in the process and the 
perception by the client of the rather standardised and 
uninnovative offers from the private sector, which lacked 
experience in the hospital sector. The consequences of this 
narrow range are significant because the economics of any 
contract overall will be strongly linked to the range of 
maintenance and operational services offered. 
If the perception of the architectural quality associated 
with PPPs remains positive in the hospital sector, this is 
not the case for other projects. One fact is very much 
confirmed – the higher costs of PPPs. This reflects both 
the inclusion of new elements in the economic appraisal, 
such as costs of maintenance and refurbishment, which 
are generally little known in the hospital sector, and a 
more structural factor linked to the higher rates of interest 
applicable to private finance. In the long term, the financial 
structure of PPPs risks being a threat to the solvency of 
hospital establishments. This explains the current pause in 
the launching of PPPs in the hospital sector until more 
complete results are available from the analysis of the 
second wave of feedback.
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ConCluSIonS
To conclude, PPPs in France are situated at a crossroads 
between national specificities and growing insertion in the 
international economy. The effects of both these factors on 
the forms of regulation (here understood in the sense of 
the definition of the rules of the game) contribute each in 
their own fashion to explaining why the use of new PPPs 
remains limited in France. In a very schematic manner, we 
can argue that the national specificities manifest 
themselves at the level of the regulation of public 
procurement (and the production of goods and services) 
while the international influences have more effect on the 
regulation of the management of public debt and of 
financial flows.
The case of France is also interesting because even if it 
does not have a monopoly on the engagement of the state 
in the promotion of PPPs it is, perhaps, one of the 
countries that allows us to focus most clearly on the nature 
of the transformations in progress. It is the historical use 
of traditional forms of PPP in France that allows us to 
identify the changes brought by the new contemporary 
forms. The new PPPs are, in effect, the fruits of the 
management of public debt in a more internationalised 
economy. Public debt permits providers of capital to live 
from the state precisely because of this debt, so it is 
important to pay attention to transformations in the law. 
The conditions for the implementation of new PPPs in 
France, in particular the Contrat de Parteneriat, show that 
one of the necessary criteria has been the progressive 
abandonment of administrative law, which has notably 
permitted the legal development of the concession and 
DSP, in favour of a more subjective law of contract. The 
PPPs highlight the manner in which French administrative 
law moves closer to the law of commercial contract 
business in removing one by one all the checks and 
balances that assure the maintenance of administrative 
law. It also shows the manner in which the public debt, 
managed as a system of rights and credits, is orientated 
towards the much greater financialisation of public 
procurement. From the perspective of the state, the new 
PPPs in France translate as a combination of the principles 
of the new public management as they have been defined 
in France (Campagnac 2009b) and this tendency towards 
financialisation. 
Thus the analysis of CP and its mechanisms of 
development or blockage opened up a new field of 
research.
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InTroduCTIon
The public private partnership (PPP) model has emerged 
in recent years as the most important policy instrument 
for attracting private investments in India’s chronically 
deficient infrastructure sector. A series of policy initiatives 
since 2007 seem to have reduced the barriers to 
investment in PPP projects.1 PPP concessions in central 
government projects increased between February 2009 
and February 2010, when new projects worth US$18.5 
billion were finalised, with roads drawing US$11.3 billion 
and ports US$5 billion. In contrast, the cumulative 
investment in PPP projects between 1995 and 2006 was 
only US$15.8 billion.2 
PPP models are now increasingly used in state 
government projects as well.3 As many as 1112 state-level 
projects worth Rs650303 crore ($135 billion) are in the 
pipeline. These PPP projects are in various sectors, such 
as education, health, urban development, municipal 
services, water supply and sanitation. Buoyed by the 
success of PPP projects in the highway, port and airport 
sectors, many state governments have now been making 
special efforts to attract investments and harness private 
sector efficiencies in infrastructure and public utility 
services.4 
The most important driver of the growth of PPP projects in 
India is increased demand and greater willingness to pay 
for such services. The demand has been driven by 
sustained economic growth during the last two decades. In 
addition, political pressure is increasing for spending more 
budgetary resources on rural development and poverty 
1.  A PPP project is defined by the Government of India as a project based 
on a contract or concession agreement between a public authority and a 
private sector company for investing in construction and maintenance of 
an infrastructure asset and/or delivering an infrastructure service. In this 
report, PPP projects are defined as projects that involve transfer or lease 
of public assets. They are either based on comprehensive concession 
agreements or take the form of operation and maintenance contracts with 
public authorities. BOO contracts, which do not entail transfer or lease of 
public assets, do not fall under this definition although they may fit into 
the government of India’s definition because in many such projects, 
particularly in the power sector, private investors enter into detailed 
contracts with public authorities/regulators for production and supply of 
power at prescribed tariffs for different categories of consumers. 
2. See Execution Noble and City of London (2010: 10) for sector-wide 
investments in the past three years. Conversion rate of US$1= Rs48 is 
used throughout this paper. Note that 1 crore is 10 million, which means 1 
billion=100 crore.
3.  The power of the States and the Union are defined by the constitution, 
and the legislative powers are divided into three lists: Union List, State List 
and Concurrent List. National highways, airports and major ports are in 
the Union List. The State List includes state highways, state ports and 
urban infrastructure. The power sector is on the Concurrent List where 
both governments can legislate but, in case of conflict, the central 
legislature prevails. 
4. For the list of the state-level projects and their estimated cost see 
Government of India (2011).
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alleviation programmes. This increased pressure is 
prompting governments to adopt proactive policy 
initiatives to attract private investments in commercially 
viable infrastructure projects so that more budgetary 
resources can be provided to the politically sensitive 
sectors. 
A virtuous cycle of investment – growth – more private 
investment is gathering momentum in India. Private 
investments in infrastructure are mitigating infrastructure 
bottlenecks in achieving higher economic growth without 
governments’ having to sacrifice fiscal disciplines 
mandated under the Fiscal Regulation and Budget 
Management (FRBM) Act. Private investments are also 
making way for greater public investment in rural 
infrastructure, irrigation and other priority sectors, 
including the targeted programmes for the poor. All these 
investments in social and economic infrastructures, and 
their spill-over effects into other sectors of the economy, 
are creating new employment opportunities for India’s 
burgeoning working-age population. Consequently, the 
willingness to pay for infrastructure services is increasing, 
and this increased demand is attracting more private 
investment, completing the virtuous cycle.
In view of the critical importance of the infrastructure 
sector, the prime minister of India has recently announced 
India’s plan to double the investment in infrastructure to 
US$1 trillion during the 12th Plan period, 2012/13 to 
2016/17. The vision is captured succinctly by the deputy 
chairman of the Planning Commission in the following 
words. 
An important aspect of infrastructure development in 
India in the years ahead is that the manner of 
infrastructure development will be very different from the 
past with a much larger role from public private 
partnership. This will throw up new challenges and it will 
be necessary for policy to be responsive to these new 
challenges and look for innovative ways of meeting them. 
(Planning Commission 2009) 
The rest of this chapter on India is organised into eight 
sections. In the first two sections, the recent policy 
initiatives, including institutional reforms, are discussed. 
Section 3 outlines the important features of model 
concession agreements in highways and ports. It also 
briefly covers the recommendations of the Chaturvedi 
Committee set up by the prime minister in August 2009. 
This is followed by an overview of PPP investments in 
different sub-sectors and then by a discussion of the 
problems in implementing PPP projects in India. Section 7 
makes the point that foreign investments are yet to play 
any significant role in Indian PPP projects. Section 8 is 
intended as a guide to how revenue streams from highway 
investments can be computed. The chapter provides a 
conclusion for the discussions and points out the reasons 
for the sub-optimal value for money (VfM) outcome of 
India’s potentially fertile PPP projects.
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reCenT PolICy InITIATIveS 
The policy regime and institutional arrangements have 
been improving in India since the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee on Infrastructure (CoI) headed by the prime 
minister was set up in August 2004. CoI has already 
initiated a number of institutional regulatory and 
procedural reforms to maximise the role of PPPs in India’s 
infrastructure development. The principal objective is 
streamlining and expediting decision making by public 
authorities in a manner that is fair, transparent and 
competitive.
Important policy initiatives taken recently by the 
Government of India include: 
1.  establishing (a) the PPP Appraisal Committee (PPPAC), 
to facilitate approval of PPP projects; (b) the India 
Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFCL), to 
facilitate the flow of longer-term loans; and (c) the India 
Infrastructure Project Development fund (IIPDF), to 
meet project development expenses  
2. providing for Viability Gap Funding (VGF) and setting 
up the Empowered Committee of Secretaries for 
sanction of VGF 
3. issuing standardised guidelines and model documents 
such as (a) the Model Concession Agreements (MCAs), 
(b) the Manuals for Specification and Standards, (c) the 
Model Request for Qualification (RFQs) and Request for 
Proposals (RFPs), incorporating key principles and best 
practices for bid processes, and (d) the National 
Highways Fee (Determination of Rates and Collection) 
Rules, 2008 
4.  implementing the recommendations of the Chaturvedi 
Committee (2009) for national highway development.
Standardised guidelines have also been issued for: 
formulation, appraisal and approval of PPP projects•	
availing financial support through grants, and •	
refinancing bank lending of longer maturity to eligible •	
infrastructure projects. 
Other policy measures include:
an income tax exemption under Section 80IA of the •	
Income Tax Act 
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 based on •	
UNICITRAL provisions
allowing the duty-free import of construction •	
equipment
100% Foreign Direct Investment under automatic route •	
for most sectors, including roads, ports, power, and 
green field airports
increasing the overseas borrowing amount from •	
US$100 million to US$500 million 
offering cheaper loans. •	
InSTITuTIonAl ArrAngemenTS  
Approval of PPP projects 
The flow chart in Figure 6.1 shows the procedure for 
approval for PPP projects and the actions of different 
agencies in the approval process. 
After approval, the bidding process starts. After scrutiny of 
the bids, concession awards are granted, following which 
financial closures are done with the banks and other 
lending authorities. The project may then start its 
operation provided that land, unencumbered from both 
legal and political standpoints, is handed over for 
construction. 
viability gap funding 
VGF was introduced in 2006 for PPP projects that have 
substantial economic and social returns but do not pass 
the standard threshold for financial returns. The scheme 
provides for budgetary grant assistance of up to 20% of 
capital costs. An additional grant of 20% of project costs 
can be provided by the sponsoring ministry, state 
government or public authority which owns the project. As 
of March 2009, 139 projects had been approved with a 
capital investment of Rs1,18,830 crore (US$25 billion) and 
a VGF commitment of Rs38,993 crore (US$812 million) 
(Planning Commission 2009: 6) 
The following are the eligibility criteria for VGF funding.
The project should be developed, financed, •	
constructed, maintained, and operated for the project 
term by a private sector company, selected by the 
government or a statutory body through open 
competitive bidding. In the case of railway projects that 
are not amenable to operation by a private company, 
this criterion may be relaxed by the Empowered 
Committee of Secretaries headed by the secretary to 
the Department of Economic Affairs.
A PPP project should be from the transport •	
infrastructure, power, education, health, tourism and 
urban development sector.5
5.  VGF in other sectors can be granted with the approval of the finance 
minister, Government of India.
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Figure 6.1 Flow chart for the approval procedure for PPP projects
Project feasibility study, 
 draft agreements and  
request for proposal




Appraisal of concession terms
Financial reviews and banking aspects
Finance Ministry, Planning Commission, 
Environmental Ministry
Recommendations of  
SFC
SFC comprises secretary of sponsoring 
ministry, financial adviser, joint secretary 
of the concerned division and 
representative of the Department of Legal 
Affairs.
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recommendations of PPPAC
PPPAC comprises the finance secretary 
and secretaries of the sponsoring ministry, 
the Planning Commission, and Legal 
Affairs. It can seek participation of other 
concerned ministries such as 
Environment.
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Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs 
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minister in charge of the infrastructure for 
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The project should be a service concession against •	
payment of a pre-determined tariff or user charge.
The government or statutory authority concerned must •	
certify that (a) the capital costs are reasonable and 
based on acceptable standards and specification and 
that capital costs cannot be further restricted to reduce 
viability gap expenditure from public funds; and (b) 
neither the tariff/user charge nor the project term can 
be increased to reduce/eliminate VGF. 
VGF is disbursed after the concessionaire has •	
expended the equity contribution required for the 
project. It is released in proportion to the debt 
disbursements remaining to be disbursed thereafter 
(Ministry of Finance 2010). 
India Infrastructure Finance Company 
The India Infrastructure Finance Company Ltd (IIFCL) 
provides long-term debt for up to 20% of the project costs 
for financing infrastructure projects. Until March 2009, 
IIFCL had raised Rs15,700 crore (US$3.27 billion) and had 
approved 88 projects with a total investment of Rs1,47,092 
crore (US$30.64 billion) of which IIFCL lending will be 
Rs18,720 crore (US$3.9 billion). It had already disbursed 
Rs4,891 crore (US$1 billion) up to March 2009. Of the 88 
projects sanctioned by IIFCL, financial closure took place in 
78 projects involving an investment of Rs115,689 crore 
(US$24 billion) (Planning Commission 2009: 6–7).
The government of India has authorised IIFCL to raise 
Rs10,000 crore (US$2.1 billion) through tax-free bonds 
and may permit it to raise further resources for supporting 
PPP projects of longer maturity, particularly in the 
highways and ports sectors (Planning Commission 2009: 7).
Type of vehicle
Base toll rate for highways 
of four lanes or more, and 
bypasses of cost less than 
10 crore1 (Rs per Km)
Base toll rate for bridges/
tunnels for structures of cost 
between 10 and 15 crore  
(Rs per vehicle per trip) Addition to bridge/tunnel toll for costly structures
Car, jeep, van,  light motor 
vehicle
0.65 5 Rs1 for every Rs5 crore or part thereof beyond Rs15 crore 
and up to Rs100 crore;  
Rs0.75 for every Rs5 crore between Rs100 and Rs200 
crore; and  
Rs0.50 for every Rs5 crore above Rs200 crore 
Light commercial vehicle, 
light goods vehicle or mini 
bus 
1.05 7.50 Rs1.50 for every Rs5 crore or part thereof beyond Rs15 
crore and up to Rs100 crore;  
Rs1.15 for every Rs5 crore between Rs100 and Rs200 
crore; and  
Rs0.75 for every Rs5 crore above Rs200 crore. 
Bus or truck 2.20 15 Rs3 for every Rs5 crore or part thereof beyond Rs15 crore 
and up to 100 crore;  
Rs2.25 for every Rs5 crore between Rs100 and Rs200 
crore; and  
Rs1.50 for every Rs5 crore above Rs200 crore.
Heavy construction 
machinery or earth moving 
equipment or multi-axle 
vehicles (3 to 6 axles)
3.45 22 Rs4.50 for every Rs5 crore or part thereof beyond Rs15 crore 
and up to Rs100 crore;  
Rs3.40 for every Rs5 crore between Rs100 and Rs200 
crore; and  
Rs2.25 for every Rs5 crore above Rs200 crore.
Oversized vehicles of seven 
or more axles
4.20 30 Rs6 for every Rs5 crore or part thereof beyond Rs15 crore 
and up to Rs100 crore;  
Rs4.50 for every Rs5 crore between Rs100 and Rs200 
crore; and  
Rs3 for every Rs5 crore above Rs200 crore.
Table 6.1: Toll tariff for national highways
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national highways Toll Tariff Structure
National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates and 
Collection Fee) Rules 2008 (Gazette of India 5 December 
2008) as amended by National Highways Fee 
(Determination of Rates and collection Fee) Rules 2010 
(Gazette of India 3 December 2010) gives the base rates 
for tolls in 2007/8 for highways with four lanes or more 
and for permanent bridges and tunnels. Table 6.1 gives the 
tariff for highways and for bridges and tunnels.
recommendations of the Chaturvedi Committee 
A committee chaired by Shri B.K. Chaturvedi, a member of 
the Planning Commission, submitted wide-ranging reforms 
intended to speed up investments in national highway 
development projects and meet the Government of India’s 
‘20km a day’ construction target. These recommendations 
were approved by the Government of India and sanctions 
issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways 
Office memorandum dated 5 November 2009. 
The changes in key provisions in the Model Concession 
Agreements are shown below.
Termination provision in Article 29.2.3 
Following implementation of the Chaturvedi Committee’s 
recommendations, there can be no reduction of the 
concession period agreed in the original concession 
agreement, even if the traffic exceeds the designed 
capacity early in the concession period. In the new 
formulation, the National Highway Authority of India 
(NHAI) may assess the cost of augmentation of capacity 
and issue a notice to the concessionaire to undertake such 
augmentation. NHAI may increase the concession period 
for a maximum period of five years so that the post-tax 
yield of 16% per annum on the equity investment is 
ensured. The concession can be terminated only if the 
concessionaire fails to undertake such augmentation.
exit policy for concessionaire
In the revised formulation, equity dilution up to 26% is 
now allowed during the construction period and for two 
years thereafter. After two years into the operation, the 
entire equity holding can be sold off subject to NOC from 
lenders. Article 48 on definitions of change in ownership 
and article 7.1(k) on representations and warranties have 
been amended to give effect to the aforesaid changes. 
Security for lenders
Article 40.2(b) of MCA has been amended to make a 
charge on the escrow account created for highway projects 
as security for indebtedness to senior lenders. Even before 
this amendment, the concessionaire’s right to toll receipts 
was circumscribed by the lender’s overriding control over 
the escrow account as per the normal escrow agreement 
for such projects. This amendment puts such loans in the 
category of secured loans so that credit flows are no 
longer constrained under extant RBI norms. 
model ConCeSSIon AgreemenTS 
In India, in most sectors, the PPP procurement process is 
non-negotiated. Recently, the government of India began 
encouraging domestic as well as foreign investors to 
participate in PPP projects on a design–build–finance–
operate–and–transfer (DBFOT) basis. It has issued 11 
standardised model concession agreements (MCAs) and 
four tendering documents with a view to achieving the 
objectives of a non-negotiated procurement process, namely, 
transparency, speed, simplicity and low bidding costs. Four 
MCAs are for highways: one each for national and state 
highways, one for operations and maintenance of highways, 
and one for up-grading national highways; two MCAs are for 
airports, one each for greenfield airports and for non-metro 
airports; one is for port terminals; one is for urban rail 
transit systems; and three other MCAs are for the operation 
of container trains, for the development of railway stations, 
and for procurement and maintenance for locomotives. 
Highways and ports constitute 75% of PPP investments in 
value and 70% in number of projects. The key features of 
their MCAs are described below. 
mCAs for highways
1. Concession period
The concession period is determined on a project-by-project 
basis depending on the volume of present and projected 
traffic, subject to a ceiling of 30 years. The time required for 
construction (about two years) is included in the concession 
period so as to give incentives for early completion.
2. Technical parameters
Only the core technical parameters of design, construction, 
operation and maintenance are to be specified in the 
contract, leaving enough room for the concessionaire to 
innovate and add value. 
3. Risk allocation
The upside risk of operating above-target traffic is no 
longer borne by the concessionaire. The concession period 
is not shortened if the designed capacity is reached in the 
middle of the concession period. The downside risk of 
operating below-target traffic is mitigated by the extension 
of the concession period by up to 20%. The political risks 
of land acquisition and environmental clearance are 
assigned to the highway authority, which is required to 
hand over possession of at least 80% of the required land 
and obtain environmental clearance for the project before 
financial close. 
4. User fee
The user fee is based on the declared principles and 
mechanisms and on the rates notified by the government. 
These are mentioned in Table 6.1. The user fee is indexed 
to inflation to the extent of 40% of the rise in the wholesale 
price index (WPI). 
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5. Financial close
The MCA specifies a period of 180 days to secure financial 
close, failing which the bid security is forfeited.
6. Operation and maintenance
MCAs provide for a mechanism to evaluate and upgrade 
safety requirements as and when necessary. This 
mechanism provides for traffic regulation, police 
assistance, emergency medical services and rescue 
operations. For contracts entered into after 5 November 
2009, the damages for breach of maintenance are 
calculated and paid for each day of delay until the breach 
is cured at the higher of (a) 5% of average daily fee and (b) 
1% of the cost of such repair or rectification for the 
balance period of the concession. Recovery of these 
damages is without prejudice to the right of termination. 
7. Right of substitution
The concession can be transferred from one company to 
another in the event of failure of the former to operate the 
project successfully. For contracts after 5 November 2009, 
equity dilution of the winning bidder/bidding consortium 
(change in ownership of the concession) is allowed by up 
to 26% during the construction period and for two years 
into operation, following which the entire equity holding 
can be sold off.
8. Force majeure
MCAs provide protection to the concessionaire against 
political actions that may adversely affect the project.
9. Termination
A concession contract may be terminated if the 
concessionaire fails to respond to the notice of the 
National Highways Authority of India to augment capacity 
within six months of the notice. Such notice may be issued 
if the average daily traffic in the project highway reaches 
the designed capacity in any accounting year. In the event 
of termination, the MCA provides for protection of the 
project debt by the Highways Authority. There are two 
possible situations:
if termination occurs as a result of default by the •	
concessionaire, 90% of the debt is protected
in the event of non-political force majeure such as •	
natural disasters, 90% of the debt not covered by 
insurance will be protected. If the concessionaire fails 
to commission the project owing to its own default, 
however, no termination payment will be due. 
mCAs for ports
The concession period is 30 years. The tariff of port 
charges is fixed by government inflation indexing up to 
40% of WPI.
The government is encouraging concessionaires to build 
infrastructures with large capacities, with redundancy of 
up to 30%.
Output specifications provide enough room for the 
concessionaire to innovate and add value.
Concessionaires not only procure civil works and 
equipment, they also handle cargo.
Time for construction of a port terminal is fixed at two 
years.
The key performance indicators include dwell time of the 
cargo at port terminal, berth productivity, vehicle-service 
time and ship-handling productivity.
Penalties are specified for continued failure in achieving 
requisite levels of performance.
Selection is based on revenue share with the port trust.
Only political risks are assigned to the port trust/
government. Termination payments are predetermined.
In the case of shortfall in traffic growth by 10% after 20 
years, the concession may be extended by five years. An 
increase of 6% in target traffic reduces the concession by 
18 months.
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InveSTmenTS In PPP ProJeCTS
PPP projects constitute a growing component of private 
investment in India’s infrastructure sectors, which have 
themselves been growing at a rapid pace over the last 
decade. The estimated share of private investment in 
India’s infrastructure projects during the current plan 
period (2007/8 through 2011/12) is projected at 
Rs619,591 crore (US$129.12 billion), 30% of total planned 
investment of Rs2,056,150 crore at 2006/7 prices 
(US$428 billion) as against Rs175,203 crore (US$36.5 
billion)6 during the 10th plan period (Planning Commission 
2009). Table 6.2 gives cumulative figures for projects 
under implementation and awaiting approval as of 
December 2009. 
Table 6.2: Investments in PPP projects under 
implementation/pipeline as of december 2009  









1 National highways 41,911 76,341 118,252
2 Major ports 10,509 18,466 28,975
3 Airports 18,777 18,777




5 Roads 60,865 39,482 100,347
6 Ports 51,549 17,436 68,985
7 Airports 500 4,120 4,620
8 Railways 500 312 812
9 Power 28,392 62,032 90,424
10 Urban infra 19,738 45,838 65,576
11 Other sectors 3,653 22,534 26,187
12 Total state 
government
165,197 191,754 356,951
GRAND TOTAL 241,111 376,561 617,672
GRAND TOTAL  
(in US$ billion)
50.23 78.45 128.68
Source: Planning Commission (2010)
6.  The official investment figures in US$ given in the Planning 
Commission document takes the conversion rate of Rs40 per US$ while in 
this paper the conversion rate of Rs48 for US$1 is used.
Table 6.3: estimated PPP investments during the 11th plan 











Airports 30,698 21,630 21,630
Energy 666,525 185,512 9,275.6
Ports 87,995 54,479 54,479
Roads 314,152 106,792 106,792






Telecommunication 258,439 177,686 0
Gas 16,855 6,528 1,305
Storage 22,378 11,189 0
Irrigation 253,301 0 0
Total (Rs crore at 
2006/7 prices)
2,056,150 619,771 204,063
Total (US$ billions) 428 129.12 42.51
The last column of Table 6.3 gives the sector-wide 
estimates of investment under PPP concessions during the 
current plan period while the column to the left of that 
gives the planned sector-wide amount over the eleventh 
plan period. Actual investments over the 10th plan period 
are given in the first column. The estimates are made on 
the basis of the following assumptions. First, in recent 
years, private investments in highways, ports and airports 
projects have been coming mostly through concessions 
agreements. Thus, it can be assumed that private sector 
investment will be only through PPP projects in these 
sectors during the current plan period. 
Second, as of now, investments in power projects are 
being done either by private companies or public sector 
companies such as National Thermal Power Corporation 
(NTPC). Since this trend is likely to continue in the 
remaining period of the current plan, it is assumed that 
only 5% of the private investments in the energy sector 
and gas sector will come through PPP projects. 
7.  Note that these projections are much lower than the estimates made in 
Table 6.2 for two reasons. First, this table gives estimates of planned 
investments during the current five year plan while Table 6.2 gives the 
investments in an aggregate compendium of projects including those 
spilled over from the earlier plan periods. Second, some of the projects in 
Table 6.2 particularly in energy, railways, and urban development may not 
involve any transfer or lease of public assets. So they are not PPP projects 
as per the definition adopted in this paper and therefore omitted in the 
estimates given in this table.
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Third, as not one private investment in telecommunications 
projects has followed the PPP route, it is assumed that this 
trend of pure private investment will continue in the next 
two years. Fourth, the railways PPP projects worth only 
Rs4,717 crore are under implementation as of December 
2009,  so it is assumed that only 30% of the projected 
private investments of Rs50,534 crore could be achieved 
under the PPP model during the remaining two years of 
the current plan period.  
On the basis of these assumptions, the share of PPP 
projects in private investments in the infrastructure sector 
is calculated to be about one-third, US$42.5 billion, out of 
the projected total private investment of US$129.12 billion. 
If the same one-third ratio is maintained in the 12th 
five-year plan period 2012/13 through 2016/17, projected 
aggregate PPP investments on new projects to be drawn 
up for implementation during the ensuing 12th plan 
period will be around Rs170 billion8 which is four times the 
estimated investments on PPP projects drawn up for 
implementation during the current plan period. 
Going by the above estimate and the Execution Noble and 
City of London (2010) finding that US$25 billion (including 
power projects, which were roughly US$3 billion) were 
invested during September 2006 through to February 
2010, about 60% of the estimated investment under the 
current plan has been made so far. The compliance rate, in 
terms of implementation of PPP projects out of those 
planned under the current plan, is much below 60%. This 
is because a portion of the investment shown in Table 6.3 
has come from projects planned and approved during the 
preceding plan periods that did not reach financial closure 
or could not be implemented for other reasons.
ProBlemS In ImPlemenTATIon oF PPP ProJeCTS 
Actual implementation of all infrastructure projects, 
including PPP projects, has fallen significantly short of 
projected investments. According to Gupta et al. (2009), 
the shortfall in 2007/8 and 2008/9 has been on two 
levels. First, Nodal agencies such as the National Highways 
Authority of India (NHAI) have not tendered projects as per 
the plan. Second, many tendered PPP projects have not 
found bidders owing to viability concerns and bidding 
eligibility criteria that restricted players who had been 
shortlisted for eight or more projects from bidding in 
NHDP Phase III projects (Gupta et al. 2009: 1). 
Approval of PPP projects has, however, picked up pace in 
recent years. According to the official PPP in India 
database (Government of India 2011), as of October 2010, 
515 PPP projects were underway. 180 PPP projects, each 
worth more than Rs100 crore, have been approved by 
8. Private investment is projected at US$500 billion, 50% of the total 
investment of US$1 trillion.
PPPAC9 from 29 August 2006 to 10 October 2010. 
Aggregate investment in these projects is of the order of 
Rs177,879.66 crore (US$37 billion); 164 projects worth 
Rs151,934 crore (US$31.65 billion) are in the roads and 
highways sector while ports account for 14 projects worth 
Rs14,807 crore (US$3 billion). As many as 144 projects 
(80%) were approved after April 2008, which clearly shows 
that the approval process has speeded up in recent years. 
A project may be delayed for several reasons even after its 
approval. First, in some cases only single bids come finally 
from the qualified bidders. Concessions cannot be 
awarded in such cases unless projects are restructured 
and they go through bidding process de novo. Second, the 
project may be challenged in the courts on several 
grounds, including faulty bidding process and for 
environmental reasons. Third, land assembly and utility 
removals may be delayed. In some cases, project 
authorities face steep claims for compensation for utility 
removal that they cannot pass on to the concessionaire. In 
other cases, governments face political opposition in 
acquiring land. Fourth, bank agreements may be delayed 
on account of certain changes in project parameters or in 
monetary policy between the time the project was 
originally prepared and the time when it finally cleared all 
hurdles. Such changes may increase the project risk and 
alter the project’s bankability coordinates. Finally, inability 
of concessionaires to raise long-term debt without 
suffering high cost of debt service is a general constraint 
in implementing PPP projects. 
The following examples illustrate the nature of specific 
problems faced in implementing PPP projects in India.
The Nhabhi Mumbai Greenfield Airport project is held up 
because of a dispute over whether mangrove clearances 
for the construction of the airport should be subjected to 
the same elaborate procedure of clearance as required for 
clearance of forests under India’s Forest Conservation Act. 
The matter went to the Mumbai High Court, which recently 
ruled in the affirmative. The process of environmental 
approval for mangrove clearance has to start afresh, going 
right back to the local district authorities in the areas 
where such forests are being cut, and will finally end with 
the approval by the central Environment Ministry. 
The fourth international container terminal project at 
Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Nhava Sheva, Mumbai worth 
Rs6,700 crore (US$1.4 billion) could not be awarded this 
year owing to litigation over the bidding procedure. 
Political opposition in acquiring land is a common cause of 
delay in project implementation in some areas in eastern 
and central India where Maoist influence is strong in the 
state governments. Sometimes places of worship also 
create obstacles to land acquisition. For example, a 
9. Projects below Rs100 crore are not required to be approved by this 
committee. They are approved by the Standing Finance Committee (SFC) 
or EFC and then by the relevant Minister. 
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capacity expansion project of Kolkata International Airport 
has been delayed as there was political opposition to 
acquiring land on which a mosque was built.
Out of 21 targeted PPP projects for major ports during  
2010/11, only two projects, at Tuticorin and Ennore ports, 
with investments of Rs14,000 crore (about US$3 billion) 
could be finally awarded (Business Standard 2010). The 
requirement of construction of excess capacity up to 30%, 
uncertainty over future tariff increases, and the system of 
not allowing the concessionaire to phase out capital 
expenditure in cases where it will take several years to 
reach full capacity, are cited as reasons for lack of 
sufficient interest by potential investors.
ForeIgn dIreCT InveSTmenT (FdI) In PPP ProJeCTS
Although 100% FDI is allowed in most infrastructure 
sectors, including roads, ports, greenfield airports, energy 
and urban development, foreign equity participation has 
been a meagre 1% of the total investment in PPP projects. 
According to the official PPP in India database, 27 foreign 
companies invested only Rs1,725.85 crore (less than 
US$3.6 billion) by way of equity participation.10 As reported 
in the database, foreign players have participated in only 22 
projects (7%); nine projects in the port and road sectors, and 
four projects in airports. Prominent PPP projects where they 
have equity stakes include Mumbai and Delhi international 
airports, Bangalore International airport, Delhi-Noida toll 
bridge, Pipavav port, and JNPT container terminal.
Road infrastructure projects are overwhelmingly dominated 
by domestic players with little presence of foreign 
investors. Among the domestic players, Larson & Toubro is 
the leader followed by GMR Infrastructure and IVRCL 
Infrastructure & Projects Ltd. In the case of small road 
projects, Sadbhav Engineering Limited is the leader company. 
ComPuTATIon oF reTurnS From hIghWAy 
InveSTmenT
The example of a hypothetical highway development 
project given below shows how to assess returns from 
such a project. Let us take the development of a 100km 
segment of a four-lane national highway that is going to be 
ready for operation from April 2012. The revenue streams 
from the project can be computed using the toll tariff 
structure given in Table 6.1. Assume that the distribution 
of traffic in the highway is as follows: cars and other LMVs 
constitute 30%; LCVs 30%; and buses and trucks 40% of 
the traffic. Assume also that: 
the average growth of traffic in the last two years has •	
been 10% from the baseline average daily traffic of 
12,500 vehicles in 2008/9 when the project was 
awarded
10. Malaysian companies are the leaders with investment in six projects, 
followed by the UK in four, Mauritius with three projects and two each by 
France, Germany, the UAE and the Philippines; and one each by the US 
and by Switzerland (Government of India 2011).
WPI rose by 5% in 2008/9, 6% in 2009/10, and is •	
expected to rise by 7% in 2010/11, and 
the estimated cost of construction of the segment is •	
Rs50 million per kilometre (US$1.02 million per km).
Total estimated annual toll revenue in this case in the first 
year of its operation in 2010/11 works out at Rs824 million 
(US$17.2 million) out of a total investment of Rs5 billion 
(US$102 million): that is a 17% return on investment in the 
first year. For such a project the bidders may do without a 
VGF grant as it is clearly a bankable project under DBFOT/ 
BOT (Toll), even if the designed capacity is reached only 
half-way through the concession period of 20 years. The 
exit option is also easy as there will be buyers for this 
concession at a good premium. 
ConCluSIonS
The potential of India’s infrastructure sector as an attractive 
destination for future investment has to be seen from a 
multidimensional perspective. First, India’s high growth 
over the last two decades, averaging about 7% per annum, 
has put a severe strain on its already low level of physical 
infrastructure for the size of its economy and its growth 
over the last two decades.11 Therefore, the marginal product 
of capital investment in India’s infrastructure ought to be 
considerably higher than in countries that do not have 
such acute infrastructure shortages. It is also higher than 
in many other countries that have a smaller market size 
and have been growing at a slower pace. The supply 
constraints and persistent demand for new capacity in 
transport infrastructure, energy and telecommunication 
witnessed in India in recent years are clear indicators of 
high potential private returns from these investments. 
Second, a higher level of good-quality infrastructure will 
facilitate entry of global players and foreign direct 
investment across the Indian economy. As more global 
players enter the Indian marketplace there will be higher 
level of competition, which will have a beneficial effect on 
the productivity of domestic manufacturing and service 
enterprises. Such competition will reduce surplus rents 
and the corruption that comes with such rents. Moreover, 
the demand for infrastructure services shall also increase 
with greater economic activity by global multinationals.
Third, but for improved infrastructure services, particularly 
in the power and transport sectors, India’s manufacturing 
industry will not be in a position to attain the scale and 
scope necessary for increasing its export growth potential. 
The growth of the manufacturing sector is essential to 
enable India’s burgeoning working-age population to find 
gainful employment opportunities. If this fails, instead of 
fuelling economic growth, India’s younger demographic 
profile will cause social tension and conflicts. 
11. The level of investments in India’s infrastructure has been low; it was 
5% of GDP in 2007 which is considerably less than the average level in 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America.
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Fourth, with greater levels of private investment in 
infrastructure projects, the government will be in a better 
position to provide budgetary support for critical services 
such as water supply and solid waste management, for 
which the willingness to pay is still not high in India. State 
governments will also be able to invest more capital 
resources in electrification, irrigation and water resources 
for India’s 600,000 villages. Such and investment will 
boost the growth of sectors such as FMCG, consumer 
durables, telecommunications, insurance, education, and 
healthcare services in those areas. This, in turn, will 
increase the demand for privately funded infrastructure 
services. 
For these reasons, the multiplier effect of investment in 
infrastructure sector is very high in India. On account of its 
scale and scope, India’s domestic market provides ample 
avenues for internalising the externalities and capturing 
complementarities associated with investments in 
infrastructure sectors. Considering their spill-over effects 
into other sectors of the economy, the aggregate social 
returns of such investments in India are also likely to be 
high.
The recent spurt in capital flow in PPP projects suggests 
that the private sector is beginning to appreciate the 
potential returns of these projects. Nonetheless, two major 
problems still remain. Leading global infrastructure 
construction companies have not yet effectively responded 
to the globally tendered bids in India’s PPP projects; and 
domestic players who can develop good-quality 
infrastructure within time and cost constraints are too few 
in number. Consequently, a significant number of projects 
have been drawing no qualified bid or only single bids, 
leading to cost and time overruns. In other words, private 
sector efficiencies are not being harnessed adequately. For 
these reasons, value-for-money (VfM) for PPP projects in 
India has been sub-optimal or below its true potential. The 
major challenge for the policymakers is that of finding 
innovative ways of promoting competition by facilitating 
the entry of global players and breaking the prevailing 
nexus between a few domestic players and project 
authorities.
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Many would argue about whether the implementation of 
public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the provision of 
infrastructure will diminish the role of government. 
Nonetheless, in Indonesia PPP is seen as a solution to the 
main constraint in infrastructure development, the 
financial gap in infrastructure funding. Although PPP has 
been used since the 1980s it still faces major challenges. 
The government has responded to the challenges by 
various policy enactments over the years but only the 
recent establishment of financing institutions and a 
government organisation responsible for PPP development 
has provided the basis for an emerging PPP framework. 
This chapter discusses the government’s role in the 
practice of PPP in Indonesia, its history, institutions and 
capabilities, PPP models, relevant organisations, public 
accountability, accounting treatment, procurement 
procedure, contractual agreement and financial aspect. 
The practice of PPP in Indonesia will be illustrated by two 
study cases that demonstrate good practice in PPP as well 
as the challenges it faces.
The provision of infrastructure through PPP in Indonesia is 
desired principally because of the demands for equitable 
infrastructure development, which encounter an obstacle 
in the form of governmental financial constraints. Other 
factors, such as the transference of risk to the private 
sector and the urgency of accelerating economic growth, 
are the internal drivers of developing PPPs in Indonesia. 
The government has acknowledged that the main factors 
in the development of PPP are the gap in infrastructure 
financing, the risk-related issues in infrastructure 
financing, and the need to improve the quantity, quality 
and efficiency of infrastructure provision to society . During 
the fiscal years 2005–2009, the government could finance 
only 17% of the total required amount for infrastructure 
construction, and the national bank covered 21%, which 
left 62% of this finance to be obtained through other 
sources.  
Figure 7.1: government funding capacity and required 
infrastructure financing 2010–14
  Source: Indra (2009).
The figures estimated for the fiscal years 2010–14 in 
Figure 7.1 show positive signs compared with the fiscal 
years 2005–9. The government’s financing capabilities 
have increased to 31%, or in the region of Rp451 trillion 
(see Figure 7.1), of the total required amount of 
infrastructure financing, leaving the remaining 69% to be 
financed by other sources. This figure is only a recent 
example of financial gap issues in Indonesia, and such 
issues are also experienced by many developing countries. 
To bridge the financial gap in the provision of 
infrastructure, the government of Indonesia has, since the 
early 1990s, supported the development of PPP by 
developing a PPP framework based on various regulations.
Nonetheless, as with other government policies in 
Indonesia where the decisions are made through highly 
political processes, the implementation of PPP faces 
several constraints, It is seen by many as a process where 
interference by a lot of interested parties can damage the 
accountability of PPP projects. For example, there has 
been evidence indicating the involvement of the former 
president’s family in early PPP toll road projects, which 
many people see as nepotism. There are also critics of the 
transference of risk to the private sector. During the 
economic crisis of the late 1990s, the private sector was 
unable to carry the risks, which led to the delay of PPP 
projects. This was seen as evidence of the government’s 
wrong perception of PPP as a method of transferring risk, 
although many argue that the impact of the financial crisis 
was too heavy to be borne by the private sector alone. 
These are some of the challenges in PPP implementation 
and explain why the PPP framework needs to be adapted 
from time to time.
hISTory oF PPP evoluTIon
The first phase of the evolution of PPP in the 1980s 
started in the toll road sector through the adoption of Law 
No. 13 Year 1987 / Undang-Undang No. 13 Tahun 1987 on 
Roads, and Presidential Regulation No. 8 Year 1990 / 
Peraturan Presiden No. 8 Tahun 1990 on Toll Roads. The 
immediate impact of the regulations can be seen in the 
building  of the Tangerang–Merak toll road. The 
government has tried to implement PPP in different 
sectors such as the electricity sector but progress has not 
been as fast as in the toll road sector. The next phase of 
PPP development in Indonesia was marked by a decline in 
PPP due to the tremendous impact of the economic crisis 
that hit Asia in 1998. 
7. Public private partnership in Indonesia: Is infrastructure development 
in Indonesia shifting towards a decreasing role for government?
Pradono, Wishnu Bagoes oka and diandra k. Pratami, Institute of Technology of Bandung
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Table 7.1: Indonesia’s PPP evolution
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Introduction for infrastructure 1998–2004: consolidation period 
following the Asian financial crisis 
and changes in the Indonesian 
political system
2005–9: laying the foundation for 
PPP project implementation through 
policy and regulatory reform to 
adopt international best practices
Source: National Development Planning Agency (2010).
More recently, the development of PPP in Indonesia was 
supported by the government with the adoption of best 
practices of PPP on the international level through the 
Presidential Regulation No. 67 Year 2005 on Public-Private 
Partnership in Infrastructure Development. The regulation 
served as a basis for all PPP frameworks until its revision 
in 2010 through the Presidential Regulation No. 13 Year 
2010. Government efforts to develop PPP can also be seen 
in the establishment of a government institution to support 
the PPP policy. As the foundation for a PPP framework in 
Indonesia has now been developed, an improvement in the 
quantity and quality of PPP project development is 
expected to occur in coming years. The development of 
PPP in Indonesia is illustrated in Table 7.1.
57TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD PART 2: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
The ChAngIng role oF governmenT In PPP
As explained above, Indonesia has experienced several 
changes in PPP implementation. These changes can be 
seen as a form of adaptation to the latest conditions. In 
accordance with the framework changes, the role of 
government in PPP has also changed over time. In the 
early years of PPP implementation, the government was a 
dominant player in the financing of PPPs. This can be seen 
in the dominant share of state-owned enterprises in PPP 
infrastructure projects. In the mid 1990s, the private 
sector was given a larger role in PPP project financing, 
although this was still relatively small compared with the 
role of the government through its state-owned 
enterprises. During this period, many projects were 
affected by the impact of the economic crisis and many 
also carried the consequences of longstanding corruption 
and nepotism. Therefore, many projects were taken over 
by the government and many were also stopped due to the 
government’s financial constraints. This shows that after 
the economic crisis, the role of government in PPP 
financing became more dominant. 
After the economic recovery in the early 2000s, the private 
sector began to take small initiatives in several project 
companies involved in toll road developments. The private 
sector’s role grew larger with the introduction of Ministry 
of Finance Regulation No. 38 (2006),12 which gives the 
government a new role in PPP project financing as a 
guarantor. During this period, the government’s role 
shifted slightly from being just a financier to being both 
financier and guarantor. Although still a dominant player in 
PPP financing, this new role has opened the door for the 
private sector to be more involved in PPP financing. As a 
result, during the late 2000s, the private sector became a 
major shareholder in several project companies, such as 
the Kanci-Pejagan (Central Java) and Jakarta Outer Ring 
Road section W1 (Jakarta) toll road projects. In the future, 
it is likely that the private sector will play a bigger role in 
PPP financing, as the government (through the Ministry of 
Finance and several recently established state-owned 
enterprises) will focus on the role of guarantor jointly with 
development banks.
Theoretically, the increasing role of the private sector in 
PPP financing can be seen as an act of privatisation 
(Khanom 2009). Owing to the nature of the private sector 
in maximising profits, the project should become more 
efficient compared with conventional infrastructure 
development. This is one of the motives underlying a 
government decision to implement PPP. 
12. Later revised through Ministry of Finance Regulation No 260 (2010).
From the perspective of the public sector, the change of 
the government’s role from financier to guarantor can also 
be seen as a form of efficiency in which the government 
may allocate its financial resource to fund other projects 
that are not under the PPP framework. Even so, the fact 
that infrastructure projects in Indonesia usually have a 
large amount of risk means that a role as project guarantor 
would remain a difficult task, especially when these risks 
are related to costs (such as land acquisition13).
The dominant role of the public sector can be seen as 
indicating a reluctance by the government in transferring 
some responsibility to the private sector. Nonetheless, the 
fact is that there are only a few financially viable projects 
offered for PPP, and owing to the projects’ marginal 
financial viability, government financial support is needed, 
often for a large amount. This explains why the state-
owned enterprises are often the dominant shareholders in 
infrastructure projects. Under the expectation that PPP 
financing will become more efficient, the government 
should improve the proposed PPP projects’ financial 
feasibility through economic development. That way, the 
role of the private sector in PPP financing would increase 
and, therefore, decrease the role of the government and 
increase efficiency.
The modIFIed-BoT model In PPP ProJeCTS
Indonesia developed PPP projects first in the early 1990s 
with the establishment of the Tangerang – Merak Toll Road, 
learning from the PPP experience in other countries. 
Nonetheless, the implementation of PPP in Indonesia 
shows Indonesian-specific characteristics. According to 
Yescombe (2007) there are four widely known 
implementation models: 
Design – Build – Finance – Operate (DBFO) •	
Build – Transfer – Operate (BTO)•	
Build – Operate – Transfer (BOT) •	
Build – Own – Operate (BOO)•	
In practice, three infrastructure project business models 
have been applied to toll road projects as illustrated in 
Table 7.2: the Pure Public Model, the BOT Model and the 
Joint-Venture Model, also known as the Modified BOT 
model (Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. 2007) ). In fact, only the latter 
two are considered to be PPPs.
13. The government is in the process of developing a new regulation on 
land acquisition with the House of Representatives, which it is hoped will 
solve the issues of land acquisition for infrastructure projects and reduce 
the land acquisition risk of such projects.
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Source: Indonesia Toll Road Authority Ministry of Public Works (2008).
In the BOT model, the private sector fully funds the 
financing of land acquisition, construction and operation 
and maintenance phase through project companies. In the 
recent practice of PPP, however, many projects have had 
marginal financial feasibility and, given its nature, the 
private sector is interested only in projects with good 
financial feasibility. Therefore, projects with a marginal 
financial feasibility are expected to have government 
financing participation14 for land acquisition and/or parts 
of the construction, which leaves the private sector parties 
to participate in other parts of the construction phase, in 
operation and maintenance, and phase financing. This is 
done to strengthen the financial feasibility of those 
projects with marginal feasibility in order to stimulate the 
interest of private investors to invest in the project. The 
participation of government through financing the 
project,15 as explained above, is the basic characteristic 
that differentiates the modified-BOT model from the BOT 
model. 
14. According to Presidential Regulation No.13 Year 2010 concerning 
Revision on Presidential Regulation No. 67 Year 2005 / Peraturan Presiden 
No. 13 Tahun 2010 mengenai Perubahan Peratyran Presiden No. 67 Tahun 
2005, the government can participate in the project financing through 
government support and government guarantees. Government support 
can be in the form of fiscal contribution on the land acquisition, paying for 
part of the construction, and other supports such as tax incentives, while 
government guarantees are a form of compensation covering the 
occurrence of certain risks associated with projects, which can be given 
with regard to the principles of risk control and management. The 
government financing participation referred to in the text refers to the 
government support, which is seen as a government investment. The 
government as an investor would, therefore, be compensated with a share 
in the project company, as are the private entities, as they both funded the 
project through the project company.
15. The participation of government through financing cited in the text 
above refers to the government support.
Table 7.3: Toll road network in operation managed by the 
private sector
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IV
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According to the Independent Auditors Report 2009 (HLB 
Hadori Sugiarto Adi & Rekan 2010), of eight toll road 
networks in operation managed by the private sector, six 
are using the modified-BOT model16 (Tangerang-Merak, Ir. 
Wiyoto Wiyono MSc, Surabaya-Gresik, Harbour Road, SS 
Waru-Bandara Juanda, Serpong-Pondok Aren) and two are 
using the BOT model (Ujung Pandang Tahap I, Makassar 
Seksi IV). The implementation of a modified-BOT model in 
most PPP projects can be seen as an indication of a high 
level of government intervention in the toll road business. 
This also indicates that, on average, the financial feasibility 
of projects in the toll road sector of PPP is still marginal, 
given that government participation in infrastructure 
funding is high. The government is still playing a key role 
in infrastructure financing.
16. Toll road projects with a government share in the project company 
owned through PT. JasaMarga (a state-owned enterprise) fall into the 
category of modified-BOT; the project company invests along with the 
private entities as they both funded the project through the project 
company. The participation of government through financing in the text 
above refers to the Government Support. Toll road projects with a 
government share in the project company through PT. JasaMarga fall 
within the BOT model.
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A third-party service provider can assist the project 
company on project construction (including engineering 
and construction), project operation and maintenance, and 
other aspects. Such providers can be contractors, 
providing construction services in the area of construction 
planning consulting, construction works and construction 
works supervision consulting; or they can be operation 
and maintenance operators, private contractors who are 
paid to manage and operate services.
The user of the project facility takes the form of a GCA, a 
company that buys the outcomes of the PPP project as a 
single buyer (single off-taker) and distributes them to the 
customers, such as those in the water and electricity 
sectors. The GCA acts as an administrator of the facility 
after the concession period ends. Authorisation and 
licensing bodies are governmental bodies with 
responsibility for environmental management, foreign 
investments and company establishment (for example, the 
Coordinating Body in Capital Investments), labour and 
immigration and other bodies needed to obtain 
authorisation and approval in order to operate the 
company (Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs 2010). 
From this scheme, we can see that the government is 
playing a key role in PPP implementation through GCAs 
and authorisation and licensing bodies.
relevant organisations for national PPP governance
There are four main national organisations involved in 
developing PPP policy: the National Development Agency, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Coordinating Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, and the Policy Committee for 
Accelerating the Provision of Infrastructure. The Public-
Private Partnership Central Unit (P3CU), a unit in the 
National Planning Agency, carries out most of the agency’s 
PPP development work, such as policy development, jointly 
with the Policy Committee for Accelerating the Provision of 
Infrastructure. It also carries out assessments of the 
demand for conditional support from the government, 
helping the government to identify the list of projects that 
are likely to be attractive for private investment.17 The 
Ministry of Finance, responsible for managing government 
investment, covers regulation (through the Directorate 
General of the Treasury), supervision (through the Central 
Government Investment Committee) and operations 
(through the Centre of Government Investment). The 
Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs regulates a more 
general and cross-departmental policy related to PPP than 
does the Ministry of Finance. The Policy Committee for 
Accelerating the Provision of Infrastructure (KKPPI) is an 
inter-ministerial committee, chaired by the coordinating 
minister of economic affairs, responsible for policy 
coordination related to the private provision of 
infrastructure. On the basis of the regulation, KKPPI is 
17. P3CU categorises PPP projects in three stages: potential PPP projects 
at the preliminary study stage, priority PPP projects where the PPP model 
has been identified, and PPP projects ‘Ready for Offer’, where bidding 
documents have been completed and government support has been 
approved (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 2009).
The CurrenT PPP SCheme In IndoneSIA
A typical PPP structure can be quite complex, involving 
contractual agreements between government, financiers, 
engineers, contractors, operators and customers 
(Transport Policy and Tourism Section 2008). The National 
Development Agency, as the responsible authority for 
formulating PPP policy, has recently developed a new PPP 
scheme. The following section will discuss the relations 
between the project companies (also known as Special 
Purpose Vehicles/SPVs) and their clients, the relevant 
organisations in national PPP governance, the financing 
scheme, the participation of local government in PPP, and 
the contractual scheme between a project company and 
its clients.
A project company and its clients
According to the new PPP scheme, project clients are 
divided into three types: 
the third-party service provider, which consists of •	
contractors and an operation and maintenance 
operator
the service off-taker, which is the user, and •	
the licensing and permitting agencies and government •	
contracting agencies (GCAs). The relationship is 











Figure 7.2: PPP project clients
Source: Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (2010).
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electricity, natural gas and potable water sectors.18 In the 
toll road sector, the Indonesia Toll Road Authority (BPJT) is 
the regulatory authority on toll road PPP development. Its 
duties include taking over toll road sections that have 
completed their concession period or where there has 
been failure to implement the concession agreement. The 
BPJT then recommends the next operation to the minister, 
re-auctions its concession, or conducts procurement on 
toll road investment through a transparent and open 
auction. In the seaport sector, each port has a different 
authority responsible for its operation and PPP 
implementation.19 The absence of a national port authority 
means that PT. Pelindo, a state-owned enterprise, is the 
GCA in obtaining development licences and port operation 
approval from the Ministry of Transport. The latter acts 
jointly with the Special Economic Zone administrator as 
the regulatory authority for granting business permits for 
the seaport sector. Other sectors, such as electricity, 
natural gas and potable water, have their own GCAs but 
most of them are responsible for off-taker issues. 
According to this scheme, the government is the central 
figure in developing national PPP policy, mainly through 
the National Planning Agency and P3CU. It also plays a key 
role in PPP policy development in specific industry sectors 
through the GCAs.
PPP financing scheme 
The project financing process involves resources such as 
the project company, project sponsors, local and foreign 
commercial banks, the Indonesia Infrastructure Financing 
(IIF), the Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Fund (IIGF), 
and multilateral development banks. The financing 
mechanism is divided into guarantees, loans and equities. 
The project company (also called a Special Purpose 
Vehicle/SPV), an Indonesian corporation either in the form 
of a private limited company, a state-owned enterprise, a 
regional-owned enterprise or a co-operative, is the central 
figure in the project financing process as it handles this 
entire process. The project company20 may consist of 
project sponsors, either from the private sector, including 
local and foreign investors, and/or government through 
18. As stipulated in the Presidential Regulation No. 67 Year 2005 on 
Public Private Partnership in Infrastructure Development (revised by the 
Presidential Regulation No. 13 Year 2010), there are eight types of 
infrastructure project that can be undertaken in cooperation with the 
private sector. As yet, only six of them have been implemented as PPP 
projects.
19. According to Law No.17 Year 2008 on Shipping, although seaport 
operational business is open to private entities there is no nationally 
specific organisation playing a key role in it.
20. In the toll road sector, there are project companies such as PT. Citra 
Marga Nusaphala Persada, PT. Marga Mandala Sakti, PT. Bosowa Marga 
Nusantara and many more handling the toll road project, as seen in Table 
7.3, where most of them have a major government share. Although the 
private sector is allowed to invest in the project company, only a few pure 
private project companies are involved in the toll road business, mainly 
owing to the lack of financial feasibility of most projects in Indonesia.
Source: Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (2010)














required to approve demands for government support 
(guarantees) for the consideration and approval of the 
Finance Minister (Coordinating Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 2010).
The government contracting agencies (GCAs) are a type of 
organisation that plays a key role in the PPP policy 
development and implementation. Following previous PPP 
practices and current regulations, the implementation of 
PPP in Indonesia varies from one sector to another. There 
follows a discussion of the GCAs in the toll road, seaport, 
61TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD PART 2: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
state-owned enterprises.21 Project companies are 
approved by the government to supply services through a 
contractual agreement between the GCA and the project 
company.
The Indonesia Infrastructure Financing (IIF) is an 
infrastructure-financing enterprise tasked with helping 
infrastructure development in Indonesia by increasing the 
availability of equity and long-term debt, particularly in 
Indonesian currency (the rupiah) for PPP infrastructure 
investment. The Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Fund 
(IIGF) is a state-owned enterprise responsible for providing 
a better framework for attracting larger-scale private 
investment in infrastructure projects. IIGF works as an 
instrument to protect investors in the infrastructure 
projects against potential risks that may have an impact 
on the investment.22 IIGF can also cooperate with the 
Multilateral Development Banks under the condition of 
insufficient resources to provide guarantees. The commercial 
banks provide funding through loans/credit for 
infrastructure projects.
The financing scheme used in Indonesia has yet to be 
evaluated owing to its recent implementation. The large 
amount of risk that surrounds infrastructure projects in 
Indonesia seems to be a significant problem for future PPP 
development. Therefore, the role of IIGF is considered vital. 
Yet, the framework of IIGF as set up under Presidential 
Regulation No. 78 (2010) and Ministry of Finance 
Regulation No. 260 (2010) fails to identify which risks can 
be taken over by the IIGF and which cannot. The regulation 
has also failed to identify the limit of IIGF guarantees. Both 
these problems are likely to open doors to misinterpretation 
and could pose a threat for future PPP development. The 
government should look to other countries that have 
successfully implemented PPP financing schemes, such as 
India with its viability gap funding (VGF) regulation.
21. In 2009, PT. Sarana Multi Infrastruktur, a state-owned financing 
enterprise was set up by the government to accelerate infrastructure 
development in Indonesia through Senior Loans (loan financing for 
infrastructure projects where PT. SMI acts as senior lender to the project); 
Subordinated Loan (loan financing for infrastructure projects where PT. 
SMI act as junior lender to the project); Convertible Loan (a financing 
scheme with a conversion to equity arrangement at loan maturity date); 
Equity Investments (a direct investment to infrastructure projects through 
equity ownership); Contract Financing (a working capital loan to 
contractors who build infrastructure projects where the disbursement of 
the loan is based on contracts granted by the project owner); and Invoice 
Financing (a working capital loan financing contractors who build the 
infrastructure project, where the disbursement of the loan is based on 
receivables of the projects).
22. As a state-owned enterprise, IIGF is established by the Ministry of 
Finance for the purposes of government guarantees on PPP infrastructure 
development, according to Presidential Regulation No 78 (2010) on 
Infrastructure Guarantees on Public-Private Partnership Project through 
State-Owned Enterprise. It is designed to be a credible guarantee provider 
for PPP infrastructure projects risks on the basis of contractual 
agreements in accordance with Ministry of Finance Regulation No 260/
PMK.011/ 2010 on Guidelines on Infrastructure Guarantees in Public-Private 
Partnership. IIGF is also allowed to obtain a sum of money in return for its 
services, calculated by considering all the spent cost and a fair amount of 
profit.
Figure 7.4: The project financing process
Source: Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (2010)
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Each of the financial resources illustrated in Figure 7.4 has 
different capabilities. PT. Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (SMI), 
for example, has a budget of Rp1 trillion to invest in two 
infrastructure projects (Kontan Online 2010). The 
government is also committed to increasing the capital to 
over Rp2 trillion, which is expected to be injected through 
the 2010 state budget revision. The Rp2 trillion equity, 
however, will be shared with the company’s subsidiaries 
PT. IIF. The IIF will provide funding towards commercially 
feasible, mainly private infrastructure projects financed 
through debt instruments, equity participation or 
infrastructure financing guarantees for credit 
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local government participation in public–private 
partnership financing
In Indonesia local government has participated in PPP 
projects all over the country and in many sectors. Local 
government can invest in PPP projects through local 
government-owned enterprises.24
The areas of responsibility depend on the level of 
governance. The central government’s remit is policy and 
strategy development of PPP whereas the local 
governments’ work focuses on the organising and project 
planning of the PPP. As can be seen from Table 7.4, 
between 2010 and 2014, local governments are expected 
to initiate 50 PPP projects, one ready-to-offer project, nine 
priority projects and 40 potential projects. Although local 
government is expected to initiate a large number of PPP 
projects, by project cost it is only expected to initiate 
US$15.852 billion-worth of projects; compare that with the 
total value of projects initiated by the central government, 
which is expected to be in the region of US$31.447 billion.
24. Presidential Regulation No.13 Year 2010 concerning Revision on 
Presidential Regulation No. 67 Year 2005 / Peraturan Presiden No. 13 
Tahun 2010 mengenai Perubahan Peratyran Presiden No. 67 Tahun 2005 
and the Interior Ministry Regulation No. 13 Year 2006 concerning Local 
Government Financial Management / Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 
13 Tahun 2006 Mengenai Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah.
enhancement. The IIF is supported by the equity 
commitments of its other founding shareholders. Beside 
the Indonesian government, through PT. SMI, these are the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Finance 
Corporation and the Deutsche Investitions-und 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH. They can commit to a 
maximum Rp400 billion, Rp400 billion and Rp200 billion 
equity respectively. PT. IIF will also receive ADB and World 
Bank loans each worth the equivalent of IDR 1 trillion, 
making the total capital invested Rp3600 billion. As for 
IIGF, the government has invested over Rp1 trillion as a 
state capital investment in the IIGF through the state 
budget in 2009 and, owing to the large scale of 
infrastructure projects, the capability of IIGF to provide 
guarantees will be enhanced yearly, as by next year 
another Rp1 trillion will be invested in the IIGF through the 
state budget for the year 2010, to enhance its capacity 
(Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs 2010). 
Currently, the IIGF is in the process of acquiring joint 
underwriting support from the World Bank worth US$500 
million to cover estimated project risks worth US$2 billion, 
owing to leveraging effects up to four times from the World 
Bank AAA-rating. National banking, according to Djunedi 
(2007), is expected to cover 21% of the total amount of 
infrastructure funds needs, which are expected to reach 
over Rp1,400 trillion during the years 2005 to 2009. For 
example, PT. Bank Mandiri is ready to allocate a budget of 
Rp38 trillion for infrastructure development, while PT. BNI 
and PT. Bank Danamon are each allocating a budget of 
Rp23 trillion and Rp3 trillion respectively. Even PT. BRI, 
which usually services small debtors, is allocating Rp800 
billion for toll road loans23 (PT. Media Data Riset 2010).
As mentioned above, the financial feasibility of the projects 
is one of the constraints in PPP infrastructure 
development. To solve this problem, government 
participation in PPP financing is needed to improve the 
financial feasibility of projects and to attract private 
investors (either national banks or investment companies)
through state-owned enterprises. 
23. PT. Bank Mandiri, PT. Bank BNI and PT. BRI are state-owned 
companies in the national banking business.
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Figure 7.5: Areas of responsibility for central and local 
government in implementing PPP 
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Local government participation in PPP project is mainly in 
small-scale projects owing to limited financial resources. In 
the future, however, the collaboration between government 
and local government in PPP funding is expected to 
increase as there is no regulation opposing this.


























Total 100 47,298,930 
Source: State Ministry of National Development Planning et al. (2010).
PPP contractual scheme
PPP is defined as a contractual agreement between the 
government, through a GCA, and business entities. 
Therefore, contractual agreement is an essential part of 
the PPP process and acts as a basis for PPP projects. 
A typical PPP structure can be quite complex, involving 
contractual agreements between government, financiers, 
engineers, contractors, operators and customers 
(Transport Policy & Tourism Section 2008). Based on the 
Presidential Regulation No.13 Year 2010 concerning 
Revision on Presidential Regulation No. 67 Year 2005 / 
Peraturan Presiden No. 13 Tahun 2010 mengenai Perubahan 
Peraturan Presiden No. 67 Tahun 2005, a project company 
undertakes the project and, therefore, all contractual 
agreements between various parties such as the 
government, through GCAs; financiers (Indonesia 
Infrastructure Guarantee Fund, Multilateral Development 
Banks, project sponsors, local and foreign commercial 
banks and Indonesia Infrastructure Fund); contractors 
(technical engineering, provision, construction and 
operation and maintenance contractors); and customers 
will be negotiated between themselves and the project 
company.
Public accountability 
In several countries, the decision to implement a PPP 
model on a project and the PPP implementation 
alternatives are based on a value-for-money (VfM) 
assessment. The traditional VFM assessment determines 
whether the provision of service and infrastructure can be 
done more cost-effectively and efficiently by implementing 
a PPP than through the standard public sector approach 
as defined by Public Sector Comparator (PSC). This 
approach is, however, based on assumptions that do not fit 
the conditions in Indonesia. For example, the traditional 
VfM assessment is based on the PSC, which implicitly 
assumes that infrastructure development by the 
government, or public sector, is a realistic option. This 









































condition may not apply in Indonesia because of its 
government’s fund limitation and capability (Coordinating 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 2010). Therefore, the Inter-
America Development Bank has recommended an 
alternative approach to project assessment, which 
recommends evaluating the top-ranked modality 
quantitatively, using a financial model to determine which 
modality yields the highest revenue-constrained project 
Net Present Value (NPV). 
One of the most striking aspects of public accountability in 
Indonesia is the lack of evaluation and monitoring. The 
Indonesia toll-road sector is one of the more advanced 
sectors in PPP regulation in its organisation and project 
accountability, and has been applying project evaluation 
and monitoring through regulations, although it is deficient 
in its implementation. In the toll-road sector, the post-
implementation information publication is divided into two 
parts according to the scope of monitoring. The first part 
covers monitoring of the toll road by the related ministry 
and the second part covers the monitoring carried out by 
the Indonesia Toll Road Authority (BPJT). The related 
ministry monitors toll road management, development, 
functions, benefits and performance. The Indonesian Toll 
Road Authority carries out a periodic evaluation of the six 
elements of minimum service standards. However, the 
monitoring reports could not be found. The post-
implementation information publication for other sectors 
have not yet been developed.
CASe STudIeS
This section will give two examples of PPP projects, one 
representing good practice and the other illustrating the 
challenges faced. The good-practice example will be 
represented by the Jakarta Outer Ring Road Section W1 
(JORR W1) toll road project and the challenges faced in 
PPP practice will be demonstrated by the Ungaran potable 
water project. Different aspects of the case studies will be 
discussed, such as each project’s PPP model, 
procurement, contractual agreement, financing and public 
accountability.
The Jorr Section W1 PPP Toll road Project
This PPP scheme was only developed in early 2010 and it 
is too early to say how it will stand the test of time. Even 
so, there are several conclusions we can draw from the toll 
road project with regard to the PPP model chosen, its 
financial aspects and public accountability. Regarding the 
implementation of the BOT model in the project, the 
benefit of the model is that the organisational scheme can 
be adapted to the latest format recommended by the 
Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs. This can be 
done by integrating the support from the other financial 
resources such as PT. Sarana Multi Infrastruktur, the IIGF 
and the IIF with that from the PT. Jakarta Lingkar Barat as 
the project company in the organisational scheme. The 
integration of such a model will ease the project financing 
by involving more financial resources. 
With regard to the financial aspect, the PPP between PT. 
Jakarta Lingkar Barat and the Indonesian government has 
benefited the government and the private sector. The 
government benefited from the PPP through the provision 
of a toll road that it did not have to finance fully, although 
some indirect government investment was provided 
through the minor share of a state-owned enterprise (PT. 
Jasa Marga) in the project. The private sector will benefit 
from the profits from operating the toll road, although it 
will have to carry a big risk burden. In practice this should 
not pose a problem for the private sector as the risk 
allocation issue will be taken into consideration by the 
government in determining the toll road tariff and its 
adjustment. 
With regard to the risk allocations issue in the contractual 
agreement, although the project is financially feasible, the 
risk allocation borne by a single party, the project 
company, might reduce the feasibility of the project if risks 
materialise. Although the project is now in operation, the 
experience illustrates the risk allocation problem in the 
form of project delays that have occurred when specific 
risks materialised. The risks borne by the project company 
alone are, however, expected to be compensated for by the 
high return of the project through tariff adjustment. 
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With regard to public accountability, the project appraisal, 
evaluation and monitoring have been carried out according 
to the relevant regulations. The appraisal and evaluation 
have been conducted so as to form a framework for the 
next steps of project development while the monitoring is 
conducted to ensure that the facility meets the minimum 
required standard. This shows that the related institutions/
organisations outside the project have contributed to good 
practice in the PPP arrangement, although the information 
on such studies has never been made publicly available. 
As for the project evaluation, it is too early to conduct an 
assessment as the facility has only recently started 
operating, although it is likely that in the future an 
evaluation study on the project will be conducted. 
The implementation of good PPP practice, such as the 
publishing of project information, has so far met 
constraints that could be caused by the lack of awareness 
about the project’s public accountability and the need for 
information transparency. These deficiencies occurred in 
the previous government era, when they were considered 
normal and therefore occurred on many projects, not just 
PPP projects.
With regard to the procurement process conducted by PT. 
Jasa Marga, which at the time was the regulatory body for 
the toll-road sector, it can be seen as an odd process and 
should not be considered an example to follow in future 
project procurements, although considering the situation 
at that time, what the company did was considered as 
necessary. 
The ungaran Potable Water PPP Project
The Ungaran Potable Water PPP Project has encountered 
several challenges in its development owing to its unique 
PPP scheme, awkwardness in the procurement process, 
unfair risk allocations in the contractual agreement, 
constraints in project financing and issues related to 
public accountability. The PPP scheme is unique as it did 
not establish a project company. The organisations 
involved in the project are the private company and the 
government contracting agency. The private partner is 
required to run the business and carries a larger share of 
the risks. PDAM of Semarang Regency receives a royalty 
irrespective of profit or loss, and earns dividends when the 
business earns a profit. This is an example of an unfair 
PPP, an arrangement that may result in project failure. This 
may in future be resolved through the establishment of a 
project company in accordance with the current PPP 
regulation. Through the project company, issues related to 
risk allocation could be resolved by the provision of 
guarantee funds from IIGF and equities from IIF and SMI, 
which will involve them as shareholders in order to share 
the risk allocation borne by the PT. STU. The involvement 
of those institutions may also increase the interest of other 
private entities to participate in the project as project 
sponsors.
The current PPP scheme limits the financial resources of 
the project and prevents it from developing its business in 
the future. The Ungaran Potable Water Project is 
considered a small-scale PPP project and, therefore, may 
not be too vulnerable to risks. If this kind of PPP scheme is 
applied to larger PPP projects with financial constraints, it 
may be more vulnerable to risks as the risks occurring in 
large-scale projects have higher probabilities and greater 
impact than in small-scale projects.
The lack of information on the Ungaran Potable Water PPP 
Project could be due to two factors. First, the government’s 
lack of awareness of the importance of public 
accountability and information transparency continues as 
in the previous government era. Secondly, the government 
may use PPP as a pretext for not publishing documents 
related to project information because of company 
information security issues (Yescombe 2007). Those two 
factors are likely to apply because many earlier 
government projects in Indonesia showed many deviations 
in project implementation from the current regulations or 
contractual agreements. The procurement process could 
also have encountered several challenges related to 
political intervention, as there are no independent 
committees established to evaluate prospective investors.
ConCluSIonS
The Indonesian government’s role in the provision of 
infrastructure has not diminished. The government 
continues to play a central role in policy development and 
maintains control of the implementation of PPP through 
government bodies such as the National Planning Agency, 
KKPPI, IIF and the Ministry of Finance. Although the private 
sector and other partners are expected to finance 69% of 
the infrastructure projects in Indonesia, the government is 
still a key player in infrastructure development. This can be 
seen by the implementation of the modified-BOT model in 
most PPP projects in Indonesia, where the government 
participates in the infrastructure financing as the major 
shareholder together with the private sector as the minor 
shareholder. In the future, however, the private sector and 
local government are expected to be more involved in 
infrastructure financing, in particular with regards to 
improving projects’ financial feasibility. The government’s 
role in PPP implementation can also be seen in the PPP 
schemes where GCAs and the authorisation and licensing 
body are the regulatory authorities, responsible for 
ensuring that projects meet the required standards and 
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InTroduCTIon
This chapter provides an overview of private finance for 
public service provision with specific reference to Japan’s 
private finance policy development and experience with 
private finance models. Any explicit and implicit 
institutional arrangements are history dependent in the 
sense that they are affected by the overall social and 
political context. This chapter investigates how the current 
private finance policy and practice in Japan have been 
formed under the influence of the social and political 
context. It examines data and cases that support the 
argument that the Japanese Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
has been driven by a motivation of the government and 
industries toward additionality to public finance rather 
than value for money in terms of cost and quality. Few 
projects have been implemented that have the potential 
for financial benefits that could be exploited by the private 
sector’s ability and effort. A case of bankruptcy of a PFI 
project showed that the government’s lack of capability in 
assessing the ability of the candidate private operator 
could lead to the failure of PFI implementation. The new 
public accounting model for local municipalities launched 
in 2008, in which the government’s commitment to 
long-term payment is treated as on the balance sheet 
might give the government a negative incentive towards 
extensive application of ‘additionality-driven’ PFI. 
Nonetheless, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in powr 
since 2009, is committed to an extensive use of PFI for 
public procurement. Japan is now facing the challenge of 
implementing PFI. 
SoCIAl And PolITICAl ConTexT
Mobilising private capital for public investment is not a 
recent development in Japan. The first model of public 
service provision with private finance was a joint venture 
between the public and the private, called the ‘third sector’, 
which was introduced in 1913. A steam shipping company 
in charge of shipping transportation between the main 
island of Japan and the isolated Sado Island was 
established with the sponsorship of the Niigata prefecture 
and three private shipping companies. 
The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme (FILP), Zaisei 
Toyushi, played a significant role in developing both 
infrastructure and politically important industries in the 
post-war reconstruction period. Under the FILP the 
government provides loans to politically necessary 
projects such as national highways and airports, where it is 
difficult to raise private funds. Users of infrastructures 
such as national highways and airports can easily be 
identified. The fact that users of these infrastructures 
could be charged for such use has made it possible to use 
the FILP for infrastructure development. The FILP is a form 
of government intervention in the financial sector to 
complement the private financial sector’s role (Iwamoto 
2002). As shown in Figure 8.1, before the fundamental 
reform in 2001, the main financial resource of the FILP 
was postal savings and public pension reserves. 
The FILP is expected to achieve a reduction in the tax 
burden. In addition, because the agencies are required to 
repay loans, it is expecte d that they will care about 
profitability, which will lead to project efficiency. In fact, the 
2001 reform disconnected the postal saving and public 
pension reserves from the FILP owing to the excessive size 
of the FILP and the huge money flow inside the 
government (Iwamoto 2002). Instead of these reserves, the 
FILP bond,25 which is issued by the newly formed Fiscal 
Loan Fund, is used to raise funds. After the 2001 reform, 
the FILP set up FILP agencies, whose activities include 
expressway construction, airports, water supply and 
sewers, and regional development projects. 
25.  As the FILP bond is backed by the national government, it is regarded 
as the de facto national debt. 
8. Current status and perspective of private finance in Japan
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The financial resource of the FILP was also mobilised to 
establish third-sector companies. Joint venture companies, 
called third-sector, were regarded as state-led companies 
that were closely related to the national policies of that 
time. The third-sector model was a result of the public 
sector’s active role in developing the national industry 
through its broader intervention in extensive private areas. 
The government played a role as a capital supplier to the 
private sector rather than as a capital demander in the 
public domain or the private domain, where projects tend 
to be profitable. Major infrastructures such as national 
highways, national railways, ports and airports were 
developed and operated by companies owned by the 
national government, which could raise funds with national 
credit. Private involvement in such major infrastructures 
was not common. This scheme allowed the government to 
meet the growing demand for public services.
Such aggressive national investment resulted in a 
considerable national deficit. When the Liberal Democratic 
Party government came to power in 1976, fiscal reform 
was a crucial issue of economic policy in Japan because 
the fiscal policy aimed at 7% annual growth. As the Ohira 
cabinet had had to give up introducing a consumer tax 
policy, the next, Suzuki, cabinet took the ‘fiscal reform 
without tax increase’ approach. As a result, from 1982 to 
1988 annual growth rates of subsidies for public works 
were negative. The Plaza accord26 in 1985 brought about a 
strong Japanese Yen, and the Nakasone cabinet eventually 
took the approach of domestic demand-led recovery. In 
contrast with the earlier stage, the government confronted 
a dilemma between the need for economic stimulus and a 
constraint in raising funds due to the excess deficit. It was 
in these circumstances that the idea of mobilising private 
finance as an alternative financial source for public 
enterprise projects was born in the 1980s.
Models of this type are projects of the urban and regional 
development industry and leisure and tourism industry. 
The third sector in the 1980s was driven by the 
government’s expectation that the private sector would act 
not only as a capable operator but also as a funding 
source. In practice, the government had faced criticism 
because many such projects had made considerable 
deficits that were supposed to be covered by the 
government. The key deficiency of the third-sector 
approach is the lack of governance due to ambiguity 
around risk sharing. The private sector expected the 
government to reimburse deficits if a project failed. Such 
an expectation gives less incentive to the private sector to 
operate efficiently. 
The collapse of the bubble economy was decisive for the 
loss of the third-sector model’s attractiveness, which 
meant that many third-sector companies went bankrupt. 
Blurred lines of responsibility between the public and 
26.  An agreement between the governments of France, West Germany, 
Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom to depreciate the US 
dollar in relation to the Japanese Yen and the German Deutschmark by 
intervening in currency markets.
private sectors created a serious moral hazard problem for 
both the private and public sector. There are two main 
reasons for the failure of the third-sector approach (Akai 
2006):
lack of clarity in risk allocation between the public and •	
the private sectors
low transparency of third-sector companies, that is, •	
those regarded as organisations outside the control of 
the public sector.
The use of the third-sector model became limited to areas 
such as local railway services, which cannot make a profit 
from user payments alone. 
At the same time, in the early 1980s, the considerable 
deficit of the national railway companies was revealed. 
Because these state-led companies were owned by the 
public sector, their deficit could be covered by general tax 
or additional debt issue. The revelation of the deficit in 
these companies made the nation aware of their lack of 
governance in achieving operational efficiency, owing to 
public ownership. Privatisation has the effect that the 
government is not responsible for bailing out failing 
companies. Therefore, the primary objective of 
privatisation in Japan is to provide more effective 
governance rather than to overcome difficulties in raising 
funds. 
emergenCe oF PFI
Since the bubble economy’s collapse around 1990, the 
Japanese economy has suffered a severe recession. The 
Japanese government implemented economic measures, 
including expansion of public investment, which eventually 
led to the official declaration of a fiscal crisis by the 
Ministry of Finance in 1995, owing to the heavy burden of 
the fiscal deficit. Since then, the Japanese government has 
applied an austerity economic policy that has led to a 
decline in public investment. A loss in tax revenues due to 
the rapidly ageing society has contributed to the 
difficulties for the government in raising funds for public 
works. 
Under these circumstances, the government started to 
discuss PFI, which was becoming popular in the UK at that 
time. PFI was recognised as an alternative to the third-
sector model that would overcome the lack of governance. 
In the early reports on PFI, it is insisted that PFI is a model 
for accessing private capital for developing public facilities 
without causing moral hazard in the private sector as it 
requires an agreement for clearly defined risk allocation 
between the public and the private sectors. 
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The report Nikkenren Vision, published by the Japan 
Federation of Construction Contractors in 1996, was the 
first step towards introducing PFI in Japan. The report was 
written against the background of the construction 
industry’s need for further opportunities to undertake 
public works. The Japanese government also tried to 
stimulate the recession economy under the austerity 
economic policy regime. Public discussions, led by the 
central government, about introducing PFI to Japan started 
in 1997. The government decided to cut 15% of 
expenditure for public works as one of the policies of 
national fiscal reform. In 1997, the Ministry of Construction 
and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
established task force groups consisting of academics and 
practitioners from relevant industries. A task force 
organised by the Japan Project Industry Council was 
influential in informing PFI policy development from the 
private sector’s perspective. The Liberal Democratic Party 
government started discussions aimed at introducing PFI, 
which had been developed in the UK at that time, as a new 
public procurement system in the emergent economic 
policy plan.
In studying the process of PFI introduction, it emerged that 
the UK model was inconsistent with legislation in Japan. 
The PFI model in Japan had to be modified to be 
consistent with Japanese law. The issue of ownership was 
one of the key considerations. In the UK, the build–
transfer–operate (BTO) model, under which the 
government has the ownership of facilities during the 
operation period, is not permitted because this is 
interpreted as a deferred payment for construction. The 
UK government permits only the private ownership of 
facilities (Ryrie Rule). In Japan, by contrast, private 
ownership and administration of legally defined public 
assets are not permitted under the legislation on the 
administration of public assets. Eventually, the task force 
allowed the BTO model to be included in PFI in Japan. 
Since then, it has been claimed that the resulting PFI Act  
(see next section) is an obstacle to applying PFI for the 
operation of infrastructure facilities. The discussions 
before the enactment of the PFI Act focused on how to 
implement PFI within the existing legal framework rather 
than exploring how value for money could be obtained 
through PFI. 
Although the official objective of using PFI was to achieve 
economic efficiency, the real reason behind PFI 
introduction in Japan was the need for an alternative 
financial resource other than public capital to meet the 
demand for public services. It should be noted that the 
construction industry was one of the influential interest 
groups active in the course of PFI policy development. The 
public accounting treatment of PFI does not seem to have 
been raised as a topic of debate at that time.
develoPmenT oF PFI In JAPAn
Shaping the PFI business model
The development of Japanese PFI began in July 1999 
when the Act on the Promotion of Public Facilities 
Development in Use of Private Finance (Minkan shikin tou 
no katsuyou ni yoru koukyo shisetsu tou no seibi tou no 
sokushin ni kansuru houritsu) was legislated under the LDP 
government. This Act is commonly referred to as the PFI 
Act although PFI in Japan does not mean a specific model 
such as that to which the term applies in the UK.27 In 
Japan, PFI is referred to as a scheme and the basic 
principles are stipulated in Article 3 of the PFI Act: 
greater involvement of private enterprises with the aim •	
of achieving appropriate allocation of roles between the 
state, local governments and private enterprises and 
efficient use of public financial funds, and 
exploitation of the private sector’s managerial •	
capabilities, ingenuity and innovative ideas. 
The PFI Act defines the purpose of PFI, the applied areas, 
the procurement process, the legal actions for promoting 
PFI, and instalment of the PFI promotion committee under 
the Cabinet Office. Soon after the enactment of the PFI Act, 
the Cabinet Office, which plays a central role in setting up 
the shape of the Japanese PFI model, published basic 
policies on implementing PFI projects, stipulating specific 
principles for PFI projects. These are:
openness:•	  PFI projects must have a public 
accountability 
use of private capability resource:•	  PFI projects must 
use private financial resource, and private technological 
and managerial capability resource
efficiency:•	  PFI projects should  be made efficient and 
effective by respecting the private sector’s autonomy 
and innovation
equality:•	  the process that assesses the 
appropriateness of PFI adoption and the process for 
selecting the successful bidder must guarantee equal 
treatment of all parties
transparency:•	  the whole process from the idea 
development stage to the end of contract period must 
be transparent 
objectivity:•	  each assessment process must be 
objective 
contractualism:•	  in an agreement between the 
government and the private company, the roles and 
responsibilities of each party to the contract must be 
clearly defined
27.  In the UK, PFI is defined as a specific model whereby the government 
pays a service fee to the private company concerned. 
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independence:•	  entities undertaking PFI projects must 
be independent from their parent company in both 
legal structure and accounting. 
The following standardised guidelines have been published 
by the Cabinet Office: 
Guideline for a process of implementing PFI projects •	
(2008)
Guideline for risk allocation in PFI projects (2001)•	
Guideline for VfM (2008)•	
Guideline for PFI contracting (2003)•	
Guideline for monitoring PFI projects (2003).•	
Some local governments at prefecture and municipality 
level have developed their own guidelines; many of these 
are similar to those published by the Cabinet Office but 
some are more detailed than the Cabinet Office guidelines. 
Ministries in charge of procurement using PFI, such as the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT) and the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) have 
published their own guidelines or manuals for specific 
types of projects. MEXT has published a manual for 
projects for seismic reinforcement of publicly owned 
school buildings. MLIT has developed software to calculate 
the value for money of business cases. 
Application areas
As of 2010, 366 PFI projects had been publicly announced 
in Japan since 1999. The annual number of announced PFI 
projects is 40 to 50, a figure that has remained constant 
since 2002. The annual total value of announced PFI 
projects has been approximately Y30 billion since 2005. 
PFI projects contribute approximately 1.5% of new total 
public fixed asset formation, which is significantly less than 
in the UK where 10% of public projects in terms of value 
are implemented by PFI. Areas where PFI has been 
adopted include educational and cultural facilities (31%), 
funeral parlours and waste treatments (19%), public 
buildings and accommodations (19%), and car parks and 
social housing (11%). As will be explained below, a 
dominant PFI model is one in which the private sector is 
involved only in designing, constructing and maintaining 
buildings but not in their operation, which may not bring 
substantial value for money. Major infrastructures such as 
roads, railways and rivers have not been procured by PFI 
as the legislation on the administration of public assets 
does not allow for private sector administration of areas 
under government control, though the interpretation of the 
legislation is controversial.
ISSueS oF JAPAn’S PFI
‘hakomono’ PFI – poor opportunities for value for money 
A specific feature of PFI in Japan is the fact that the 
dominant model is one in which private companies are 
usually involved only in the design, construction and 
maintenance of PFI project facilities. Private companies are 
rarely involved in the operation of PFI projects facilities 
and, even when they are involved, their involvement is 
generally limited to minor aspects of the operation of the 
PFI projects facility. Such PFI projects are referred as 
hakomono PFI projects. The main task of private sector is 
just to create building shells and to maintain them. 
Therefore, hakomono projects rarely offer opportunities for 
private companies to use innovative technologies. Higuchi 
(2006) estimates that approximately 85% of PFI projects 
begun up to 2006 could be characterised as hakomono PFI 
projects. 
Less involvement of private companies in the operation of 
PFI projects implies that they have less opportunity to 
enhance value for money by applying the innovative 
technologies that differentiate these companies from the 
public sector. Therefore, in theory, hakomono PFI projects 
are not attractive in terms of exploiting the potential value 
for money. The efficiency principle is clearly stipulated in 
the PFI basic policy. The dominance of hakomono PFI 
projects raises a question as to whether the efficiency 
principle has been respected in practice. 
Inappropriate assessment of value for money
Considering the disadvantages of PFI, ie expensive cost of 
capital and of transactions, it would be difficult to argue 
the business case for using PFI for hakomono projects . 
This raises the question of why hakomono PFI projects are 
dominant in spite of this. As long as we assume that the 
government sees PFI as an alternative model of fund 
raising under the austerity economic policy regime, we 
may infer that it might be motivated to manipulate the 
business case to justify PFI. 
The value-for-money assessment is a key process in 
determining a potential PFI business case. The first edition 
of the guideline for such assessments was published in 
2001 and revised in 2010. It provides a basic rationale for 
conducting a public project by PFI. This guideline provides 
a method for quantitative assessment rather than 
qualitative assessment, on the basis that the quality of 
service provided by the private enterprise should be equal 
to the quality provided by the public sector. Therefore, 
although cost savings are merited as a source of value for 
money, the guideline does not provide clear instructions 
on how to calculate PFI life-cycle cost (LCC). It only 
mentions that the basis of LCC for a PFI project must be 
clearly assessed by employing consultants or by 
conducting surveys of similar projects, or conducting 
market surveys. Profitability and the financial plan of a 
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Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV))28 must also be taken in 
consideration. If a project is planned in an area for which 
there is no track record on which to base a business case, 
assessment will be vulnerable to manipulation. Even if 
there are such track records, the reliability of those ex-post 
assessments of value for money is dubious. According to 
Higuchi (2006), most of those running the PFI projects in 
Japan were told that a considerable proportion of the value 
for money was realised by the procurement of services 
through PFI. But this reduction in prices is speculated to 
have arisen because general construction companies no 
longer participate in scandalous illegal bid-rigging. In fact, 
a reduction in prices has also been observed for projects 
procured by traditional methods. In addition, many general 
construction companies complain that they cannot gain 
sufficient profits from the PFI projects, partly because of 
extremely low pricing caused by excess competition 
(Higuchi 2006). If the government refers to such track 
records when making the business case for future PFI 
projects, it could lead to overestimating their value for 
money. 
Transparency 
The government neither commits to disclosing business 
cases for PFI nor forces local government to disclose, 
though the guideline encourages doing so. A survey 
conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2008 shows that the 
rate of value for money, ie the ratio of cost reduction 
against the public sector comparator (PSC), was disclosed 
in 88% of PFI projects. In more than 60% of PFI projects, 
PFI LCC was calculated by just multiplying a constant ratio 
with the PSC, which the public suspected was an arbitrary 
figure. In fact, the reason for using this constant ratio was 
disclosed in only 1.3% of the projects covered in the 
survey. In 2008, a report by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (MIAC) on the assessment of PFI 
policy gave an opinion about improving objectivity and 
transparency. The 2010 revision of the value-for-money 
assessment guideline encourages estimating by 
accumulating unit costs and discourages the easy 
application of a constant ratio to the PSC. MIAC also 
pointed out public officers’ lack of knowledge about value 
for money assessment. There have been cases where 
public officers did not check the assessment reports 
prepared by a consulting company. This implies that there 
are cases where value for money has been disregarded in 
the business case process. 
Accounting treatment
As far as the authors know, a special guideline for 
accounting treatment of PFI has yet to be published. 
Article 86 in the Constitution of Japan states that the 
Cabinet shall prepare and submit a budget for each fiscal 
year to the parliament (Diet) for its consideration and 
decision. This is called the annual decision principle of the 
28.  A Special Purpose Vehicle is a vehicle established solely for 
undertaking a specific project. 
budget. In practice, because the period of the state 
obligation does not necessarily coincide with the period of 
a fiscal year, the Public Finance Act allows a legal 
obligation to be fulfilled over multiple years under the 
authorisation of the Diet. As a PFI agreement typically 
involves a commitment of payments over several decades, 
the government has to seek an authorisation from the Diet 
to commit to the payments for multiple years. The Public 
Finance Act regulated the maximum period of this 
commitment as five years, but the PFI Act allows 30 years’ 
commitment for PFI projects. The reason that the Public 
Finance Act limits the maximum commitment to five years 
is to avoid the possibility that there will be a failure to deal 
with unforeseen fiscal demands. It also allows a certain 
level of fiscal flexibility in the future. 
Misumi (2005) points out that in recent fiscal years the 
trend has been towards an increasing ratio of planned 
expense to the maximum limitation amount of the State 
obligation commitment, although the latter does not itself 
seem to increase. In addition, the ratio of the State 
obligation commitment for PFI to the total amount of 
committed expenditure also shows an increasing trend. 
Deregulation of the maximum period for the State 
obligation commitment would put a heavier burden on the 
state obligation in the future, as the PFI becomes more 
pervasive.
Although there is no special guideline for the public 
accounting treatment of PFI projects, the method can be 
understood by applying the public accounting treatment of 
the State obligation commitment, which is provided in The 
Guideline of Public Accounting for Local Governments, 
published by the MIAC (2008). 
Whether the obligation is regarded as a decisive debt or 
not depends on the type of PFI project. The obligation is 
regarded as decisive only if the service fee is separated 
into two parts: capex (capital expenditure) and opex 
(operation expenditure), under the BTO model. As the BTO 
model requires ownership transfer from the private 
company to the government when construction is 
complete, the debt obligation also comes into effect at that 
time. Another condition necessary to make the debt 
obligation decisive is that the price of the facility should be 
determined. If the service fee is determined on the unitary 
payment basis, however, the price of the facility does not 
become clear. Therefore, the obligation of long-term 
payment is regarded as on-balance sheet only under the 
BTO model with non-unitary payment. In the other cases, 
the obligation is off-balance sheet but the maximum 
limited amount of the obligation commitment must be 
noted as a special notification. In addition, even if the 
obligation has already been made, the obligation is treated 
as a contractual debt (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIAC) 2008). 
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lack of governance – risk-free lender and government 
monitoring
An important case of failure in PFI implementation is the 
bankrupt project of the Thalassotherapy facility of Fukuoka 
City, a user-payment project that was the third PFI project 
in Japan. Eventually, the bankruptcy of the project caused 
a four-months-long interruption of service provision. The 
main sponsor of the project was a medium-sized 
construction company. In 2006, the sponsor company 
went bankrupt owing to its heavy burden of PFI project 
deficit. In this project, there was an agreement that 
Fukuoka City had to buy out the facility at a price high 
enough to cover the amount of senior loan in the case of 
contract termination. Therefore, the senior lender did not 
take the risk of financial deficit. In addition, all risks related 
to this project were passed through to the sponsor 
company, to which was delegated the operational work as 
well. One of the problems of its governance failure was that 
the risk-free lender was not motivated to monitor the 
operational management of the SPC. The second defect of 
this governance structure was insufficient monitoring by 
the government of the managerial capability of the 
candidate bidder. The winning bidder overestimated the 
demand for the facility in order to gain the contract, which 
eventually resulted in too heavy a burden of demand risk 
when users did not materialise in the expected numbers. 
In addition, Fukuoka City did not request bidders to submit 
their financial condition so that it could assess whether the 
bidders had enough capacity to bear the demand risk. 
Fukuoka City did not know the financial structure of the 
SPC and the financial health of the sponsor company. 
Thus, even after reporting the financial deficit of the 
project, Fukuoka City had an expectation that the lender 
would intervene to continue operating the project. 
Eventually, as Fukuoka City did not prepare an action plan 
and institutional arrangement that would prevent 
interruptions in service provision should the project 
become bankrupt, the service was not provided for four 
months. According to Higuchi (2006), cases where the 
senior lender does not take any risks are not rare. All risks 
are passed on to contractors and the senior lender 
arranges an agreement for the government’s buy-out at a 
price covering the loan amount. 
nominating process
The government and bidders are not allowed to have 
one-to-one communication during the bidding process. 
This prohibition of communication hinders the possibility 
of making the most of the know-how and innovation of the 
private sector. In addition, bidders are required to spend 
considerable sums on preparing the bidding 
documentation, including the design of the facility, which 
will have been in vain in the case of an unsuccessful bid. 
Therefore, bidding costs are a source of risk for, and a 
disincentive to, potential bidders. 
reCenT develoPmenTS relATed To PFI
Having gained some experience with the PFI process, both 
the private and public sector realised the need for further 
improvement of PFI policies. A recent influential report 
from the public sector is the one published by MIAC in 
2008 on the assessment of PFI policy, which makes the 
following observations.
The objectiveness and transparency of value for money •	
is not sufficiently assured.
Both the public sector and private sector are •	
overwhelmed with determining the appropriate 
allocation of the various risks. 
Monitoring of PFI projects has not been conducted •	
adequately by public bodies.
Adequate consideration has not been given for •	
companies to demonstrate creativeness and 
appropriate technology and to simplify the bidding 
process for private companies. 
The attitude of this report towards PFI is not negative but it 
raises several concerns about the implementation of PFI in 
practice. 
Looking at the recent trend in PFI, this would seem to be 
downwards for both project numbers and total value. The 
private sector has raised concerns about the diminishing 
attractiveness of PFI, from its own perspective, owing to 
the above issues. The amount of debt of both the national 
government and the local governments has kept growing. 
Though Japan experienced a change of political power 
from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, the DPJ government has 
succeeded in making PFI a key policy for its economic 
growth strategy. The government has announced several 
measures for promoting PFI further. Firstly, the 
government has set a target of doubling the value of public 
investments procured by PFI by 2020. Secondly, the 
government has referred to promoting the concession 
model, whereby the government provides the private 
sector with a concession to operate and develop public 
assets that are chargeable to users, such as toll roads and 
railways, without transferring the ownership of these 
assets from the public to the private sector. The 
introduction of the concession model is interpreted as a 
deviation from relevant legislation that so far has 
constrained the private operation of public assets. Thirdly, 
the nomination process for successful bidders has been 
revised so as to provide incentives for private sector 
entities to participate in biddings and to innovate. Fourthly, 
support for local governments has been enhanced to 
promote PFI in relatively small municipalities. This includes 
developing a database for information sharing about PFI 
cases implemented by local governments and providing 
appropriate advice to local governments. Fifthly, more 
transparency will be promoted. 
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Transaction cost reduction – PFI without SPC
The establishment of the SPC is important for project 
stability by securing both independence from the sponsors 
and transparency. It requires considerable expense, 
however, and this is regarded as a transaction cost that 
hinders the promotion of relatively small-scale PFI 
projects. An emerging model of PFI in Japan is one without 
the instalment of an SPC (Special Purpose Company), 
despite the principle of independence provided in the 
basic policy. This model is applied in order to save the cost 
of establishing the SPC. The background to the emergence 
of this model is a continuous trend of decline in the 
numbers of applicants for PFI project biddings. If the need 
to establish an SPC can be avoided, it is expected that 
more private companies will be interested in participating 
in PFI projects, particularly in smaller-scale ones. The 
absence of an SPC will, however, make it more difficult to 
secure managerial independence and transparency. 
Despite the disadvantages of this model, the Cabinet 
Office’s Annual Report (2010) regards it as permissible to 
promote small-scale PFI projects with small initial 
investment while deploying measures to alleviate the 
disadvantages of this model, of which examples are shown 
in Table 8.1. 
According to the survey conducted by the Cabinet Office, 
the PFI model without SPC creation is likely to be seen in 
projects for car parking/bicycle parking and the 
rehabilitation of air conditioners. The 2010 Cabinet Office 
Annual Report concludes that this model may be beneficial 
for projects with little initial investment and simple 
operation tasks. The private companies are likely to have a 
stronger anxiety than the public authorities about not 
installing the SPC. Therefore, when applying this model, 
the public authorities should be concerned about the 
following issues:
the need to structure each scheme with clear task and •	
responsibility allocation
flexible consideration for financial procurement•	
the specification of a clear statement of risk and its •	
allocation
monitoring for stable operation of the project.•	
The private companies are also required to set up special 
arrangements for compensating for the lack of 
independence and transparency through measures such 
as, for example, financial procurement and clarification of 
risk management. 
Table 8.1: measures for alleviating disadvantages of PFI without SPC
Subject of measurement Comments of public sector Comments of private sector
Stability Securing joint and several surety that 
can succeed a project appropriately
Administration of finance and management by the lenders 
Monitoring by the third party 
Purchasing performance bond 
Collaboration with financial support company 
Securing surety
Independence in management Clear statement on the role of group 
members
Instalment of a special purpose division in a company 
Establishing an independent accounting sheet
Risk – Making an agreement on risk allocation and independency with a 
consortium
Project continuity Requiring submitting a method to 
secure project continuity to the 
private company
Securing a back-up service 
Inviting substitute companies based on the direct agreement between 
the public authority and the lenders
Management of self-monitoring Monitoring by accountants and report 
submission
Outsourcing of self-monitoring 
Monitoring by an independent division within a company 
Instalment of a management board
Source: Cabinet Office (2010).
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ConCluSIonS 
The use of private finance for public service provision is 
not a recent development in Japan. Particularly from the 
1980s, when the government was constrained by a 
considerable public deficit, the third-sector model was 
used to access private capital as a complementary funding 
resource for public projects, which eventually caused 
moral hazard in the private sector owing to ambiguous risk 
allocation. PFI was expected to be an alternative model for 
enabling access to private capital, which overcomes the 
shortage of the third-sector model as it provides clear 
allocation of risk between the public and the private sectors. 
Japan’s PFI has seen constant growth for the last decade. 
At the same time, those experiences have left several 
challenges in exploiting a ‘real’ benefit of PFI. As we 
observed, Japan’s PFI of the first decade of the present 
century has been driven by the merit of bringing 
additionality to public finance, rather than economic 
efficiency. It was distorted by the inappropriate off-balance 
sheet accounting treatment and a value-for-money 
evaluation method that was vulnerable to manipulation. 
Eventually, hakomono PFI has become a dominant model 
and it is not likely to result in value for money. In fact, 
because such a hakomono PFI has been treated as on 
balance since 2008, this type of PFI has become less 
attractive even for the public sector. In such 
circumstances, the national PFI policy is moving in a new 
direction in order to exploit the ‘real’ PFI benefit. 
The direction of the current national PFI policy development 
can be summarised in the following four points. Firstly, the 
government aims to be less dependent on the type of 
projects it has to reimburse. As the dominant hakomono PFI 
projects are treated as on-balance sheet, the government 
has begun to seek a new model chargeable to users, which 
in Japan is currently referred to as a concession. Secondly, 
the government aims to exploit value for money in terms of 
both cost and quality by fostering further delegation of 
operational works, as so far there have been few projects with 
room for the private sector to apply new technologies. In 
particular, delegating the operational work for infrastructures 
such as roads was constrained by the legislation relevant to 
public assets administration. Discussions on the deregulation 
of those constraints have begun. Thirdly, measures for the 
reduction of transaction cost will be taken. One of the 
measures is a model that does not require the instalment 
of an SPC. Although this model is still primitive, it deserves 
to be tried, and for its applicability to different types of 
project to be considered. The revision of the nominating 
process is also a policy aimed at reducing transaction 
costs, though it may also need revision of the legislation 
relevant to public procurement. Finally, the most important 
factor for a successful PFI is that the relevant players 
should have a correct understanding of the nature of PFI. 
As the above-mentioned case of bankrupt PFI shows, 
relevant players, particularly the public sector as a monitor 
of projects, have to acquire enough knowledge and ability 
to assess the stability of the governance structure of 
projects and to identify the potential risks that may arise 
from the opportunistic behaviour of private companies. 
reFerenCeS 
Akai, N. (2006), Gyousei Sosiki to Governance no Keizaigaku 
(Economic Analysis of Public Organization and Governance) 
(in Japanese) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku).
Cabinet Office (CAO) (2001, revised 2008), PFI jigyo jisshi 
purosesu ni kansuru gaidorain (Guideline for a process of 
implementing PFI projects) (in Japanese) (Tokyo).
Cabinet Office (CAO) (2001), PFI jigyo ni okeru risuku buntan 
tou ni kansuru gaidorain (Guideline for risk allocation in PFI 
projects (in Japanese) (Tokyo).
Cabinet Office (CAO) (2008), VfM (Value for Money) ni 
kansuru gaidorain (Guideline for VfM) (in Japanese) (Tokyo).
Cabinet Office (CAO) (2003), Keiyaku ni kansuru gaidorain – 
PFI jigyo ni okeru ryuui jikou ni tsuite (Guideline for PFI 
contracting) (in Japanese) (Tokyo).
Cabinet Office (CAO) (2003), Monitaringu ni kansuru 
gaidorain (Guideline for monitoring PFI projects) (in 
Japanese) (Tokyo). 
Cabinet Office (2010), PFI ni Kansuru Nenji Houkokusho (PFI 
Annual Report) (in Japanese) (Tokyo). 
Higuchi, T. (2006), ‘Project Finance – Legal Issues of Project 
Finance in Japan’, Japan Business Law Review, 1 (1): 51–5. 
Iwamoto, Y. (2002), ‘The Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Program in Transition’, Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economics 16: 583–604. 
Japan Federation of Construction Contractor (1996), 
Atarashii sougou kensetsu gyo no kakuritsu wo mezashite 
(Towards the establishment of new construction contractors 
industry) (in Japanese) (Tokyo).
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC) 
(2008), Chihoukoukyoudantai zaimusyorui sakusei ni kakaru 
kijun model oyobi chihoukoukyoudantai zaimusyorui sakusei 
ni kakaru soumusyou housiki kaitei model ni kansuru Q&A (in 
Japanese) (Tokyo).
Misumi, M. (2005), ‘Kokko saimu futan kouini okeru weight 
wo masu PFI’ (‘Increasing occupation of in the State 
obligation’) (in Japanese), Keizai no Prism, (Tokyo: House of 
Councillors), 12: 9–17. 
75TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD PART 2: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
The nATIonAl deBATe on PPP
Since the 1960s, Malaysia has planned her socio-economic 
growth and development principally through successive 
five-year development plans, otherwise known as the 
Malaysia Plan. The First Malaysia Plan was introduced in 
1966 (1966–70), and in 2010 the Ninth Malaysia Plan 
(2006–10) came to an end. Each Malaysia Plan stipulates 
the policies and strategies, macro-economic and sectoral 
targets, detailed public sector programmes, and 
development allocation by sector and level of government. 
It is within the context of the successive Malaysia Plans that 
Malaysia introduced and implemented the public private 
partnership (PPP), see Table 9.1. 
There are two components of the Malaysian PPP, 
Privatisation and Public Finance Initiative (PFI) (3PU29 
2010). Privatisation started in 1983, while PFI was first 
introduced in 2006. In practice, the terms PFI and PPP 
have often been used interchangeably. The government’s 
definition of privatisation is relatively broad: privatisation 
refers to the transfer to the private sector of activities and 
functions that have traditionally rested in the public sector 
(EPU 2006).
PFI is defined as: 
the transfer to the private sector of the responsibility to 
finance and manage a package of capital investment and 
services including the construction, management, 
maintenance, refurbishment and replacement of a public 
sector asset…which creates a stand-alone business. The 
private sector will create the asset and deliver a service to 
the public sector client. In return, the private sector will 
receive payment…commensurate with the levels, quality 
and timeliness of the service provision throughout the 
concession period. The structure of the lease rental 
payment for PFI projects will guarantee a total return to 
the concessionaire’s capital investment expenditures 
including financing cost repayment and profit to 
investment. The asset and facilities will be transferred to 
the public sector at the expiry of the concession period. 
(Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006)
The government has claimed that PPP has been 
successful. This claim is based on three factors. Firstly, 
statistics show that between 1983 and May 2010, 511 
projects had been implemented, and with these projects 
the government was able to transfer to the private sector 
and eliminate 113,440 jobs from its payroll, saved 
RM164.23 billion in capital expenditure, and earned 
RM6.50 billion from the sale of government equity and 
assets (3PU 2010). 
Secondly, the implementation of PPP has been 
instrumental in accelerating economic growth through 
greater investment that subsequently led to corporate 
29. 3PU or Public Private Partnership Unit is now known as UKAS or Unit 
Kerjasama Awan Swasta.
expansion. Economic growth was also generated through 
efficiency gains as more output was produced using a 
reduced amount of resources. PPP has resulted in the 
generation of a multiplier effect in the economy (Seventh 
Malaysia Plan 1996).
Thirdly, the savings, proceeds from the sale of equity, 
assets and incomes generated from corporate tax and 
from lease rentals enable the government to reduce 
borrowing, resulting in a more balanced budget and 
thereby strengthening public sector finances and enabling 
the reallocation of resources to needy sectors of the 
economy, especially education and health (Seventh 
Malaysia Plan 1996). 
The nATIonAl PolICy ConTexT on The 
InTroduCTIon oF PPP
Malaysia began employing the PPP route for public 
procurement in 1983 through privatisation with the 
introduction of two key national development policies, the 
Malaysia Incorporated Policy and the Privatisation Policy. 
In 1985, the Privatisation Policy was revised through the 
publication of the Guidelines on Privatization (Government 
of Malaysia 1985). Up to 1985, the government was 
responsible for the provision of almost all Malaysia’s 
infrastructure services.
The Malaysia Incorporated Policy stressed the need to 
define, develop and put into operation a new model of 
economic management whereby the public sector forms 
partnerships with the private sector with the strategic 
intention of improving Malaysia’s competitive advantage. 
Under the policy, the public sector acts as a facilitator and 
pacesetter, as well as the implementer of socio-economic 
development programmes, working in close cooperation 
with the private sector. Public–private consultative panels 
were established and efforts at deregulation to improve 
public administration were introduced (Rahman 1993). 
Malaysia’s objectives of privatisation included:
relieving the financial and administrative burden of the •	
government
improving efficiency and productivity •	
facilitating economic growth •	
reducing the size and presence of the public sector in •	
the economy, and 
helping to meet the national economic policy targets.•	
Since the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991–5) the focus of the 
Malaysia Plans has been on achieving Malaysia’s Vision 
2020, a long-term socio-economic development plan that 
aims to transform Malaysia from a developing country into 
a fully developed and industrialised country by 2020. It is 
against the backdrop of Vision 2020 that privatisation was 
accelerated and the privatisation policies of the 1980s 
were given a boost through the publication of the 
Privatization Master Plan for Malaysia in 1991.
9. understanding malaysia’s public private partnership
khairuddin Abdul rashid, International Islamic university
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In 2006 and under the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–10), new 
strategies aimed at streamlining privatisation were 
introduced. The strategies included efforts to strengthen 
the approval procedures, emphasising performance 
standards, streamlining the implementation process, 
enhancing viability through risk distribution, strengthening 
the institutional and regulatory framework, and increasing 
Bumiputera (indigenous) participation. In addition, the 
Ninth Malaysia Plan also saw Malaysia implementing the 
Private Finance Initiative. 
Under the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011–15) the PFI policy, 
first introduced under the Ninth Malaysia Plan, has been 
given a ‘make-over’. Learning from past mistakes in 
implementing privatisation and PFI, the so-called ‘new 
wave PFI’ under the Tenth Malaysia Plan contains a 
relatively clear, robust, detailed and transparent framework 
for the concept and method of procurement. 
Table 9.1 provides a time line showing the key policies 
related to the introduction and implementation of PPP 
(Privatisation and PFI) in Malaysia. Figure 9.1 illustrates 
the government’s position in setting the policy direction for 
PPP projects.
Table 9.1: key policies related to the evolution of PPP in malaysia
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Source: Treasury Guidelines (2006).








Federal government set policies
77TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD PART 2: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
The governmenT’S ATTITude ToWArdS PPP 
PromoTIon
The formulation of various policies and guidelines related 
to PPP demonstrates the seriousness of the Malaysian 
government towards PPP. The government has been 
consistent in implementing PPP. This implementation has 
been a top-down approach, centrally planned, controlled 
and coordinated by the Prime Minister’s Department. 
Initially, privatisation was entrusted to the Economic 
Planning Unit (EPU) but in 2009 a special unit otherwise 
known as the Public Private Partnership Unit (3PU, now 
known as UKAS) was established to take over the roles and 
functions of EPU in implementing PPP. 
The current government’s commitment to PPP promotion 
may also be illustrated by the former prime minister’s 
speech during the launch of the Ninth Malaysia Plan.
Smart and effective partnerships between the public and 
private sectors will be established to drive the economic 
transformation agenda. This new wave PPP will ensure 
equitable sharing of risks and return. (Ahmad Badawi 
2006)
There has been a continuous upward trend in the 
allocations for PPP projects: under the Ninth Malaysia Plan, 
RM20 billion was allocated for PFI projects and RM5 billion 
for facilitating grants, while the Tenth Malaysia Plan 
allocated RM63 billion-worth of projects and RM20 billion 
for a facilitation fund for PPP projects. The facilitation fund 
is a grant provided by the government to ‘bridge the 
viability gap of projects’. The fund is aimed at facilitating 
new private sector investment, large-scale ventures and 
selected privatisation and PFI projects. Figure 9.2 lists the 
roles of government in promoting PPP. 
CrITIQueS oF PPP 
The implementation of PPP is not without its critics. Some 
of the more common criticisms are given here.
Naidu (1995: 218) observes that during the first decade of 
privatisation there was ‘no tenable system to protect users’ 
welfare and no mechanism through which consumers’ 
needs and preferences can be discovered’. It was as if the 
users had ‘no voice’.  
Privatisation between 1991 and 1995 was affected by 
constraints arising mainly from land and legal issues 
(Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996). While privatization and PFI 
under the Ninth Malaysia Plan lacked a robust and 
transparent framework for project financing, procurement, 
project identification, initiation and implementation, due 
diligence, progress monitoring and performance auditing 
(Takim et al. 2008, Khairuddin 2009, Shahriman 2010) 
suggesting that they were ‘rushed-through’ and detailed 
planning was lacking. In addition, (Khairuddin 2009) 
pointed out the state of readiness of the key players to 
implement PPP has been under question because of the 
presence of a relatively big gap between the key areas of 
competencies required in the provision of PFI services and 
the availability of Malaysian experts in possession of those 
competencies.
In the case of the privatised highways, commentators, 
including Navaratnam (2001) and Khairuddin (2009), 
report the growing opposition from the public, especially 
to the continuous increases in toll charges for using the 
highways. Many parties have requested the government to 
review past concession agreements, as they see the terms 
as favouring the concessionaires by allowing them to 
increase toll charges, notwithstanding the profits these 
concessionaires have been making over the years. Then, 
when the government decided not to allow the 
concessionaires to increase the toll charges, the 
government ended up paying compensation to the 
concessionaires. Others have requested the government to 
abolish or reduce toll charges and some even called for 
the government to nationalise all privatised highways.
Concessionaires have been enjoying profits but have not 
suffered losses as these have been absorbed by the 
government. The reasons for this included ‘cronyism’, 
unfair monopolistic advantages, lack of transparency in 
competitive bidding and lopsided fixed contracts that have 
sometimes allowed concessionaires to pass on excessive 
rates and tariffs to the government (Navaratnam 2001, 
Netto 2006, Ahmad Badawi 2006, Syuhaida and Yusof 
2007, Khairuddin 2009).
In the case of the PFI implemented under the Ninth 
Malaysia Plan, criticisms include that the PFIs being 
implemented were not PFI in the true technical sense of 
what a PFI should be. Instead the term is being used as a 
front for a clever technique adopted by the government to 
alleviate deficits in the annual budgets and to lower 
borrowing and taxation levels in the short to the medium 
terms (Khairuddin 2009).Source: Khairuddin (2010).
Figure 9.2: The role of government in promoting PPP 
Policy advice and technical assistance
Broaden understanding of the range of partnership  
options that exist in emerging markets
Facilitate creation of enabling environment
Ensure both partners adhere and practice robust governance 
structures that can withstand independent scrutiny
Capacity enhancement of public sector officials  
to manage partnership
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The government approach is to establish government-
owned special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and use money 
from the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and the 
Pensions Trust Fund (PTF) to provide the SPVs with 
funding PFI projects.30 Some critics argued that these 
approaches, ie using money from the EPF and the PTF, is 
akin to taking money from the public coffers; and since the 
SPVs are government-owned companies, it is the 
government that is ultimately taking all the risks related to 
the PFI project financing (Khairuddin 2009). In a survey on 
the public’s acceptance of the government’s approach in 
using the EPF fund to finance PFI projects, 97% of the 
public responding to the survey indicated strong 
disagreement with such an approach (Takim et al. 2008).
The relATIonShIP BeTWeen PrIvATISATIon PolICy 
And PPP
In Malaysia, privatisation precedes PFI. Table 9.2 lists the 
areas of privatised projects that were implemented 
between 1983 and 2003. The highest proportion of 
privatised projects is in the construction sector. Almost all 
the privatised road projects were implemented through the 
BOT method (Khairuddin 2009).






Transport, storage and communications 13.2
Electricity, gas and water 8.4
Construction 15.2
Manufacturing 14.0
Mining and quarrying 4.0
Agriculture and forestry 6.4
Government services 7.4
Finance, real estate and business services 11.0
Wholesale and retail trade, hotel and restaurants 11.2
Others 9.2
Source: Khairuddin (2009: 49).
Privatisation and PFI or PPP are considered alternatives to 
the conventional approach of public-sector funded 
services, infrastructures and facilities. The government 
views them as modern economic tools that would help 
30. The government, under the minister of finance Inc., formed two SPVs 
and provided them with project finance from the government-owned EPF 
and PTF. The two SPVs were Pembinaan BLT Sdn Bhd (for projects under 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, which commenced operation in 2005) and 
Syarikat Pembinaan PFI Sdn Bhd (for projects implemented under the 
Ninth Malaysia Plan) (Khairuddin 2009).
Malaysia develop and sustain her economy. The 
implementation of PFI is seen as a collection of measures 
aimed at improving the delivery of privatised services. Thus, 
PFI is not only seen as an extension of the privatisation 
policy but also as an attempt by the government to 
address criticisms and to remove or alleviate constraints 
found in privatisation, including streamlining the 
implementation process, improving transparency and 
incorporating maintenance of facilities into concession 
agreements for privatised projects. Table 9.3 shows the 
main differences between privatisation and PPP.
Table 9.3: Comparison of privatisation and PPP  
Privatisation PPP
Funding via private resources 
without implicit or explicit public 
sector guarantee
Funding via private resources 
without public sector’s explicit 
guarantee
No impact on the level of public 
sector expenditure
Impact on public budget spread 
over the duration of the concession
Risks are entirely borne by the 
private sector
Risks are allocated to parties which 
can manage them most efficiently
Government acts as regulator Public sector’s involvement is 
through enforcement of pre-agreed 
key performance indicators (KPIs)
Long duration of relationship with 
private contractors
Long duration of relationship with 
private contractors
Applicable for projects with high 
commercial viability where public 
sector is not the main purchaser of 
the output
Applicable for projects that are 
commercially viable where public 
sector is the main purchaser of the 
output
Source: 3PU (2009).
ForeIgn InFluenCeS on The nATIonAl deBATe
Malaysia’s move from state-led economy to privatisation in 
1983, and later on to PFI/PPP, did not happen in a 
vacuum. The policy shift is consistent with the global trend 
in economic management and reforms of the 1980s when 
Margaret Thatcher became prime minister of the UK in 
1979, and Ronald Reagan the president of the US in 1980. 
During this era, there was a swing to conservative and 
right-wing economic thinking (eg monetarism and supply-
side economics) and the promotion of privatisation by 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank (Jomo 1995: 1).
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The Malaysian public sector policy in the provision of 
infrastructure shifted from state-led to privatisation and 
PFI, later re-branding the latter as PPP, following similar 
lines to practices elsewhere, especially in the UK. 
Nonetheless, Khairuddin (2009: 111) points out that in the 
context of the PFI under the Ninth Malaysia Plan, the 
Malaysian PFI is not necessarily the same as PFIs 
implemented elsewhere.
In contrast to the UK PFI model, the respective SPV, being 
a government owned company, does not genuinely assume 
risks. Instead all risks associated with the investment, 
construction, maintenance and operation of the buildings 
and infrastructures under the PFI projects remain with the 
government. It seems, therefore, that the PFI are not PFI in 
the true sense. Instead they are namesakes. Consequently, 
the PFI are PFIs the Malaysian way.
A review of the literature on privatisation and PPP 
published by the EPU, 3PU and other agencies such as the 
Malaysian Highway Authority gives no indication that the 
government is using foreign consultants directly in the 
implementation of privatisation and PPP. Even so, it could 
not be denied that some forms of technology and 
consultancy might have been imported. Privatisation has 
enabled Malaysians to acquire new technologies and 
expertise from foreign equity holders, management 
contract or consultancy services (Seventh Malaysia Plan). 
Some of the staff involved with privatisation and PPP 
received training abroad, for instance in the UK and 
Australia. 
hISTory oF PPP evoluTIon
With the launch of the privatisation policy in 1983, the 
government set up the Privatisation Special Task Force in 
the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister’s 
Department to coordinate the implementation of the 
policy. With the publication of the Privatization Master Plan 
in 1991, the special task force was renamed the 
Privatization Section of the EPU. In 2009, the Privatization 
Section was transferred into a new dedicated agency to 
plan and implement PPP. This agency was known as the 
Public Private Partnership of the Prime Minister’s 
Department or UKAS (Unit Kerjasama Awam Swasta, 
formerly known as 3PU). 
The implementation of privatisation and PPP required 
amendments to the Federal Constitution, the Employment 
Act 1995 (Revised 1981) and the Pensions Act 1980. New 
legislation was enacted and regulatory bodies were 
established to allow privatisation and PPP to take place, 
and to provide the requisite implementation and 
regulatory frameworks.
To allow privatisation to take place, the government passed 
the following:
The Federal Roads Act (Revised 1989)•	
Tolls (Road and Bridges) Act 1965 (Revised 1989)•	
Port Authorities Act 1963 (Revised 1992).•	
To facilitate implementing privatisation, the government 
passed the following:
Abattoirs (Privatization) Act 1993•	
Sewerage Services Act 1993•	
Highway Authority Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1980•	
Ports (Privatization) Act 1990•	
Water Services Industry Act 2006•	
National Water Services Commission Act 2006•	
Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974•	
Town and Country Planning Act 1976•	
Local Government Act 1976•	
Control of Padi and Rice Act 1994.•	
The following guidelines and key publications on PPP were 
released:
Malaysian Incorporated Policy 1983•	
Privatization Policy 1983•	
Guidelines on Privatization 1985•	
Privatization Master-plan 1991•	
Private Finance Initiative under the •	 Ninth Malaysia Plan 
2006
Procurement Guidelines for the Implementation of •	
Projects under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
Treasury letter, 14 September 2006 
Guidelines on Public Private Partnership 2009•	
Private Finance Initiative under the •	 Tenth Malaysia Plan.
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Table 9.4: Privatised highways: completed and under construction 
Highway
Length 
(km) Concessionaire Opened Concession period
Penang Bridge 13.5 Penang Bridge Sdn Bhd 9/1987 24 yrs 8 months to 
5/2018
North South Highway 823.0 Projek Lebuhraya Utara Selatan Bhd 5/1988 48 yrs to 5/2038
Shah Alam Highway (KESAS) 34.5 Konsortium Expressway Shah Alam Selangor Sdn 
Bhd
9/1998 28 yrs 9 months to 
8/2022
Seremban – Port Dickson 22.7 Plus Expressway Bhd 12/1998 n/a
Second Link Malaysia – Singapore 44.7 Linkedua (M) Sdn Bhd 8/1998 n/a
Kuala Lumpur – Karak Highway 60.0 MTD Prime Sdn Bhd 4/1999 27 yrs to 5/2021
Butterworth – Kulim Highway 17.0 KLBK Sdn Bhd 11/1996 30 yrs
Cheras – Kajang Highway 11.7 Grand Saga Sdn Bhd 1/1999 n/a
Kajang SILK Highway 37.0 Sistem Lingkaran-Lebuhraya Kajang Sdn Bhd 6/2004 n/a
Damansara-Puchong Highway 40.0 Lingkaran Transkota Holdings Bhd 1/1999 n/a
Selat Kelang Utara Baru Highway 17.5 Shapadu Sdn Bhd 3/2002 n/a
Ampang Elevated Highway 7.9 Projek Lintasan Kota Sdn Bhd 12/2000 n/a
Sungai Besi Highway 16.7 Besraya (M) Sdn Bhd 1/1999 n/a
Butterworth Outer Ring-road 12.1 Lingkaran Luar Butterworth (Penang) Sdn Bhd 2/2007 30 yrs
Skim Penyuraian Trafik KL-Barat 26.0 Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KLBarat Sdn Bhd (SPRINT) 6/2001 n/a
New Pantai Highway 19.6 New Pantai Expressway Sdn Bhd 4/2004 n/a
Guthrie Corridor Highway 25.0 PROLINTAS Expressway Sdn Bhd 4/2005 n/a
East Coast Highway (Phase 1) 169.0 MTD Prime Sdn Bhd 8/2004 n/a
East West Link Expressway 17.0 Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd 8/2003 n/a
SMART Tunnel 3.0 Syarikat Mengurus Air Banjir and Terowong Sdn Bhd 4/2007 n/a
KL-Putrajaya Highway 26.0 Maju Expressway Sdn Bhd 12/2007 33 yrs
Senai – Desaru Highway 77.0 Senai-Desaru Expressway Bhd 10/2009 n/a
Kajang – Seremban Expressway 44.3 Lebuhraya Kajang – Seremban Sdn Bhd 10/2009 33 yrs
Duta – Ulu Kelang Highway 18.0 Konsortium Lebuhraya Utara-Timur Kuala Lumpur 
Sdn Bhd
1/2009 n/a
South Klang Valley Expressway 51.0 SKVE Holding Sdn Bhd 6/2010 n/a
Kamuning – Shah Alam Highway 14.7 Projek Lintasan Shah Alam Sdn Bhd 8/2006 n/a
Kuala Lumpur – Kuala Selangor Highway 31.0 Kuala Lumpur – Kuala Selangor Expressway Bhd 8/2006
Under construction Construction started
East Coast Highway Phase 2 79.0 MTD Capital Bhd 9/2006 (82.08% completed)
East Johor Bahru Highway 8.10 MRCB Lingkaran Selatan Sdn Bhd 2/2008 (47.19% completed)
North Kinrara –Shah Alam – Old Klang Road 0.5 RY Engineering Consultants Sdn Bhd 7/2009 (85% completed)
Total 1,767.5 1,679 km in operation, 87.6 km under construction
Source: Malaysian Highway Authority (2010).
InSTITuTIonS And CAPABIlITy oF The PPP mArkeT
Table 9.2 shows the areas of privatised projects that were 
implemented between 1983 and 2003. The highest 
proportion of privatised projects is in the construction 
sector, within which construction of road and highway 
projects top the list. Table 9.4 provides a list of privatized 
roads and highways, completed and in operation and 
those currently under construction (at the time of writing).
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The Ministry of Home Affairs undertook a one-off PFI in 
2005 through which the government-owned SPV 
Pembinaan BLT Sdn Bhd completed RM2 billion-worth of 
building projects. The projects are mainly stations, living 
quarters and associated works for the Malaysian police.
When the Ninth Malaysia Plan was implemented, another 
government-owned SPV, Syarikat Pembinaan PFI Sdn Bhd, 
was entrusted with implementation of 425 projects 
belonging to various government ministries and agencies, 
and worth RM20 billion. Under the Tenth Malaysia Plan 
(2011), 52 high-impact projects worth RM63 billion have 
been identified for implementation under PPP.
major clients of PPP projects
The Federal government followed by the state governments 
are the major clients of PPP projects. For example, 
between 1991 and 1995, 204 projects were privatised, of 
which 56.4% were Federal government and 43.6% state 
government projects (Seventh Malaysia Plan). According to 
Takim et al. (2008), under the Ninth Malaysia Plan, from a 
total of 880 projects to be procured by the government, 
425 projects (48%) were to be procured via PFI with the 
Ministry of Education as the largest beneficiary (325 
projects or 76%). 
malaysian contractors with experience in PPP projects 
overseas 
Table 9.5 provides the statistics on the Malaysian 
contractors operating in the global market. Statistics by 
the Professional Services Development Corporation (PSDC 
2011) showing professional construction inputs reveal that 
from a total of 364 firms registered with the PSDC, 227 or 
62% indicated that they are ready to work overseas, 110 or 
30% are already working in 60 countries and are involved 
in providing professional construction inputs in 416 
projects.
Nonetheless, the statistics do not provide information on 
the types of project in which these contractors and 
professionals were involved, ie whether conventional or 
PPP, but media reports suggest that several of the larger 
firms have been involved in build–operate-transfer 
infrastructure projects overseas, including in China, India 
and Laos.31
31.  For further information see Skyscrapercity (2011) and IJM (2011).





m) No Value (RM, m)
ASEAN 7 1,473.94 2 887.44
India 1 899.50 – –
Middle East 23 5,525.65 16 12,459.78
Africa 1 854.00 – –
Others 17 451.97 3 80.16
Total 49 9,205.06 21 13,427.38
Source: Construction Industry Development Board (2010). 
government programmes to support PPP 
The following are specific programmes and budgets 
allocated by the government to support PPP.
Facilitation – the government pledges to facilitate project 
implementation through legislation and land-cost support. 
The private sector should focus on managing risks 
associated with design, construction, operations and 
maintenance of the capital asset. Guidelines on 
privatisation and on PFI were issued in 1985, 2006 and 
2009 respectively. 
Facilitating Grant (Dana Pemudah) – the Ninth Malaysia Plan 
(2006) established a facilitating grant of RM5 billion. The 
grant was intended to assist SPVs in identifying project 
proposals and in implementing PFI projects not included 
in the Ninth Malaysia Plan.
Facilitation Fund – the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011) allocated 
RM20 billion to a facilitation fund. Grants will be given to 
assist private sector involvement in PPP projects in 
strategic sectors such as infrastructure, education, tourism 
and health.




During the earlier period of privatisation (1991–5), most of 
the projects privatised were through the sale-of-equity 
method, followed by sale-of-asset method and BOT 
(Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996). Other methods of 
privatisation included:
land swap•	







a combination of the above methods.•	
PPP approval process
Table 9.6 provides an overview of the Guideline on Public 
Private Partnership, issued by the government in 2009 
(3PU). Figure 9.3 is a flowchart of the approval process 
and Figure 9.4 illustrates the relationships of the key 
players in a typical PPP project. 
Table 9.6: A summary of the Guideline on Public Private 
Partnership (2009)
Section Brief description
Scope and aims 
of the guideline
The guideline is intended to be brief and is subject to 
periodical reviews
Introduction Principles of PPP projects:
High socio-economic impact
Value for money
Shorter delivery period, increase in efficiency of the 
delivery services
High level of responsibility, efficiency and effectiveness
Criteria for PPP projects:
Public private partnership
Public sector dictates output specification
Private sector decides on the required input with 
elements of innovation and economy
Payment for services based on KPIs
Maintenance of the facility
Design-build-funding-maintain-operate
Asset to be transferred to the public sector at the end 
of the concession agreement
Optimum risk sharing
Whole life cycle costing  
Development of 
PPP Project
Proposal to be submitted to the respective 
government ministry. Contents of the proposal:
Justification for the proposal
Business and financial plan






Output can be identified and measured
Project life of at least 20 years
Project with outdated technology or component would 
not be considered
Proposer in strong financial position with at least 10% 
of the project cost
The proposer must form a project-specific SPV
Work flow 
process
A flow chart is provided
Source: 3PU (2009).
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national PPP governance
As explained above, since April 2009 3PU (now known as 
UKAS) has been the central agency for planning and 
processing PPP project proposals. The mission of UKAS is:
to strengthen and foster strategic PPPs with •	
transparency and integrity to stimulate the economy 
for the well-being of the public
to enhance service delivery through speedy execution •	
and implementation of PPP projects
to ensure PPP projects are ‘value for money’ for the •	
government, and
to be recognised as the centre of excellence for PPP •	
initiatives at national and international levels.
The main functions of UKAS are:
to act as secretariat to the PPP Committee responsible •	
for evaluating PPP projects and proposing potential 
projects to the Cabinet for final decision
to negotiate the terms and conditions of PPP •	
agreements
to supervise the Facilitation Fund •	
to act as secretariat to the government’s projects that •	
are to be implemented in the five ‘corridors of 
development’ (the East Coast Economic Region, 
Iskandar Malaysia, Sarawak Corridor for Renewable 
Energy, Sabah Development Corridor, North Corridor 
Economic Region) 
to monitor the implementation of PPP projects, •	
Facilitation Fund and corridors of development in 
Malaysia.
UKAS is structured into ten sections, representing 
Malaysia’s major economic sectors and its main functions. 
Leadership is provided by a director general assisted by 
two deputies. UKAS is supported by other central 
government agencies, namely the Ministry of Finance, 
Attorney General’s Chambers, Department of Land and 
Mines, Valuation and Property Services Department and 
the implementing ministries/agencies.    
Distribute national development 
planning document to ministries and 
agencies
Ministry/agency submits proposal
Evaluation and presentation to 
Cabinet for concept approval
If yes,
Ministry/agency prepares tender 
documents and calls for tenders
Ministry/agency shortlisted 3 bidders 
and submit same to 3PU
PPP Committee evaluates and 
recommends
If yes,
Seek approval from the Cabinet to 
select successful bidder
If yes,
Commence negotiation on 
concession agreement with selected 
bidder
























Figure 9.3: Approval process for PPP projects
Source: 3PU (2009).
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The government defines VfM in PPP projects (3PU 2009) 
as occurring where there is:
optimum risk transfer between the public and private •	
sector
a long-term contract that includes whole-life-cycle •	
costing
an output specification that is efficient and effective•	
competition leading to fair value projects•	
payment based on performance•	
private sector management expertise.•	
According to Suhaiza (2010), the government is yet to 
come up with a formal and detailed mechanism on the 
way to determine VfM. Despite this, Khairuddin (2010) 
points out that some form of VfM assessment, practised in 
conventional project procurement, is being employed in 
the evaluation of PPP bids.  
PuBlICITy For PPP ProJeCTS
UKAS maintains a website (www.ukas.gov.my). All matters 
related to the implementation of PPP including tender 
advertisements, results of tenders, policies on PPP, etc are 
posted on their website. In addition, UKAS advertises 
tenders in the main stream Malaysian media.
ProCuremenT ProCedure
The Guidelines on Public Private Partnership were 
published by the 3PU in 2009 (now UKAS). A description 
of the guidelines is in Table 9.6 and see also Figures 9.3 
and 9.4. In addition to the projects identified by the 
government to be procured via PPP, the private sector is 
also encouraged to submit proposals to the government. 
Those assessing unsolicited proposals must adhere to the 
following guidelines (Majid 2010): 
show clarity in the assessment of qualifying criteria•	
recognise innovative ideas•	
retain the element of competitive tension in the •	
selection process
practice a high level of transparency and governance•	
ensure that risks are well managed and contained.•	
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Figure 9.5: Components of PPP project contract 
management 
  Source: Majid (2010).
FInAnCIAl ProCuremenT
Much of the financial resource for privatisation is tapped 
from funds in the equity market when privatised entities 
float their shares on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE, now Bursa Malaysia). For example, in 1995 a total 
of 24 privatised companies were listed on the KLSE with 
total market value of RM124,695.2 million (1991: 13 
companies; RM31,040.2 million). Through the Securities 
Commission the government made it easier for 
Infrastructure Project Companies (IPCs) to be eligible for 
listing on the KLSE, ie these IPCs were not required to 
meet the usual track-record requirements on condition 
that they were awarded a concession or licence by the 
government or state agency and that the remaining 
concession period was not less than 18 years at the time 
that the IPCs submitted their proposals for listing. Other 
requirements included that the project cost was not less 
than RM500 million and the project must be able to 
generate income sufficient to give a suitable rate of return 
to its shareholders. Foreign incorporated companies 
In a seminar on Malaysia’s PPP organised by the 
International Islamic University Malaysia and 3PU (now 
UKAS) in 2010, participants expressed concerns over a 
wide range of issues and uncertainties including the 
following points.
How should a PPP project proposal be prepared?•	
How should a company respond to a Request for •	
Proposal invited by the government?
Would expenses incurred in preparing a PPP project •	
proposal be reimbursed by the government?
How may a company apply for the Facilitation Fund? •	
What are the selection criteria? What are the  
repayment terms?
What method is used to evaluate PPP proposals, PSC •	
and VfM?
Concerns were expressed about the lack of published •	
data and other information relating to PPP projects.
Many key players in the construction industry and other 
sectors of the construction supply chain are not fully aware 
of the government’s modus operandi for PPP. 
ConTrACT
Notwithstanding the lack of a standard form of PPP 
contract, Majid (2010) points out the following points 
should be addressed when structuring PPP contracts:
flexibility in terms of predicting future requirements •	
and exit costs
risk identification, allocation and mitigation•	
accounting, financial and taxation requirements•	
transaction costs•	
duration of the concession•	
ability to forecast quality and quantity in the long term•	
the expected life of assets underpinning the service and •	
their residual value
continuity of the delivery of the service•	
the viability of regularly re-competing for the contract•	
the definition of output specifications and linkages to KPIs•	
the definition of the  payment and penalty mechanism, •	
identification of default events and termination.•	
Majid (2010) further points out that when drawing up a 
PPP contract, four components of contract management 
are given emphasis. Figure 9.5 gives an overview of these 
contract management components.
Contract management team
Determines when the team should be set up, the 
team’s structure, attribute of personnel, initial and 
on-going training needs.
Manage service performance
Assessment on standards of services delivered, 
effectiveness of remedial measures, and assess if 
there is a trend in the provision of the services
Contract administration
Ensures obligations and responsibilities defined 
under the contract are met, focus on performance, 
risk distribution, payments, change, VFM, etc are 
achieved
Managing relationships
Establishes relationships, communication routes 
and systems, and the active support and 
enhancement throughout the project’s life
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operating infrastructure projects outside Malaysia, whose 
equity and key personnel were controlled by Malaysians, 
were also eligible for listing on the KLSE (Seventh Malaysia 
Plan 1996).
The listing of privatised companies on the KLSE improved 
the latter’s performance in terms of total market 
capitalisation and numbers of counters traded, and 
therefore deepened and broadened the capital market. In 
addition, the excellent performance in terms of the 
increased share price of some of the IPCs32 has benefited 
many investors and at the same time these shares, owing 
to their high value, were used as collateral for additional 
source of funds for further investment (Seventh Malaysia 
Plan 1996). In addition, SPVs appointed by the government 
also fund their own project, some without government 
assistance, through a combination of internal funding 
(equity) and issuing bonds. The bonds often combine 
Islamic debt (with Shari’ah-compliant terms) and 
conventional arrangments. Funding is usually organised by 
one of the Malaysian-incorporated merchant banks 
(Khairuddin 2009). 
32. For example, TNB a privatised utility company supplying electricity in 
Malaysia, saw its share price increase by 122% from RM4.50 in 1992 to 
RM10.00 at the end of 1995.
Other forms of funding include splitting privatised projects 
into packages. Those packages that have high potential for 
the concessionaires to collect users’ fees (eg toll roads) are 
funded internally by the concessionaires, while those 
packages with lesser potential to generate income are 
procured by the government via a lump sum contract and 
paid through interim or deferred payment mechanisms 
(Khairuddin 2009, cf. case studies below). Funding for the 
one-off PFI projects for the Ministry of Home Affairs in 
2005 was provided by the government-owned EPF and 
funding for PFI projects under the Ninth Malaysia Plan was 
provided by the EPF, Pension Trust Fund and a government 
linked bank, Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad. Figures 
9.6 and 9.7 illustrate the funding arrangements for these 
PFI projects (Khairuddin 2009) and Figure 9.8 lists the 
sources of financing and factors for their consideration for 
PPP projects under the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2010). 
Figure 9.6: Funding arrangement for PFI projects under the BlT Sdn Bhd – ministry of home Affairs (2005)
  Source: Khairuddin (2007).
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  Source: Majid (2010).
Figure 9.7: Funding arrangement for PFI projects under the ninth malaysia Plan 
  Source: Khairuddin (2007).
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Malaysia’s PPP has two main components, namely 
privatisation and PFI. The former was implemented in 
1983 and the latter in 2006. The terms PFI and PPP are 
often used interchangeably. PPP was implemented against 
the backdrop of various policies and long-term and 
medium-term development plans. 
Malaysia’s PPP has come a long way from what it was 29 
years ago. There were shortcomings, especially during the 
implementation of the earlier privatisation schemes. Even 
so, many of the shortcomings have been resolved through 
the later versions of PFI, such as that in the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan (2006). Further strategies are being planned for 
implementation under the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011)
aimed at strengthening the delivery processes of PPP 
projects. The planning and implementation of the 
strategies illustrate the government’s commitment to learn 
from past mistakes and to make amends. Consequently, it 
could be said that that Malaysia’s PPP model is 
approaching maturity.
Malaysia’s PPP appears to be a home-grown series of 
initiatives. While the implementation of PPP is in line with 
the international trend of market liberalisation, there has 
been little foreign involvement in the way in which the 
concept has been formulated, implemented and funded. It 
has apparently been possible to implement PPP projects 
using indigenous expertise without encountering major 
set-backs or difficulties. 
Nonetheless, there are issues and problems requiring 
urgent solutions:
the absence of a formal and robust scheme for •	
evaluating PPP projects, including the absence of a 
public sector comparator (PSC)
the absence of standard forms of contracts for PPP •	
projects
the lack of participation of private sector banks and •	
other financial institutions in funding PPP projects and 
the perception that the government prefers the 
government-owned pension funds or government-
linked financial institutions
the lack of capacity building to equip civil servants and •	
professionals in PPP project supervision, especially in 
life cycle costing and in facilities management.
PPP is set to stay in Malaysia. Despite the criticisms, 
Malaysia enjoys many benefits arising from the 
implementation of PPP.
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InTroduCTIon
The concept of PPP has been adopted by many countries 
as it provides an opportunity for efficient allocation of 
project risks whereby these can be borne by the parties 
who are best able to manage them. Procurement of PPPs 
has become popular as they enable the provision of value 
for money to the public by tapping into the expertise of, 
and benefiting from the technology and management skills 
of the private sector (Algarni et al. 2007; ADB 2008). 
The concept of public private partnership (PPP) was 
introduced to Singapore in 2003. Although there was much 
hype about what it could accomplish in Singapore in the 
early days, so far only eight projects have been successfully 
procured as PPPs. Notably, four of these projects concern 
the building of physical infrastructure facilities. Two of the 
projects are in the area of information technology infrastructure. 
The remaining two projects deal with the construction of 
defence facilities. In recent times, several projects initially 
considered for development as PPPs have been procured 
following the more traditional methods such as design and 
build. This chapter examines the key barriers that have 
contributed to the slow progress made thus far, and the 
policy and institutional changes necessary to make PPPs a 
success story in Singapore. The analysis presented and 
the conclusions reached in this chapter are based on a 
study of the existing literature and policy architecture. 
uSe oF The PPP ConCePT In SIngAPore
As noted in Chapter 1, there is no precise and commonly 
accepted definition of PPP. The difficulty arises as a result 
of the diverse interests and objectives of the public and 
private parties when entering into PPPs. For the public 
sector, the need to enter into PPPs may be due to lack of 
finance, the need for modern technology or for effective 
and efficient management skills, and the need to transfer 
risk. For private sector entities, PPPs offer new investment 
opportunities, new markets and the opportunity to collaborate 
with public sector entities that, in the past, enjoyed a 
monopoly in the provision of certain infrastructure 
facilities (Gunawansa 2000). 
The needs of both public sector and private sector entities 
to enter into PPPs can differ from project to project and 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This is another reason for the 
absence of a common definition of PPP. For example, the 
need of a cash-strapped developing country to enter into a 
PPP to develop a project to provide clean water or electricity 
to the citizens will be different from the need of a developed 
country in considering a PPP to develop an airport or a 
highway. 
In Singapore, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) produced the 
following definition.
PPP refers to long-term partnering relationships between 
the public and private sector to deliver services. It is a new 
approach that Government is adopting to increase private 
sector involvement in the delivery of public services. 
(M0F 2004)
The Singapore definition focuses on PPPs as long-term 
relationships between the public and private sector which 
enable the public sector to involve the private sector in 
providing services to the people. This definition does not 
give any indication as to the real need for the public sector 
to enter into PPPs. Further, in Singapore, the PPP is also 
seen as a way of bringing in specialist private sector 
expertise to stimulate an exchange of ideas and bring 
more international players into the domestic market 
(KPMG 2007).
Even though there is some evidence indicating that private 
investment in public infrastructure can be traced back to 
the 18th century in European countries (Kumaraswamy 
and Morris 2002), according to Harris (2004), the 
increasing adoption of PPPs by countries in the late 1990s 
was due to the success of PPPs in the UK. According to 
Harris, it was the development and refinement of the 
private finance initiative (PFI) by the UK in 1992, as one of 
a range of government policies designed to increase 
private sector involvement in the provision of public 
services, which led to the renewed international interest in 
PPPs. Since then, many countries around the world have 
either embarked on or considered the adoption of a PPP 
programme (Harris 2004). 
PPP was first introduced in Singapore in 2003 under the 
Best Sourcing Framework, whereby the public sector will 
engage private sector providers to deliver non-core 
government services that the private sector can provide 
more effectively and efficiently (MOF 2004). The first PPP 
contract was awarded by the Public Utilities Board (PUB) 
for a desalination plant.
Singapore’s interest in PPP was set out in a consultation 
document and a subsequent PPP Handbook, which was 
published in October 2004 by the MOF. This handbook 
provides general guidance on PPP procurement, and 
dictates that all government infrastructure projects in 
excess of S$50 million should be actively considered for 
suitability as PPPs. As stated in the Handbook, the MOF 
has identified a number of sectors in Singapore for PPPs. 
These include sports facilities, incineration plants, water 
and sewerage treatment works, large IT infrastructure 
facilities, education and healthcare facilities, expressways 
and government buildings. 
According to the Handbook, the main aims of implementing 
PPPs in Singapore include: 
allowing the public sector to get better value for money •	
in the delivery of public services
offering the private sector more business opportunities •	
and more room to innovate and offer efficient solutions 
for public services, and 
combining the expertise of the government and the •	
private sector to meet the needs of the public 
effectively and efficiently (MOF 2004). 
10. The use of the public private partnership concept in Singapore
Asanga gunawansa, national university of Singapore
91TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD PART 2: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
In addition to the Handbook, the MOF created a PPP 
Advisory Council whose aim is to create awareness of PPP, 
draft PPP policy and provide guidance on PPP matters. 
The Council also oversees the progress of major PPP 
projects and facilitates resolution of inter-agency issues. 
Nonetheless, since the introduction of the PPP concept in 
Singapore, it has achieved very limited success, with only 
eight PPPs successfully implemented to date. The limited 
success of PPPs in Singapore was not envisioned by either 
public sector or private sector entities as its introduction 
was met with much enthusiasm. As commented by Harris 
(2008): 
With an apparent championing behind this within the 
Ministry of Finance, and a strong pipeline of planned 
projects, the stage seemed set for a promising period for 
developers, bankers and the usual slew of advisers 
(financial, legal and technical). Three years later and the 
common view seems to be that things haven’t worked out 
as planned. That’s not to say things have gone badly. 
More that things have gone slowly and, on a few 
occasions, with some unexpected hiccups in implementation. 
Let’s face it, in the Singapore context, that’s unusual.
In these circumstances, it is important to consider whether 
PPP is a feasible procurement method for the 
development of public infrastructure facilities in Singapore. 
Further, it is important to examine the reasons for the 
limited success of PPPs in Singapore and propose 
measures to give PPP a new lease of life if it is to be a 
viable procurement option for the country.
PPP STruCTure And PPP ProJeCTS In SIngAPore
PPPs are implemented for a wide range of social and 
economic infrastructure projects. They are, however, used 
mainly to build and operate hospitals, schools, prisons, 
roads, bridges and tunnels, light rail networks, and water 
and sanitation plants (IMF 2004). Usually, the project will 
take the form of one of the PPP models such as joint 
ventures, strategic partnerships between the public and 
private sectors, design–build–operate (DBO), design–
build–finance–operate (DBFO), build–operate–transfer 
(BOT), build–transfer–operate (BTO), build–own–operate 
(BOO) and many other variants (MOF 2004; IMF 2004). As 
each PPP project is unique, a different PPP model can be 
flexibly selected and tailored according to the project 
(Gunawansa 2000). The public sector and the private 
sector have to work closely together to determine the 
optimal scope of collaboration in each PPP project for the 
benefit of the members of the public who use the services, 
the government and the private sector (MOF 2004).
Under a PPP, a public entity would typically specify the 
outputs or services required and a private company or 
consortium would be responsible for the finance, design, 
construction, operation and maintenance of a facility. The 
consortium is typically organised by a project developer 
who brings together financiers, engineering firms, 
construction companies and facilities management 
companies to provide individual services. A typical PPP 
structure is shown in Figure 10.1.































The PPP contract between the public agency and the 
consortium would usually be for a period of 10 to 30 years 
and, unlike traditional procurement methods, the public 
sector does not own the facility during this period. A PPP 
thus allows the public sector to move away from directly 
owning and operating facilities, to purchasing services 
directly from the private consortium (MOF 2004). 
Alternatively, the public sector may continue to deliver the 
core services traditionally associated with a facility (such 
as teaching in schools and medical services in hospitals) 
while the consortium may deliver the ancillary services 
which support the infrastructure). It is often only after the 
expiry of the contract period that the facility returns to 
public ownership.
A PPP is different from a conventional project in that a PPP 
consortium would be able to recover its investment only 
through income earned by operating the facility. As stated 
by KPMG (2007), the public sector may compensate the 
consortium with service payments, rights to levy tariffs or 
fees against the public users, or a combination of these. 
For a project that produces a public utility service, an 
off-take contract may be signed between the consortium 
and the public agency, whereby the public agency agrees 
to purchase the output of the facility at an agreed price 
and volume on a long-term basis. This off-take contract 
serves as the basis for project financing (Yescombe 2002).
The PPP payment mechanism typically provides the 
government with the power to withhold or deduct 
payments if the quality of service provided by the private 
sector consortium is lower than agreed. The government 
may also reserve the right to step in and regain control of 
the asset in the event of repeated default in service 
provision by the private sector operator.
CurrenT STATuS oF PPPS In SIngAPore
According to the Department of Treasury and Finance 
(2002), by using the joint skills of the public and private 
sectors, Singapore will be able to:
create new infrastructure which will potentially be of a •	
standard beyond that which could be delivered by the 
public sector alone
support the infrastructure with guaranteed services to •	
ensure its continued usefulness, efficiency and 
longevity
take advantage of innovative ideas and technology, •	
which have traditionally been fostered in commercial 
environments, for the benefit of users of public 
infrastructure, and
manage the risks that naturally come with very large •	
and complex infrastructure projects more effectively by 
allocating risks to the party that is able to manage 
them best.
Nonetheless, as stated in a report by KPMG (2007):
Unlike many countries undertaking PPP, the government 
of Singapore does not need private funds to improve its 
social and other infrastructure. It has large reserves and 
typically a budget surplus. Nor would the government 
necessarily concede that private sector provision of goods 
and services is more efficient than that of the public 
sector. The need or ability to raise capital is a less 
pressing concern in Singapore than it might be in some 
parts of the region.
Thus, the rationale for introducing PPP into Singapore is 
mainly focused on the need to achieve value for money in 
the delivery of public services as stated in the PPP 
Handbook (ADB 2008). This means that PPP was perceived 
as a mechanism that could be used for projects to allow 
optimal balance of benefits and costs on the basis of total 
cost of ownership, even though it may not be at the lowest 
price. This could be achieved when synergies are 
generated through the alignment of design, construction, 
maintenance and operation phases, taking into 
consideration the whole life cycle of the project (MOF 2009).
PPP ProJeCTS ImPlemenTed In SIngAPore
Since the introduction of PPP in 2003, the Singapore 
government has explored the implementation of various 
projects as PPPs. Some have met with success while 
others have been abandoned, awarded under traditional 
procurement methods, or are still under consideration. A 
summary of these projects and their status are presented 
in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: PPP projects in Singapore as of 27 october 
2009 




1 Desalination plant: 
design–build–own–
operate (DBOO) 
facility to supply 
desalinated water to 
PUB for 20 years
September  
2001
PUB Tender awarded 






2 Ulu Pandan NEWater 
Plant: a DBOO 
project for recycling 
and supply of waste 
water to PUB for 20 
years
May 2004 PUB Tender awarded 






3 Fifth incineration 
plant: a DBOO project 
to incinerate 800 
tonnes of refuse per 
day for a period of 25 
years
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4 TradeXchange: an IT 
PPP project to 






operation of the 
system for 10 years. 
Dec 2005 Singapore 
Customs
Contract 
awarded on 8 
Dec 2005. 
Tenure of 10 
years between 
2007 and 2017
5 Basic Wings Course: 
a 20-year PPP to 
acquire and maintain 
a fleet of trainer 
aircraft and ground-
based training 
systems to meet the 
hardware 
requirements for the 
Republic of 
Singapore Air Force’s 
basic wings flying 
training. 







achieved on 3 
Nov 2006. 
Tenure of 20 
years from 2008 
to 2028.
6 Rotary Winged 
Course: a 20-year 





optimise the resource 
and risk allocation 
between public 
sector and private 
sector in flying 
training operations. 





duration of 20 
years from 2006 
to 2026
7 Next Generation 
National Broadband 
Network: a PPP 
project for the design 
and construction of 
the passive 




seeks to transform 
Singapore into an 
intelligent nation and 
global city, powered 
by infocomm. The 
project also involves 

























8 ITE College West: 
design–build–
finance–operate 
(DBFO) project for a 
period of 27 years. 
The PPP includes the 
management and 
coordination of all 
building-related and 
estate management 
matters, allowing the 
ITE to focus its 
resources and 
attention on the 
delivery of vocational 
and technical 
education.  







achieved on 11 
Aug 2008.
Construction 
phase of the 
project. The 
Project is under 
construction 
(2011).
9 Changi NEWater 
Plant: a DBOO 
project for the supply 
of 50 million gallons 
of NEWater per day 
to PUB over a period 
of 25 years.
Aug 2007 PUB Tender awarded 
in early 2008.  




opened in May 
2010
10 Sports Hub: a 25 












11 NUS University Town: 
a PPP for the 
development of a 
6,200-bed student 
housing with ancillary 
facilities.






in June 2007. 
Decision to 
launch the 





12 Advanced Fighter 
Winged Course: a 


















13 Rifles Range Training 
Facility: a 20-year 
PPP for the 
construction, 
maintenance and 
management of a 
training ground for 
small arms. 
Unknown DSTA Bids submitted 
for projects in 
late August 
2009.  Project 
cancelled in 
2010.
14 2nd Tuas 
Desalination Plant: a 
Design, Build, Own 
and Operate (DBOO) 
PPP project with a 25 




PUB Tender awarded 
on 7 March 
2011. The water 
Purchase 
Agreement 
signed on 6 
April 2011.
Source: Loh 2007, PUB 2007, CNA 2009, Dalal 2009, Lazauskaite 2009, 
MOF 2009, Wang 2009.
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As can be seen from Table 10.1, the Singapore government 
has considered 14 PPP projects in various asset classes, 
including water, solid waste, education, defence and IT 
sector, since the introduction of the concept in 2003. Nine 
of those projects have been successfully implemented 
(items 1–9). Five of the latter (desalination plant, NEWater 
plants, incineration plant, and ITE College West) involve 
building infrastructure. The projects involving the water 
and solid waste sector are utility-related PPPs. These have 
been procured by two agencies, the National Environment 
Agency and the Public Utilities Board. These projects 
consist of a single demand stream model with little 
political sensitivity (KMPG 2007), thus their procurement 
should not be considered complicated. 
Singapore has also sought to procure large-scale social 
infrastructure projects such as the ITE College West, 
Sports Hub and the University Town @ Warren. Such 
projects involve multiple revenue streams and numerous 
stakeholders with greater scrutiny of business plans 
(KMPG 2007), thus making them more complicated. The 
implementation of these projects, with the exception of the 
ITE College West project, has not been successful. It 
should be noted that even in the case of the ITE College 
West, the procurement process had encountered financing 
delays as the banks that had initially supported the private 
sector consortium withdrew as a result of the subprime 
crisis (Lee  and Rathbone 2008, Menon 2008). 
The University Town project was initially earmarked to be 
financed, designed, constructed and operated by a private 
sector entity for a period of 25 to 30 years. In fact, 
according to a government press release in January 2008 
(MCYS 2008), it is now owned and funded by the National 
University of Singapore (NUS) through government grants. 
This US$423 million (SGD$500–$600 million) project is 
expected to be completed before the end of 2010. No clear 
reason has been disclosed for the shift. It is likely, however, 
that as it is a social infrastructure development project, the 
project proponents found it unviable for development as a 
PPP, given that administration of the university facilities 
requires active participation of the public sector, while the 
revenue for the private sector developer has to be sourced 
from student fees and other sources of revenue to be 
generated by the facilities within the University Town. 
Because the town is an educational institution controlled 
by the public sector, the private developer’s freedom to 
price the services would have had to be highly regulated, a 
condition that the private sector developer may have found 
unfavourable. 
As far as the Sports Hub project, launched in 2005, is 
concerned, to date it has not advanced from the preferred 
bidder stage. The completion date for the project has been 
repeatedly extended. The first delay occurred because of 
the addition of a public water sports centre into the 
original bid requirements, as a result of which the process 
of submission of the bid proposal and the evaluation 
period were  postponed by about a year (Lim 2007). The 
second delay occurred as a result of increased 
construction costs and the contemporary global financial 
crisis, which made it difficult to raise funds from financial 
institutions. It is expected that the project will be 
completed by the end of 2013 or early 2014, provided that 
there are no further delays (Wang 2009).
BArrIerS To PPPS In SIngAPore 
Even though there has been considerable interest in the 
use of PPP as a procurement method, there are a wide 
range of barriers. As found by Zhang (2005) in a 
questionnaire survey of various organisations in different 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
China, the barriers to PPPs can be broadly classified into 
six categories:
social, political, and legal risks1. 
unfavourable economic and commercial conditions2. 
inefficient public procurement framework3. 
lack of mature financial engineering techniques4. 
problems related to the public sector5. 
problems related to the private sector.6. 
It is important to note that the above barriers are not 
generic to every country. In the case of Singapore, it is not 
difficult to argue that the social, political and legal risks 
that usually discourage investors from investing in 
countries are absent (IMF 2004). Since independence in 
1965, Singapore has steadily developed its social, political 
and legal infrastructure to offer one of the most politically 
stable, corruption-free and investment-friendly 
environments in the world (Lim and Lloyd 1986, Peebles 
and Wilson 2002). Furthermore, Singapore is ranked as 
the fourth richest country in the world behind Qatar, 
Luxembourg and Norway (Global Finance 2010, IMF 2010). 
Moreover, according to the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report for 2009/10 (WEF 2010), 
Singapore is ranked the third most competitive economy 
in the world. It provides inter alia that:
Its institutions are viewed as the best in the world, while 
business confidence in the government remains strong 
despite the global recession. That, along with a highly 
skilled workforce and sophisticated financial markets, 
helped Singapore jump two places in the 2009 rankings 
from last year’s result. (WEF 2010)
In these circumstances, it is difficult to argue that 
categories 1, 2 and 4 listed by Zhang (2005, see above) 
apply in the case of Singapore as barriers to PPPs. 
As far as the public procurement framework is concerned, 
it should be stated that Singapore has a well-developed 
legal system that provides a sound framework for efficient 
and corruption-free public procurement. For example, the 
Singapore government is bound by certain commitments 
in the various international agreements on public 
procurement, including the 1994 Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA) under the World Trade 
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Organisation, the Agreement between New Zealand and 
Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership (ANZSCEP), 
the Agreement between Japan and Singapore for a New 
Age Economic Partnership (JSEPA), the  EFTA–Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement (ESFTA) and Singapore–Australia 
Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), and the United States–
Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA). 
In addition, as far as national legislation is concerned, 
Singapore has enacted the Government Procurement Act 
No. 14 of 1997 as amended (Chapter 120), which deals 
with public procurement. There are four relevant 
subsidiary legislations, namely Government Procurement 
(Challenge Proceedings) Regulations, Government 
Procurement Regulations, Government Procurement 
(Application) Order and Government Procurement Act 
(commencement) Notification 2002. In addition, there is a 
Government Instructions Manual on procurement 
procedures. 
All public contracts awarded by the Singapore government 
are published on the government e-business website. The 
award notice includes the name of the successful tenderer, 
the contract sum, and a description of the contract along 
with the name and address of the awarding government 
procuring entity. A similar disclosure is made by the 
Ministry of Finance concerning PPP projects (MOF 2004) 
According to the self-assessment made by Singapore in 
response to the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for 
Asia and the Pacific (ADB/OECD 2006), the government 
procuring entity will, at the request of unsuccessful 
renderers, explain the reasons why their bids have not 
been accepted. Thus, transparency in the process is 
maintained. 
As commented by Mr Kamran Khan, head of the World 
Bank Office Singapore (East Asia Infrastructure Finance 
Practice Group), in an interview with the Business Times 
Singapore in November 2009:
The public entities in Singapore are one of the most 
efficient in the world. They are professional and act 
almost like the private sector, but they protect the interest 
of the public sector, which is a very unique thing. 
Hence, corruption in public procurement as a barrier to 
PPPs in Singapore can be ruled out as well.
This leaves us to consider whether there are any problems 
with the public or private sector that act as barriers to 
implementing PPPs in Singapore. Typically, problems with 
the public sector in successfully implementing PPP 
projects would arise because of unfamiliarity with the PPP 
mechanism, reluctance to share responsibilities with the 
private sector, problems relating to regulations, lack of 
commitment towards investor protection, and hesitancy to 
share risks (Gunawansa 2000, Zhang 2005). Problems 
with the private sector in implementing PPPs would arise 
owing to lack of financial and technological capacity, 
reluctance to work with the public sector, reluctance to 
deal directly with the end-users of utilities and other 
infrastructure services, inability to be competitive in 
delivering services to the public, and incapacity to work in 
a consortium (Gunawansa 2000, Zhang 2005). 
Given the success story of Singapore’s economic 
development and market competitiveness as well as the 
efficient and transparent public procurement process 
which has been summarised above, it would be difficult to 
argue that there were obvious problems with either the 
public or the private sector in Singapore that would 
discourage PPPs. If this is the case, then what are the 
reasons for the limited success of the concept in 
Singapore? In answering this question, the following 
hypotheses are proposed.
First, the public sector entities in Singapore such as the 
PUB, which is in charge of power and water utilities, the 
Land Transport Authority, which is in charge of the road 
network, and the Housing Development Board, which is in 
charge of public housing, to name a few, have been 
providing efficient services to the public. They have the 
regulatory and management capacity to take charge of the 
facilities. They have the necessary funds for development 
of infrastructure through direct contracting. Thus, the need 
for PPPs is limited.
Secondly, the Singapore government is committed to 
financing and encouraging research and development in 
various areas, including physical and social infrastructure 
development in the country. As a result, the relevant 
technologies for the sustainable development of the nation 
are financed by the public sector and developed largely in 
public sector entities such as state universities and 
research centres set up within universities. For example, 
the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB) has 
announced that it will spend about S$680 million 
(US$483.3 million) to build a clean technology ecosystem 
over the period 2010 to 2015 as part of the country’s plan 
to become a global research and development hub. EDB 
has already allocated S$350 million of the total investment 
for developing the country’s clean energy sector, with a 
focus on solar energy. The remaining S$330 million will go 
towards developing water and waste management 
solutions. This initiative is part of the government’s plan, 
announced in September 2009, to invest S$1 billion to 
build a greener and more energy efficient country by 2015 
(EcoSeed 2010). In addition, the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee for Sustainable Development in Singapore has 
earmarked about S$700 million for developing the rest of 
the clean technology sector and S$3.4 billion to boost the 
country’s economic output, along with the creation of 
18,000 green jobs by 2015 (EcoSeed 2010). Thus, public 
entities in Singapore, which invest in the advancement of 
technology, might find direct contracting with contractors 
to build public facilities more appropriate than PPPs.
Thirdly, the absence of a centralised body both inside and 
outside the MOF to champion the cause of PPP also acts 
as a barrier. The PPP Advisory Council that was set up at 
the time PPP was introduced into Singapore has 
functioned largely as an entity to promote PPP awareness, 
help draft relevant policy and provide guidance on PPP 
matters. What is required is either to give it more teeth or 
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replace it with an agency that could act as the ‘one stop 
shop’ between public and private sector entities, to 
facilitate PPPs.
Fourthly, an inadequate focus on project identification and 
feasibility studies is an apparent weakness in the PPP 
procurement machinery in Singapore. A number of 
projects have been unsuccessfully procured (see Table 
10.1). 
Fifthly, the failure to maintain an identified list of future 
projects is also a barrier, limiting the scope for public-
private engagement to develop projects. If a centralised 
public sector entity could work with the other government 
agencies and identify sectors for PPPs and line up possible 
future projects, then it would provide a more efficient 
platform for interested private sector entities to engage 
with the public sector concerning the development of such 
projects. 
Lastly, however efficient and transparent the current 
procurement mechanism is, use of open tenders may not 
always be the best procurement practice for PPP. It limits 
the scope of private sector participation to projects 
specifically identified by the government. If sectors are 
identified and a pipeline of possible projects is maintained, 
interested private sector entities would be able to submit 
to the government early proposals for developing the 
pipelined projects. This would enable the government to 
decide whether to engage in direct negotiations with the 
private party that had expressed early interest or to call for 
competitive tenders. 
FuTure oF PPP In SIngAPore
As noted above, Singapore offers one of the most reliable 
and competitive environments for investment. The country 
has an efficient and corruption-free public sector. Further, 
the people in Singapore are able and willing to pay for 
efficient public services. In addition, the local private sector 
has the capacity to provide the necessary local 
partnership to foreign investors or to take the lead in 
investment projects in the country. In these circumstances, 
the future of PPP in Singapore need not be bleak if the 
issues identified above are adequately addressed.
The PPP Advisory Council should be empowered to 
coordinate with the various government agencies to 
identify sectors in which PPPs can be introduced. It should 
also take a more active role in promoting guidelines and a 
framework for the implementation of PPP projects, as well 
as promoting PPPs to the different agencies. In addition, 
the PPP Advisory Council should act as a repository of 
knowledge for all projects that have been either considered 
or implemented as PPPs. As an alternative, the 
government should consider establishing a new agency 
that could perform the functions discussed above. The 
establishment of a ‘one stop shop’ that can facilitate the 
engagement of public and private sector entities should be 
considered. Such an agency should, in addition to 
publicising the pipeline of projects and sectors identified 
for PPP, possess the capacity to facilitate investor 
engagement by cutting red tape and enabling the 
acquisition of relevant approvals and permits, provided 
that such process remains legal. 
As far as identification of suitable sectors for PPP is 
concerned, Singapore should concentrate on sectors 
where it is financially strong and technologically savvy, and 
where efficient public sector entities can collaborate with 
the private sector. Construction of sustainable cities, an 
area in which Singapore has shown keen interest and has 
a good reputation, is an area that has much scope for such 
a partnership. This is because building environmentally 
sustainable cities requires not only the financial capacity 
to build but also the technological know-how in many 
areas such as roads, water, electricity, telecommunication, 
public housing, industrial and office complexes, and social 
infrastructure facilities. Such projects require expertise in 
design and engineering and the participation of 
manufacturers of environment-friendly construction 
materials and equipment. Piecing together a sustainable 
city by entering into thousands of individual contracts 
would be impractical and difficult compared with a closely 
knit project development structure in which a few PPPs 
can work towards developing the project. 
ConCluSIonS
PPP is a feasible procurement method for Singapore. As 
has been pointed out in this chapter, Singapore has a very 
conducive environment for PPP projects. Nonetheless, 
owing to the barriers that have been identified above, few 
PPP projects have been implemented in Singapore since 
the introduction of the concept in 2003. Hence there is 
room for improvement. If the government addresses the 
concerns raised above and implements the necessary 
measures, PPPs can play an important role in the 
continuing development of Singapore. Alternatively, if the 
government fails to take adequate measures, there is the 
risk of flight of capital, experts and expertise away from 
Singapore to other countries in the region. Countries such 
as China, India and Vietnam offers larger markets to 
investors, although they may not yet offer Singapore’s 
efficient and reliable investment environment. 
97TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD PART 2: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
reFerenCeS
Algarni, A. M., Arditi, D., and Polat, G. (2007), ‘Build-
Operate-Transfer in Infrastructure Projects in the United 
States’, Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management,  133 (10): 728–35.
ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2008), Public-Private 
Partnership Handbook (Manila): 12–15. 
ADB/OECD (Asian Development Bank and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) (2006), Anti-
Corruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: Progress in Legal 
and Institutional Reform in 25 Countries (Manila: ADB).
ChannelNewsAsia (CNA) (2009), ‘Singapore’s Largest 
NEWater Plant Begins Commercial Operations’, <http://
www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/
view/446564/1/.html>, accessed 17 January 2010.
Dalal, M. (2009), ‘Sports Hub PPP makes Second Attempt 
to Cross Finish Line’, International Financing Review Asia, 28 
November to 11 January 2009: 627.




accessed 30 May 2010.
Global Finance (2010), ‘The Richest Countries in the 
World’, <http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/
economic-data/10049-the-richest-countries-in-the-world.
html>, accessed 1 June 2010.
Gunawansa, A. (2000), ‘Legal Implications Concerning 
Project Financing Initiatives in Developing Countries’, 
Attorney General’s Law Review, July.
Harris, J. (2008), ‘Project Finance 2008: Singapore 
Overview’, Expert Guides, <http://www.expertguides.com/
default.asp?Page=10&GuideID=178&CountryID=21>, 
accessed 11 May 2010.
Harris, S. (2004), Public Private Partnerships: Delivering 
Better Infrastructure Services, Working Paper (Washington 
DC: Inter-American Development Bank). 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2004), ‘Public Private 
Partnerships’, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2004/
pifp/eng/031204.htm>, accessed  23 May 2010.
—— (2010), ‘World Economic Outlook Database’, <http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/
index.aspx>, accessed 01 June 2010.
KPMG (2007), ‘Building for Prosperity: Exploring the 
Prospects for Public Private Partnerships in Asia Pacific’, 
<http://www.kpmg.com.sg/publications/Industries_
PPPinAsia2007.pdf>, accessed 02 June 2010.
Kumaraswamy, M.M. and Morris, D.A. (2002), ‘Build-
Operate-Transfer-Type Procurement in Asian 
Megaprojects’, Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management, 128 (2): 93–102.
Lazauskaite, V. (2009), Developments of Next Generation 
Networks (NGN): Country Case Studies (International 
Telecommunication Union), <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/
Documentation/ITU-NGN09.pdf>, accessed 29 May 2010.
Lee, K. and Rathbone, M. (2008), ‘PPP Goes to Singapore’, 
Project Finance International, 2 April 382.
Lim, C. and Lloyd, P. (1986), Singapore’s Resources and 
Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Lim, M. (2007), ‘Bigger Sports Hub to Include Water 
Sports Centre’, The Times, 14 June.
Loh, C.K. (2007), ‘The Public-Private Way for ITE West 
Campus’, TODAY, 27 November.
Menon, M. (2008), ‘Singapore Braces for PPP Financing 
Boom’, International Financing Review Asia, 23 August to 5 
September: 565.
MCYS (Ministry of Community Development, Youth and 
Sports, Singapore) (2008), ‘Singapore’s Prime Minister 
Kicks Off Construction Work For University Town Where 
Youth Olympic Village Will Be Located’ [Press Release], 31 
January, <http://app1.mcys.gov.sg/PressRoom/
SingaporesPrimeMinisterKicksOffConstruction.aspx>, 
accessed  20 May 2010
MOF (Ministry of Finance) (2004), Public Private 
Partnership Handbook Version 1, <http://app.mof.gov.sg/
ppp.aspx>, accessed 01 June 2010.
—— (2009), ‘Government Procurement’, <http://app.mof.
gov.sg/government_procurement.aspx>, accessed 01 June 
2010.
Peebles, G. and Wilson, P. (2002), Economic Growth and 
Development in Singapore: Past and Future (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar).
PUB (Public Utilities Board) (2007), ‘PUB Calls Public 
Tender for Singapore’s Fifth NEWater Plant’ [Press 
release], <http://www.pub.gov.sg/mpublications/Pages/
PressReleases.aspx?ItemId=58>, accessed 11 May 2010.
98
The Business Times (2009), ‘9 Singapore Government 
Agencies Tapped for Urban Hub: Bigger Role Seen for 
Singapore in Growth of Developing Countries’, 13 
November.
Wang, M.M. (2009), ‘Sports Hub: Vivian Asks for Patience’, 
The Sunday Times, 22 November.
WEF (World Economic Forum) (2010), Global 
Competitiveness Report for 2000–10, <http://www.
weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf>, 
accessed 30 May 2010.
Yescombe, E.R. (2002), Principles of Project Finance (San 
Diego: Academic Press), 8–15.
Zhang, X.Q. (2005), ‘Paving the Way for Public Private 
Partnerships in Infrastructure Development’, Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 131 (1): 71–80.
99TAKING STOCK OF PPP AND PFI AROUND THE WORLD PART 2: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
InTroduCTIon
During the last 30 years, the Korean economy has grown 
fast and a great amount of money has been invested in 
constructing infrastructure facilities. As the infrastructure 
stock grows larger, maintenance cost for facilities 
constantly increase. As concerns on environment and 
welfare increase, however, the total budget for 
infrastructure facilities has been continuously reduced in 
Korea. Therefore, since the 1990s the use of the public 
private partnership (PPP) has been treated as an 
important issue by the Korean government. PPP is an 
effective way to resolve the financial constraints faced by 
the government. The scope of PPP projects is expanding 
from existing ones in road and transportation facilities to 
social infrastructure facilities, such as schools, hospitals 
and residential accommodation. As in advanced countries, 
private participation in infrastructure provision in South 
Korea is a concept which involves the public and the 
private sectors working in cooperation and partnership to 
provide infrastructure and public services. 
This chapter presents information on the infrastructure 
stock transition, the capability of the PPP market, major 
types of PPP project, relevant organisations, and contract 
and financial procurement procedures in South Korea, 
from past and present references. Finally, this chapter 
includes some urgent problems and future perspectives 
for PPP implementation in South Korea. 
Infrastructure stocks are essential social capital and 
facilities for human beings. The role of private investment 
in infrastructure facilities is expected to continue as 
government revenue is limited and increased expenditure 
in other sectors such as welfare is necessary. As a 
complement to treasury investment, since the 1990s a 
PPP programme has not only supported the continuous 
provision of economic infrastructure, such as roads, 
bridges, airports and railways, but has also extended to 
the Korean government’s investment in social 
infrastructure such as educational, cultural and welfare 
facilities.
By combining such responsibilities as design, building, 
financing and operating in a single contract and 
transferring part of the risks and responsibilities to the 
private sector, PPP projects realise value for money with 
lower project costs and improved service quality 
compared with conventional public procurement. PPP also 
encourages the private sector to use its professional skills, 
creativity and innovation, which can thus be extended to 
the public sector.
Most people recognise that PPP implementation can 
mobilise more capital than the government alone can do, 
by introducing extra capital from the private sector to 
invest in PPP projects. PPP projects are undertaken when 
better value for money (VfM) is created compared with 
what conventional government-funded projects would 
potentially deliver, such as cost reduction and improved 
service quality. Furthermore, private developers not only 
construct but also manage and operate long-term projects, 
making them consider the efficiency of the project from 
the design stage and ultimately ensuring the highest 
construction quality.
InFrASTruCTure SToCk And CAPACITy oF The PPP 
mArkeT
The total asset value of infrastructure in Korea in 2004 
was 388 trillion KRW (US$353 billion) and road and 
transportation asset value, such as roads, rail, airports and 
seaports, amounted to 215 trillion KRW (US$195 billion) 
(Ahn and Kim 2006). Despite the Korean government’s 
investment of a great amount of money in infrastructure 
areas, South Korea does not have a sufficient 
infrastructure stock compared with other developed 
countries such as the US, the UK or Japan (Do and Kwon 
2009). 
Private investment has been continuously increasing since 
the introduction of the PPP Act and has been playing a key 
role in providing infrastructure in a timely manner, 
complementing public investment. The proportion of 
private investment to public investment in Social Overhead 
Capital increased from 4% in 1998 to 18% in 2008. As of 
September 2009, PPP contracts for 461 projects had been 
awarded. As shown in Figure 11.1 and Table 11.1, 106 
build–transfer–operate (BTO) and 145 build–transfer–lease 
(BTL) projects have been completed to provide services to 
the public 
Table 11.1: Current status of PPP projects as of 
September 2009
BTO Projects BTL 
projects TotalNational Local Subtotal
Completed 24 82 106 145 251
Under 
construction
15 31 46 110 156
Contract 
awarded
8 9 17 37 54
Total 47 122 169 292 461
Source: KDI (2010).
BTO projects have been widely used in the construction of 
transportation facilities, including roads, railways and 
seaports. Road projects account for more than half of all 
investment, and environmental facilities top the list for the 
highest number of projects while having the least cost per 
project (KDI 2010).
BTL projects, which first began in 2005, have been actively 
used, especially in building and reconstructing old 
educational facilities such as elementary and middle 
schools, and university dormitories. Furthermore, BTL 
projects are making a contribution to expanding and 
improving sewage systems and military residences, as well 
as the building of new railways.
11. Current status and perspectives of public private partnership for 
infrastructure projects in South korea
myungsik do, hanbat national university, hyeon Park, korea development Institute
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Table 11.2: ratio of government to private sector in billion uS$ in % 
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Private 0.45 0.91 0.50 1.09 1.09 1.54 2.36 2.73 2.73 3.09
Government 11.54 13.82 14.54 14.54 16.73 15.82 16.64 16.73 16.73 17.82
Ratio (%) 3.9 6.6 3.4 7.5 6.6 9.8 14.2 16.3 16.3 17.3
Source: Public and Private Infrastructure Investment Management Center (2010).
role in the successful operation of Incheon International 
Airport. Since its completion in 2000, the project has 
undergone a refinancing process and now all equity 
holders are financial institutions. The Act was amended by 
the Act on Private Partnership in Infrastructure (PPI) in 
1998. The amended Act included the MRG scheme for 
overcoming financing difficulties for infrastructure 
construction projects after the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997.
Although the MRG was a factor stimulating PPP projects 
up to early 2000s, the introduction of MRG has drawn 
criticism from civil groups. Owing to bad traffic demand 
forecasting and a growing financial burden, the MRG was 
eventually abolished in 2006. As typical examples of 
overestimation of traffic volume, experts cited references 
to the Incheon international airport expressway, the 
Cheonan-Nonsan expressway, and the Incheon 
international airport railway. Table 11.3 shows the gap 
between estimated traffic volume and observed volume in 
the case of Incheon airport expressway. 






















































Investment grew by approximately five times from 2001 to 
reach 7.8 trillion KRW (US$7.1 billion) in 2008. The 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) played an important 
role in the activation of PPP projects up to the early 
2000s. Table 11.2 shows that the ratio of private 
investment was not reduced by the end of 2008 despite 
the disappearance of the Minimum Revenue Guarantee in 
the case of submission of the project proposal by the 
private sector. 
hISTory oF PPP evoluTIon
PPP was introduced in Korea by the Promotion of Private 
Capital into Social Overhead Capital Investment Act in 
1994. The Act was legislated for the construction of a 
highway to Incheon airport under a government initiative. 
The Incheon International Airport Expressway was the first 
BTO road project carried out under the 1994 PPP Act. It 
originally started as a government-financed project but 
was turned into a BTO project later on to help ease the 
fiscal burden. Its early completion has played a significant 
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With the amendment of the PPI Act in 2005, a service-
contract type (BTL) of public-private partnership was 
introduced in addition to the existing user-fee type (BTO). 
According to the PPP Act and its Enforcement ordinance, 
46 types of facility in 15 categories, such as road, rail, 
seaport, airport, water resources, energy and logistics are 
defined as infrastructure types eligible for PPP projects 
(KDI 2010). 
Table 11.3: example of traffic demand over estimation 










2001 110,622 51,939 58,683 2.13
2002 121, 496 54,244 67,252 2.24
2003 133,438 55,323 78,115 2.41
2004 146,554 59,780 86,774 2.45
2005 119,026 62,831 56,195 1.89
2006 125,322 65,571 59,751 1.91
2007 131,965 68,711 63,254 1.92
Source: Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (2010).
BTo And BTl ConTrACTuAl SChemeS
All types of contractual scheme, including BTO, BOT, BOO 
and BTL, can be applied. Among them, BTO and BTL 
schemes are commonly accepted in South Korea (Back 
2007, KDI 2010). 
In the case of BTO, ownership of the infrastructure facilities 
is transferred to the central or local government upon 
completion of construction, and the concessionaire takes 
the right to operate the infrastructure facilities for a 
specified period of time. BTO projects are carried out 
according to the following procedure: after conducting a 
value-for-money (VfM) test to evaluate its potential as a 
PPP project, competent authorities announce Requests for 
Proposals (RFPs), and evaluate proposals for selection. The 
concessionaire assumes ownership of the infrastructure 
facilities for a specified period of time after completion of 
construction, and the ownership is transferred to the 
central or local government upon termination of the 
concession period.
In the case of BTL, ownership of the infrastructure facilities 
is transferred to the central or local government upon 
completion of construction, and the concessionaire takes 
the right to operate the infrastructure facilities for a 
specified period of time, in which case the concessionaire 
profits from the project by leasing the facilities to the 
government to use for a period of time set out in the 
concession agreement. BTL projects are carried out 
according to the following procedure: a BTL project is 
initiated by the competent authority, reviewed by the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance to decide on an 
aggregate investment ceiling for the project, and then 
approved by the National Assembly. The investment ceiling 
for BTL projects is the aggregate BTL investment cost for 
the fiscal year. An amount detailing the total limit of all BTL 
projects as well as the limits for each facility type is 
submitted to the National Assembly along with the budget 
plan. In the case of BOT (build–operate–transfer), however, 
the concessionaire assumes ownership of the 
infrastructure facilities for a specified period of time after 
completion of construction, and the ownership is 
transferred to the central or local government upon 
termination of the concession period. The procedures from 
announcement of RFPs to construction and operation are 
the same as for the BTO contractual scheme.
The ProCuremenT ProCeSS
Implementation procedure for solicited projects
The Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) is 
responsible for administering the PPP Act and its 
enforcement ordinance as well as the basic plan for the 
PPP. As the central body in charge of national PPP 
programmes, the ministry has key roles that include the 
development of PPP policies and the establishment of 
comprehensive investment plans. MOSF also chairs the 
PPP Review Committee, which deliberates on the 
establishment of major PPP policies and makes key 
decisions about the implementation of large-scale PPP 
projects. Procuring ministries are responsible for 
establishing and coordinating sector-specific PPP 
investment plans and policies. They also implement and 
monitor PPP projects.
The government identifies a potential PPP project and then 
seeks concessionaires for solicited projects. Competent 
authorities develop a potential project after considering 
related plans and demands for the facility. They then 
analyse the procurement options in order to determine 
whether PPP procurement is more efficient than 
conventional procurement.
There are a number of important points to consider before 
making decisions on a PPP project.
Is the facility qualified for a PPP project as prescribed •	
in the PPP Act and the enforcement ordinance? 
Is the project a high priority for medium and long-term •	
infrastructure investment plans? 
Does it offer more timely benefits than a conventional •	
government-procured project which has budget 
constraints? 
Will operational efficiency and services improve by •	
taking advantage of creativity and know-how from the 
private sector? 
Will it be profitable considering the level of user fees •	
and subsidies for BTO projects?
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Designation procedures for PPI projects are explained 
below, when financial support from the government is 
required.33
For projects with total cost of less than 200 billion KRW 
(US$182 million), prior to designating a PPI project, the 
competent authority must perform a feasibility analysis 
through a specialised research organisation. When a 
project with a total cost of 50 billion KRW (US$45 million) 
or more, and requiring 30 billion KRW (US$27 million) or 
more as government subsidy, is to be implemented as a 
PPI project, however, the competent authority must apply 
in advance to the Minister of Planning and Budget for a 
preliminary feasibility study of the project concerned (KDI 
2010, PIMAC 2010). Upon designating a PPI project, the 
competent authority must publish its decision in the 
official gazette and notify the Minister of Planning and 
Budget without delay. 
For projects with a total cost of 200 billion KRW (US$182 
million) or more and with a government subsidy of 30 
billion KRW (US$27 million) or more, the competent 
authority must apply to the Minister of Planning and 
Budget for a preliminary feasibility study of the project 
concerned. The competent authority must make a request 
to the Minister of Planning and Budget for deliberation by 
the PPP Review Committee while attaching the result of 
the feasibility study as well as the opinion of the Director 
of the Public and Private Infrastructure Investment 
Management Center (PIMAC). The competent authority 
shall formulate a request for a proposal for a PPI within 
one year from its designation as a PPI project. The 
contents shall be published in the official gazette in 
addition to notification through at least three daily 
newspapers and on the PIMAC homepage bulletin. A PPI 
project may be implemented by a private corporation or a 
joint public and private corporation.
The competent authority shall designate a concessionaire 
by finalising all negotiations for a concession agreement 
with the potential concessionaire, which will include the 
terms and conditions of project implementation. Key 
elements to be included in the concession agreement are:
basic information regarding the PPI project, including •	
designation of the concessionaire, the operation and 
management period, and the relationship of the rights 
and obligations of the parties to the concession 
agreement, etc 
the implementation procedure for a project, application •	
for the Detailed Engineering and Design Plan for 
Implementation (DEDPI), matters concerning 
guarantees and risks of project implementation, safety 
control, environmental management, etc
33.  PPI is the term commonly used to describe the infrastructure part of 
PPP.
details of construction, including the commencement •	
date and duration, supervision, levy of liquidated 
damages, etc 
total project cost and user fees, internal rate of return, •	
and other operating revenue and costs
details of government support, including guarantee of •	
operating revenue, assistance with applying for 
authorisation and permission, etc 
maintenance, repair, management and operation of the •	
facilities
classification of risk types and principles of risk •	
allocation
conditions and procedures for nullifying the concession •	
agreement, and payment criteria and procedures 
thereof
conditions and method of exercising the buyout right of •	
the concessionaire, and 
procedures for concluding negotiations and measures •	
for dispute resolution among negotiating parties, etc 
(PIMAC 2010). 
The competent authority must consult with PIMAC when 
concluding the concession agreement on projects with a 
total project cost of 200 billion KRW (US$182 million) or 
more or those that require deliberation by the PPP Review 
Committee. The procedure for consultation and review by 
PIMAC may be exempted for concession agreements 
where the competent authority has proceeded with the 
negotiations by commissioning PIMAC to finalise its 
negotiations.
PIMAC was established under the PPP Act in order to 
provide comprehensive and professional support for the 
implementation of PPP projects. Its main duties are: 
to support the government in developing PPP policies •	
and guidelines
to provide technical assistance throughout the •	
procurement process for PPP projects, including VfM 
tests, formulation of RFPs, evaluation of project 
proposals, and negotiations with potential 
concessionaires
to organise capacity-building programmes and provide •	
support for foreign investors through investment 
consultation, and 
to promote international cooperation for knowledge •	
sharing (KDI 2010).
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PIMAC, which is also in charge of the ex-ante evaluation of 
public investment projects, contributes to enhancing 
efficiency and transparency in national infrastructure 
planning through comprehensive and systematic 
management of both public and PPP investment for 
infrastructure (KDI 2010).
For concession agreements that include an agreement for 
government support, the competent authority must refer 
to the opinion of the Minister for Planning and Budget in 
advance. The scope of government support covers 
construction subsidies and long-term loans in addition to 
subsidies for key facilities, but excludes government 
payments such as lease fees for BTL projects. Projects 
with a high share of foreign investors will receive maximum 
consideration for their foreign investors’ opinions with 
regard to the prevailing language of the concession 
agreement, dispute resolution clause, etc. The 
concessionaire must apply for the approval of the DEDPI 
within one year from its designation as concessionaire. The 
competent authority must notify the concessionaire in 
writing of its decision on the approval of the DEDPI within 
three months from the filing date of the application, except 
in special circumstances. Finally, after approved DEDPI, 
solicited projects will be conducted and confirmed as 
completion of construction. 
Implementation procedure for unsolicited projects
The private sector can propose a PPP project for 
infrastructure that is in high demand but has been delayed 
by government budget constraints. After considering 
factors such as demand, profitability, project structure, 
construction and operating plans, and funding, the private 
partner creates a project plan and submits the proposal to 
the competent authority. The private sector may propose 
profitable and creative ancillary/supplementary projects 
related to the main PPP project. The competent authority 
reviews and evaluates the contents and value for money of 
the private proposal (KDI 2010).
In the case of submission of a project proposal by the 
private sector, the private sector company must submit 
that proposal to the competent authority. This proposal 
must cover a specific list of items:
1.  the outcome of the feasibility study of the proposed 
unsolicited project
2.  details of the project proposal
3.  the amount and calculation of the total project cost, 
and a financing plan
4.  details of the determination of the concession period or 
ownership and operation period of the completed 
facilities
5.  a facility management and operation plan
6.  an income and expenditure plan for project operation, 
including such items as user fee revenue
7.  details of, and grounds for, implementing 
supplementary projects, if any; and other necessary 
matters for the implementation of the project 
concerned.
The competent authority must request a review of the 
contents of the project proposal within 15 days from the 
filing date of the proposal, except in special circumstances 
such as a need to improve the proposal. 
For projects with a total project cost of 300 billion KRW 
(US$273 million) or more, the director of PIMAC then 
conducts a value-for-money test that includes a cost and 
benefit analysis (CBA) comparing how the PPI project 
would operate if promoted by public procurement, and 
tests the reasonability of the facility demand forecast.
The value-for-money (VfM) test conducted on projects with 
a total project cost of 300 billion KRW (US$273 million) or 
more is carried out as follows. First, there is a feasibility 
judgement: the cost and benefit analysis is conducted to 
determine the national economic feasibility of the project. 
This is followed by a value-for-money judgement: after 
passing the feasibility judgement test, a comparative 
analysis is conducted between the public sector 
comparator and the project proposal to determine whether 
the project proposal has a higher VfM. Thirdly, there is the 
establishment of a PFI alternative: when the project 
proposal shows VfM, a financial analysis is conducted to 
calculate an appropriate level of project cost, user fee, 
subsidy scale, etc., to allow the proposal of PFI alternatives.
The Director of PIMAC must submit an opinion on the 
project proposal to the competent authority and the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget within 60 days of 
receiving the request for review of the project proposal 
from the competent authority, except in special 
circumstances.
The competent authority must notify the proposer in 
writing of the official opinion about the project proposal 
concerned, including, but not limited to, its decision on the 
possibility of implementing the proposed project by means 
of private investment, within 60 days from the receipt of 
the opinion of the Director of PIMAC. When pursuing an 
unsolicited project as a PPI project pursuant to the Act on 
PPI, the competent authority shall announce the outlined 
content of the project proposal concerned in the official 
gazette, and at least three daily newspapers, in addition to 
posting on PIMAC homepage bulletin to allow for the third 
parties other than the initial proposer to submit alternative 
proposals for the project concerned. The competent 
authority reviews and evaluates the proposal of the initial 
proposer and that of the third party to determine the 
potential concessionaire. The conclusion of concession 
agreements and designation of concessionaire procedures 
are the same as for solicited projects. 
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Feasibility and value-for-money assessment 
A preliminary feasibility study was introduced in 1999 to 
encourage a rational approach to new large-scale projects 
by enhancing the efficiency of fiscal investment by 
verifying the feasibility of projects in such aspects as 
economics, policy analysis, investment priority, proper 
timing and financing methods, by conducting general 
research on large-scale development projects. 
Whereas a feasibility study focuses mainly on the technical 
viability, a preliminary feasibility study largely reviews 
economic and policy adequacy. Also, while a feasibility 
study is carried out by competent authorities, a 
preliminary feasibility study is conducted by the Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance. The National Finance Act, 
Article 38, serves as a legal basis for a preliminary 
feasibility study and stipulates that projects requiring not 
only the approval of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
but also the decision of the National Assembly must 
undergo inspection and verification in order to corroborate 
the preliminary feasibility study. Guidelines should be 
created to establish the criteria by which: 
1.  the project will be selected
2.  an appropriate agency will be set up to conduct a 
preliminary feasibility study, and 
3.  a selection will be made of the method and procedures 
upon which the study will be based .
The aim of conducting feasibility studies and assessing 
VfM by comparing Private Finance Initiative (PFI) against 
the public sector comparator (PSC) is to test if PPP 
procurement would improve the value of taxpayers’ 
money. Therefore, the competent authority uses VfM 
reports as basic information for making a judgement on 
whether to move forwards with a PPP project proposed by 
the private proponent. 
Selection methods and procedures
Projects are selected by examining the urgency and 
necessity of a project’s implementation, taking into 
account the priorities set by the government’s medium-
term and long-term plans for related areas. The guidelines 
for each sector (road, railway, airport, harbour, culture, 
tourism, sports, and science) for preliminary feasibility 
studies include: 
an analysis of project overview and basic materials•	
an economic feasibility analysis•	
a policy analysis•	
a general evaluation using the Analytic Hierarchy •	
Process technique. 
FInAnCIAl reSourCeS
Table 11.4 shows the main providers of financial resources 
for PPP projects: construction companies with an average 
of 57.11% and bank or insurance companies with an 
average of 11.98%. 
For the financial security of the project, private partners 
need to maintain a minimum required equity ratio. During 
the construction period, project companies need to 
maintain a minimum required equity ratio of at least 20% 
for a BTO project, or 5% or more for a BTL project. When 
the investment input of financial investors is above 50% of 
the total equity, the minimum required equity ratio during 
construction can be lowered from 20% to 15%.
The concessionaire is allowed to refinance according to 
changes in the macroeconomic environment, project risk, etc. 
Investors may see their expected returns increase depending 
on changes in capital structure and debt financing 
conditions, etc. Refinancing gains are shared between the 
concessionaire and the government to benefit both parties. 
Refinancing gains can be used to lower the level of user 
fee so that facility users can also benefit from refinancing. 
Table 11.4: Investors in government controlled projects in %
Construction 
company










Road 64.1 11.1 12.8 4.7 5.0 2.2
Seaport 70.0 10.2 4.3 2.3 0 13.2
Rail 58.6 15.6 7.8 4.9 1.7 11.5
Logistics, airport 23.45 5.0 0 0 0 71.55
Environmental, water 
resources
69.4 18.0 0 2.0 6.2 4.4
Average (%) 57.11 11.98 4.98 2.78 2.58 20.57
Source: Joo et al. (2010).
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CASe STudIeS And FuTure PerSPeCTIveS
The government may pay the shortfall when the actual 
operation revenue is less than the share of investment 
risks borne by the government. If the actual operation 
revenue exceeds expected income revenue, however, it will 
be redeemed within the limit of the government share of 
investment.  As mentioned in the previous section, the 
minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) scheme was 
introduced to overcome financing difficulties for 
infrastructure construction projects after the onset of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
Table 11.5 illustrates how total paid revenue of central-
government-paid expenses and local-government-paid 
expenses increased significantly from 2001 to 2008. The 
guaranteed rate of return of each project shows MRG 
percentages in the concession agreement. The numbers in 
brackets are the ratios of the estimated volume and 
observed volume. Most of observed traffic volumes are not 
less than 60% of estimated volume. In particular, Incheon 
airport expressway and railway are attaining into almost 
70% of total central government expenditure for MRGs. 
Financing through the infrastructure fund is also 
encouraged to diversify the investor profile. The 
infrastructure fund is an indirect investment facility that 
collects funds from investors to lend and invest in PPP 
projects, while also distributing profits to multiple 
investors. Regulations on asset management and financing 
have been eased to promote the use of the infrastructure 
fund. Investments through the infrastructure fund 
increased from 80 billion KRW (US$73 million) in 1999 to 
3.3 trillion KRW (US$3 billion) in 2008, with a total of 10 
funds being managed in 2010.
The Korea Infrastructure Credit Guarantee Fund (KICGF) 
was established by the PPP Act to provide credit 
guarantees for concessionaires who obtain bank loans 
from financial institutions or issue infrastructure bonds for 
PPP projects. KICGF is a public fund established under the 
PPP Act to guarantee the credit of a concessionaire that 
intends to obtain loans from financial institutions for PPP 
projects. It is managed by the Korea Credit Guarantee 
Fund and funded by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(KDI 2010).
Table 11.5: Annual paid revenue and traffic demand accuracy (in million uSd)
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53.7 62.1 123.3 127.5 95.5 134.2 237.7 325.4 1,159.6

































5.6 4.8 5.7 15.9 16.5 17.0 17.5 22.6 105.8
Total 59.3 66.9 129.1 143.4 112.1 151.2 255.2 348.1 1,265.4
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2010) and the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (2010).
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Incheon airport expressway MLTM* Solicited 20 1995/10 80
Kwangju 2nd bypass phase 1 Kwangju Solicited 28 1997/02 85
Cheonan-Nonsan expressway MLTM Solicited 20 1997/04 82
Daegu-Busan expressway MLTM Solicited 20 1998/03 77
Woomyeonsan tunnel Seoul Solicited 30 1998/05 79
Seoul beltway MLTM Solicited 20 2000/12 90
Ilsan bridge Gyeonggi 
province
Solicited 30 2002/06 90
Machang bridge Gyeongnam 
province
Unsolicited 30 2003/05 80




Mokpo new port phase 1-1 MLTM Solicited 20 1997/07 79,77
Incheon N. port phase 1-1 MLTM Solicited 20 2001/08 80
Mokpo new port phase 1-2 MLTM Unsolicited 20 2001/12 79,77
Incheon N. port wharf MLTM Unsolicited 15 2003/02 80
Environmental Seoul landfill gas facility MOE** Solicited 11 2003/03 90
Airport Incheon airport oil facility MLTM Solicited 11 1997/02 90
*MLTM: Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, **MOE: Ministry of Environment
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2010) and the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (2010).
Table 11.6 shows the guaranteed periods and guaranteed 
rates, competent authorities and concession agreement 
dates for currently operating projects. At the start of the 
introduction of MRG, the guaranteed period and 
guaranteed ratio were 30 years and 90% respectively. 
Most MRG periods for projects signed since 2004 have, 
however, been reduced to 15 years after the start of 
operations and the MRG ratio was reduced by 
approximately 10: in units of five years based on the 
revised PPI Act in 2003.
Table 11.7 shows the guaranteed periods and guaranteed 
rates, competent authorities and concession agreement 
dates for construction projects. The amount of additional 
MRG burden is expected to increase significantly owing to 
movement of new projects into the operational phase.
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Busan-Geojae road Busan Solicited 20 2003/02 90
Incheon Bridge (2nd bridge) MLTM Unsolicited 15 2003/06 80
Myungji bridge Busan Unsolicited 15 2004/01 80,70,60
Seoul-Chuncheon Expressway MLTM Unsolicited 15 2004/03 80,70,60
Siheung-Namdong road Gyeonggi 
province
Solicited 20 2004/09 90,85,80,75
Yongin-Seoul road MLTM Unsolicited 10 2005/01 70
Seosuwon-Pyeongtaek expressway MLTM Unsolicited 15 2005/01 80.70.60
N. port bridge Busan Solicited 15 2006/01 80,60
Daegu 4th bypass Daegu Unsolicited 5 2008/05 80
Rail 
(6)
Incheon airport railway MLTM Solicited 33 2001/03 90
New Bundang railway MLTM Unsolicited 10 2005/03 80,70
Yongin light rail Yongin Solicited 30 2004/07 90
Busan-kimhae light rail MLTM Solicited 20 2002/12 80,78,75
Seoul urban rail line 9 Seoul Solicited 15 2005/05 90,80,70
Uijeonbu light rail Uijeonbu Solicited 10 2006/04 80,70
Port 
(5)
Ulsan new port phase 1-1 MLTM Solicited 15 2004/03 90
Masan port phase 1-1 MLTM Solicited 14 2004/06 90,80,70
Pohang new port phase 1-1 MLTM Solicited 14 2004/06 90,85,80
Incheon N. port wharf MLTM Solicited 15 2005/07 85,75,65
Pyeongtaek port E. wharf MLTM Solicited 15 2005/06 85,75,65
Environmental Yongin sewage treatment Yongin Solicited 15 2005/01 75,65,55
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2010) and the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (2010).
The government has established mid-to-long-term 
investment plans for PPP projects in order to manage PPP 
investments at a sustainable level, ensuring the stable 
conduct of PPP projects. PPP investments are managed as 
part of national financial planning and are linked to the 
National Fiscal Management Plan, the government’s 
five-year fiscal plan established by the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance.
As shown in Tables 11.5 to 11.7, the MRG on the 
government financial burden is expected to increase 
sharply. New demands in the infrastructure sector are 
expected owing to the rapidly aging population and the 
increasingly uncertain economic circumstances. Therefore, 
the government has been trying to reduce and abolish the 
MRG periods or rates, and to improve the traffic demand 
forecasting process. Since 2009, the government has been 
introducing and implementing a refinancing request 
system. According to the refinancing request system, even 
if there is no request from the project company, the 
competent authorities may request to review whether to 
adopt refinancing measures such as changing capital 
structure and financing conditions. 
If the financial burden of MRG continues to increase after 
refinancing and revenue increases, the government would 
consider termination of the contract and acquisition of the 
project. A typical example is the Korea Railroad Co., which 
is trying to acquire the equity of the Incheon airport 
railway from the construction companies’ consortium.
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ConCluSIonS
In the face of an aging population, welfare expenses are 
gradually rising, limiting public investment in 
infrastructure. Thus, the government is actively promoting 
private investment in areas where private entities prove 
more efficient and competitive in supplementing the 
government’s budget. Therefore, PPPs will continue to play 
an important role in expanding and improving 
infrastructure facilities in South Korea.
The use of PPP is not expected to be smooth for the 
following reasons. First, the Korean government adopted a 
double entry bookkeeping system in January 2009 to 
improve the efficiency, clarity and responsibility of public 
financial affairs. There have been many problems in 
operating the new system due to difficulties in 
understanding the new accounting method, a limited 
preparatory period, etc. With the introduction of 
International Financial Reporting Standards from 2011 on, 
the pressure on the construction sector is expected to 
grow. For example, the project financing debts of a special 
purpose company will be moved to the parent company’s 
debt. Therefore, restructuring, mergers and acquisitions in 
the construction industry are expected to be activated with 
the introduction of IFRS.
Second, in a now rapidly aging society, the creation of new 
demand is expected to be difficult. This feasibility problem 
is the largest problem the infrastructure sector is facing. 
The current population of over-65-year-olds accounts for 
8.1% of the total population in South Korea. By 2016, this 
age group is expected to increase to 12.4% of the 
population. Combined with a low birth rate, the financial 
situation is expected to become more difficult owing to a 
decline in the working-age population. 
Third, following on from the introduction of MRG, annual 
charges to be paid by the government are expected to 
grow significantly. In other words, no additional 
government funding can be afforded. 
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InTroduCTIon
Infrastructure plays a crucial role in the economic 
development and improvement of living standards of 
people in every nation. Thailand has encountered various 
infrastructure challenges in recent decades resulting from 
the increasing demand for infrastructure that responds to 
economic development and international competition, 
growth of urban areas, and global energy crises.
Public private partnership (PPP) has been implemented 
for the delivery of infrastructure projects worldwide. PPP 
has been adopted for delivering both physical and social 
infrastructures that are necessary for extensive economic 
and social development. Creating infrastructure 
development by forming partnerships with the private 
sector yields several benefits. Governments, which usually 
have limited resources, can use the private sector’s 
resources in infrastructure development. They can also 
access state-of-the-art technologies and expertise 
available in the market. Moreover, the state and the private 
sector can share project risks, especially financial risk, 
which it might be impossible for a single party to bear, 
while the private sector partner can enjoy the profits 
gained from the investment.
This chapter reviews the PPP implementation in Thailand 
by focusing on the following issues: the history of PPP 
evolution, national policy development, the institutional 
framework, the procurement procedure, types of contract, 
the relationship between privatisation policy and PPP, foreign 
influence, and weaknesses of the current PPP framework. 
It discusses four key infrastructure sectors in Thailand: 
transport, energy, telecommunications and public utilities.
hISTory oF PPP evoluTIon In ThAIlAnd
PPP implementation and management strategies are 
diverse. In Thailand, there have been a large number of 
infrastructure projects delivered by using PPP. 
Nonetheless, in Thailand the regulatory and legal 
frameworks underlying these infrastructure projects are 
considered incomplete and fragmented, and the actual 
implementation and degree of success of the projects have 
varied widely (Valentine 2008).
Until the late 1980s, infrastructure project development in 
Thailand was exclusive to state enterprises. In 1988, the 
government, for the first time, invited the private sector to 
invest in a transport infrastructure project in Bangkok. The 
Express and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand, a state 
enterprise, granted a 30-year build-transfer-operate (BTO) 
concession to a private company. The contract involved 
the construction of a six-lane, 40km elevated expressway 
worth US$900 million. This BTO scheme was specifically 
designed to circumvent national legislation that prohibits 
private ownership of public infrastructure (Nikomborirak 
2004).
In other cases, the investments were shared by the state 
and the private sector. For example, for the construction of 
the first subway line in Bangkok, the state financed the 
construction of civil works (tunnels, rails and stations) with 
the approximate amount of US$2 billion whereas the 
private sector, a multinational joint venture, invested 
approximately US$350 million in the rolling stock and the 
system operation. The government realised that this public 
transport service would not be commercially viable without 
some state subsidy. The cost of the subway project is 
extremely high compared with the cost of other public 
transport systems such as bus or light rail networks.
Another example of private participation in transport 
infrastructure projects is the construction and operation of 
ports. The private sector operates all eight docks at the 
Lam Chabang Seaport on the eastern coast of Thailand. 
Five of the eight docks are owned by the Port Authority of 
Thailand, a state enterprise, and operated under 
management contracts; major shipping companies own 
the other three docks.
In 1992, the private sector began to participate in 
investment for electricity generation. The capacity of the 
state enterprises was so limited that it could not catch up 
with the increasing demand for electricity due to the rapid 
economic growth at that time. As a result, seven 
independent power producers (IPPs) were selected to sign 
long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with the 
total generation capacity of 5,943 MW and total private 
financing of US$10 billion.
In the same year, several major telecommunications 
concessions were granted to the private sector, including 
fixed line and mobile phone services, and paging. Owing to 
the constraint imposed by the domestic law, rather as in 
the case of transport infrastructure mentioned above, the 
private sector was prohibited from owning any 
telecommunications infrastructure. As a result, the BTO 
scheme was used in these concession contracts, including 
the concession to install 1.5 million fixed line services in 
the provinces and 2.6 million lines in Bangkok, as well as 
two cellular concessions with unlimited scale of operation. 
By 2004, there were more than 40 telecommunications 
concessions granted to private operators such as VSAT, 
and companies running a broadband network and yellow 
pages (Nikomborirak 2004).
The private participation in water utilities has been limited 
compared with other types of infrastructure even though 
there is a desperate need for developing the infrastructure. 
Of Thailand’s 62 million people, 38 million must rely on 
local wells or low-quality small-scale local water supply 
systems, which contribute to social and environmental 
problems. In 1992, the Provincial Water Authority (PWA) of 
Thailand, a state enterprise, set up a company named the 
East Water Company to produce and distribute water to 
the eastern seaboard industrial estates. Even though the 
company was at first wholly state-owned, it was later 
privatised with a minority holding of 44% retained by the 
state. In 1995, the PWA granted a build-operate-transfer 
(BOT) contract to a private company to modernise the 
water distribution system and build water purification 
plants in Pathumtani province. Since then, there have been 
several build-own-operate (BOO) contracts awarded for 
12. review of public private partnership implementation in Thailand
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the provision of raw water, water treatment, and local 
distribution. Even so, these contracts provide less than one 
per cent of the total water supply provided by the state-
owned water authorities.
In the early 2000s, the government focused on privatising 
the state enterprises, especially in the telecommunications 
and the energy sectors. There were both successful and 
unsuccessful examples resulting from this policy.
nATIonAl PolICy on PPP
To date, the government has been solely responsible for 
investment in infrastructure projects and has relied on 
annual budgets, loans and financial assistance from 
foreign countries. The projects were executed by 
government agencies or state enterprises on the basis of 
the policy of their responsible ministries. Owing to 
economic slowdowns and lack of funding sources, the 
government has become interested in private funding to 
alleviate its financial burden.
So far, the PPP schemes that have been adopted for 
infrastructure project development in Thailand can be 
summarised as follows (NESDB 2004).
1. Turnkey contracts are those where the private sector is 
responsible for design and construction under the 
provisions of contracts. The private sector earns a fixed 
amount of payment as specified in the contract when 
the project is completed, whereas the state owns the 
facilities. An example of this contract is the Bangna-
Chonburi Expressway project.
2. Concession agreements are those where the state 
grants the private sector the right to design, build, 
manage, collect fees, and maintain infrastructure 
facilities under the provisions of agreements and the 
state’s supervision. Typical concession periods range 
from 15 to 30 years. The revenue sharing schemes are 
also diverse. The concession agreements entail several 
forms of contractual arrangements. 
In build–transfer–operate (BTO) projects, the private  –
sector must transfer the ownership of infrastructure 
to the state immediately after the construction is 
complete. Notwithstanding this, the private sector 
partner continues administrating the facility until 
the contract expires. Examples of infrastructure 
projects under this contractual arrangement are 
Sriratch Expressway, Bangna-Bangpa-in 
Expressway, Donmuang Tollway, fixed line services 
(TA and TT&T), and mobile phone services (AIS and 
DTAC).
In build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects, the  –
ownership of infrastructure is transferred to the 
state at the end of the concession period. Examples 
of projects under this form of concession are the 
BTS elevated train, the three docks at Lam Chabang 
Seaport, and the water supply project at Pathumtani 
province.
In build–own–operate (BOO) projects, the private  –
partner does not have to transfer the ownership to 
the state, but the state agrees to purchase products 
or services during the contractual period. Examples 
of such infrastructure projects are the small power 
producer (SPP) and independent power producer 
(IPP). 
3.  Service contracts are those where the private partner 
performs some form of service for the state, such as 
collecting road tolls. These are usually short-term and 
low-amount contracts. 
4. Lease contracts are those where the state invests in 
the construction of infrastructure and then leases it to 
the private sector for operating the facility for 25 to 30 
years. An example under this contractual arrangement 
is the docks at Lam Chabang Seaport.
The main providers of financial resources for PPP projects 
in Thailand are the government budget, domestic loans, 
and foreign loans such as from the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (NESDB and World Bank 2008).
According to the NESDB and World Bank (2008), most of 
the infrastructure development in Thailand has been done 
in response to demand rather than being planned 
strategically. Its availability and accessibility are no longer 
a challenge. Now the country needs to focus more on the 
quality of service delivery, management, and regulation. 
Most importantly, Thailand needs a clear policy framework 
and development direction, set by the policymakers and 
based on reliable information.
The Tenth National Development Plan (2007–11) 
addresses the infrastructure development strategy in three 
main areas: 
1. infrastructure and logistics services, 
2. energy efficiency and alternative sources of energy, and 
3. the framework for overall infrastructure development. 
The summary of each area is shown in Figure 12.1.
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Figure 12.1: Summary of the Tenth national development Plan (2007–11) infrastructure development strategy
1. Development of infrastructure and logistics services to support production structural adjustments. Infrastructure 
development aims to support the competitiveness and enhance the efficiency of the private sector in both production and 
service sectors.
(a) Develop up-to-date and efficient transport, logistics services and telecommunication systems.
Develop a domestic and international logistics network through multi-modal transportation networks, feeder systems, •	
and distribution centres at strategic production locations. Enhanced trade facilitation is also a key concern.
Enhance efficiencies in logistics management within the production sectors, particularly along the supply chain.•	
Support transport modes and transport management that are energy-efficient, particularly development of rail •	
systems, waterways, and delivery of energy through pipelines. Energy-saving transport and increased use of modern 
technology to reduce the cost of transport is encouraged.
Develop an urban mass-transit network to enhance efficiency, safety, time-saving, and reduction of energy use.•	
Develop a telecommunications network that is efficient and up-to-date. Competition in service provision and the •	
importance of a return on investment are emphasised, in order to serve production, private, and service sectors, and 
to enhance government’s services. 
(b) Transparent and efficient management of infrastructure under stakeholders’ participation.
•	 Create	stakeholder	participation	in	infrastructure	project	development.
•	 Emphasise	careful	project	studies	on	feasibilities,	environmental	impacts,	social	impacts,	and	health-related	impacts	
to ensure the project’s viability, with clear with clear mitigation plans .
•	 Support	public-private	partnership	in	infrastructure	investment	through	improved	regulations	and	laws.	Regulators	
for each sector are important for consumer protection and transparent and fair competition.
•	 Support	demand	management	initiatives	that	aim	to	create	awareness	in	efficient	use	of	resources.
2.  Improved energy efficiency and expedition of alternative energy initiatives in order to reduce energy imports, costs to both 
producers and consumers and pollution.
(a) Find new energy sources, both domestic and international, and secure energy reserves that ensure long-term energy 
security for Thailand.
(b) Increase energy efficiency in transport, manufacturing, and household sectors through incentives and law enforcement. 
For example, provide investment incentives to attract high-value-added industries with low-energy consumption and 
make regulations that encourage importing energy-inefficient machinery. Other strategies for enhancing energy efficiency 
are proper city planning, structural reform of transport, logistics management, development of rail and waterways as 
alternative modes of transportation, and industrial cluster development. 
(c) Campaign for energy conservation and for alternative energy use in every sector. For example, promoting NGV, gasohol, 
and biodiesel for vehicles. Consultation services for households, and private and public organisations, about alternative 
energy and energy efficiency to help create awareness in energy conservation.
(d) Research alternative and renewable energy including new fuels and electricity-generating technology. Research should 
encompass technical, economic and environmental aspects of alternative and renewable energy. The programmes should 
also include capacity-building activities and public information dissemination of research results.
3.  A framework for fair distribution of the benefits of infrastructure development, particularly in favour of rural areas. This is to 
enhance access, ensure sufficient provision and be responsive to the demand for infrastructure. Well-established stakeholder 
participation, expanded coverage on telecommunications and media, access to clean water through piped water systems in 
rural areas, and city planning, which will bring residents close to production bases, should lead to better distribution of 
infrastructure and related services around the country. This should in turn contribute to the alleviation of a rural–urban 
disparity.
Source: NESDB and World Bank 2008: 18–9.
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The institutional framework
The institutional frameworks for different infrastructure 
sectors are diverse. Tables 12.1 to 12.5 show the 
institutional frameworks for five main infrastructure 
sectors. For example, the institutional arrangements for 
the land transport sector are characterised by several 
actors such as state agencies, state enterprises, and the 
private sector. Since 2002, policies have been formulated 
by the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning 
(OTP) and the Ministry of Transport (MOT) with oversight 
by the Commission for the Management of Land Traffic. 
The Department of Land Transport is the main regulator 
but its authority is limited to bus operations, vehicle safety 
and road transport only. Rail and mass rapid transit are 
not within its regulatory scope. There are several overlaps 
of regulatory and implementing functions among several 
agencies. Some agencies, such as the State Railway of 
Thailand (SRT), the Mass Rapid Transit Authority and the 
Bangkok Mass Transit Authority, act as both regulator (ie 
regulating service providers operating under concessions 
granted by them) and operator (ie competing in the same 
service as their concessionaires). This clearly leads to a 
governance issue and potential conflicts of interest. Since 
there is no single regulatory agency that regulates all 
modes of transport, it creates difficulties to established 
integral, coordinated, long-term policies on multi-model 
transport (NESDB and World Bank 2008). 
The institutional frameworks for infrastructure in Thailand 
are a fragmented hierarchy where different bodies have 
assumed various responsibilities across several sectors. 
For example, in the transport sector, there are six 
departments within the MOT, each of which can grant and 
manage PPP projects, rather than the MOT itself being 
responsible for these regulatory duties.





























Commission for the Management of Land 
Traffic
√
Ministry of Transport √
Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and 
Planning
√
Department of Land Transport √ √
Department of Highways √ √
Department of Rural Roads √
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority √ √
State Railway of Thailand √ √
Expressway & Rapid Transit Authority of 
Thailand
√ √
Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand √ √
Bangkok Mass Transit Authority √ √
The Transport Co., Ltd. √ √
Private sector √
Source: NESDB and World Bank (2008).
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Ministry of Transport √
Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and 
Planning
√
Marine Department √ √
Port Authority of Thailand √ √
Thai Maritime Navigation Co., Ltd. √
Bangkok Dock Co., Ltd. √
Private sector √
Source: NESDB and World Bank (2008).





























Ministry of Transport √
Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and 
Planning
√
Department of Civil Aviation √ √
Thai Airway International PCL √
Airport of Thailand PCL √ √
Aeronautical Radio of Thailand √
Private sector √
Source: NESDB and World Bank (2008).





























National Energy Policy Council √
Ministry of Energy (ie EPPO) √
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) √
Electricity Generation Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT)
√
Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA) √
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) √
Private sector √
Source: NESDB and World Bank (2008).





























Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology
√
National Telecommunication Commission √ √
TOT Corporation Public Company Limited √
CAT Telecom Public Company Limited √
Private sector √
Source: NESDB and World Bank 2008.
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ProCuremenT ProCedure
The existing legal framework for PPP regulation in 
Thailand is derived from the Private Participation in State 
Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992), which was originally 
enacted by the government to ensure transparency in the 
undertaking of large-scale PPP projects whose amount 
exceeds one billion THB. Figure 12.2 illustrates the 
procurement procedure for PPP projects in accordance 
with this law.
The law outlines the internal processes for the government 
to follow to prevent corruption, rather than outlining the 
necessary components of a good regulatory and 
institutional framework for PPPs. In addition, only certain 
types of PPP project (eg BOT and BTO schemes) are 
covered by the Act whereas several other schemes, 
including those developed since 1992, such as the BOO 
and turnkey PPP models, are not covered. Owing to the 
incompleteness of the Act, many PPP projects that have 
been developed and implemented in Thailand since 1992 
have been able to exploit several different loose 
interpretations of the law as their legal framework. Another 
limitation of this Act is that it does not address risk 
management for PPP projects. The law does not provide 
any methodology for identifying, analysing, allocating, and 
mitigating risks in PPP infrastructure project development, 
even though this is one of the most important 
considerations in developing PPP projects (Valentine 
2008). 
ConTrACT
There is no official guidance on standardisation of PPP 
contracts in Thailand. Typically, the project agency 
initiating a new PPP project hires a consultant to assist in 
preparing the contract. Then, according to the Private 
Participation in State Undertakings Act (Section 20), the 
draft contract must be examined by the Office of the 
Attorney General before the contract can be executed. In 
addition to being used for the current PPP project, the 
approved contract can be used again in future for similar 
PPP projects by making minor changes to the wording.
Common characteristics of Thai PPP contracts can be 
summarised as follows (Wityatem 2007). They:   
are non-standardised •	
are long-term •	
include the right to supply goods or services•	
set a regulated price•	
are made at net cost •	
include a lump sum payment spread over the •	
construction period
cover delay and cost overrun concerns•	
allow the private sector to collect all revenue•	
do not involve  government subsidies for projects.•	
Figure 12.2: Procurement procedure of PPP projects in 
Thailand
Propose the project  













Council of Ministers 
























Submit the result 
of selection
Source: adapted from NESDB (2004): Fig. 1.6.
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relATIon BeTWeen PrIvATISATIon PolICy And PPP
The relation between privatisation policy and PPP depends 
on the infrastructure sector. The details are as follows 
(NESDB and World Bank 2008).
Transport sector
For land transport, private participation plays a moderate 
role in the road transport infrastructure, most of which is 
in the form of concessions under the Private Participation 
in State Undertaking Act, B.E. 2535 (1992). Construction 
of most highways and major roads has been funded by the 
government budget whereas concessions have been 
granted for road maintenance. The Department of 
Highways (DOH) and Expressway and Rapid Transit 
Authority (ETA) has granted concessions to private 
companies for some toll roads and expressway projects in 
the form of build–transfer–operate (BTO) contracts. For 
example, the Don Muang Tollway is operated under a 
concession granted by DOH, and the Second Stage 
Expressway is operated under another, granted by ETA. 
Private participation is more dominant in urban transport: 
mass rapid transit projects. Major projects such as the 
Bangkok Transit System and the Mass Rail Transit (MRT) 
were financed with private participation. The BTS or Sky 
Train was wholly financed by a private company, the 
Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Company Limited 
(BTSC), under a concession granted by the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration in the form of a build–
transfer–operate (BTO) contract. In this project, not only 
did BTSC invest in the infrastructure, but it also operates 
and maintains the system. For the MRT or the subway line, 
the Mass Rapid Transit Authority, a state enterprise, 
invested in all civil infrastructures and granted a 25-year 
BTO concession for the operation and maintenance of the 
system to a private company, the Bangkok Metro Company 
Limited.
In the case of water transport, the Port Authority of 
Thailand (PAT) is a state enterprise that is responsible for 
the management of all seven deep-sea ports, including two 
main seaports, Bangkok Port and Laem Chabang Port. At 
Laem Chabang Port, all eight berths are operated by 
private companies with PAT acting as the supervisor. Five 
of them still belong to PAT, which contracted private 
companies to manage the port under lease contracts. 
Three berths belong to major shipping companies, which 
also operate them.
For air transport, major airports in Thailand are owned and 
operated by Airport of Thailand (AOT), formerly a state 
enterprise which became incorporated and acquired a 
public company status in 2002. AOT is currently 
responsible for six of the twelve  international airports in 
the country. Other, regional, airports are the responsibility 
of the Department of Civil Aviation. Some domestic 
airports were wholly financed by private airline companies 
to serve their own routes. AOT mainly relies on its own 
funds or on loans to finance projects. For example, 
Suvarnabhumi Airport was funded 30% by AOT, and the 
remaining 70% was funded by a loan from the Japan Bank 
for International Cooperation.
energy sector
There have been continuous privatisation efforts in the 
power sector. The government has been attempting to 
privatise the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) and restructure its role to break up its monopoly in 
power generation and transmission. Thus, this 
infrastructure sector has been gradually liberalised with 
increasing private sector participation in power generation 
through EGAT’s IPP, SPP, and VSPP (‘very small power 
producer’) programmes. In addition, two EGAT 
subsidiaries, Electricity Generating Company and 
Ratcharburi, were established as private stock-listed 
vehicles, with EGAT participation at 25% and 45% 
respectively.
In 2003, the Cabinet approved the latest power industry 
restructuring model, called the ‘enhanced single buyer 
model’. According to this model, EGAT will remain the 
country’s sole electricity buyer, transmitter, and wholesaler 
while the private sector will compete with EGAT in power 
generation.
EGAT became a partial corporate in June 2005 but the 
total privatisation was repealed following a Supreme 
Administrative Court ruling, which ordered the suspension 
of the initial public offering and listing of EGAT in the stock 
market in 2006. The privatisation of EGAT currently 
remains on hold.
Private participation in the petroleum industry has been 
active from upstream to downstream, especially by foreign 
entities. Private oil companies bid for concessions from the 
government to explore and develop oil and gas fields. In 
contrast, competition in the natural gas industry is still 
limited. The Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) has 
significant monopoly control by acting as the sole 
purchaser, transporter and distributor of natural gas. 
Regarding privatisation, the former public Petroleum 
Authority of Thailand was incorporated in 2001 but the 
majority of its shares are still held by the Ministry of 
Finance. The incorporation of PTT was implemented as a 
single conglomerate entity (ie transmission, distribution 
pipelines and gas trading businesses were not unbundled 
before it was privatised).
Telecommunications sector
Until the 1990s, Thailand’s telecommunications sector was 
characterised by a duopolistic structure. Telephone 
Organization of Thailand (TOT) owned a statutory 
monopoly in domestic telephone services while CAT had a 
monopoly over the provision of the international Internet 
gateway (IIG) and Internet services. In the 1990s, these 
state monopolies began to grant concessions to private 
operators. Both granted several such concessions on a 
BTO contract basis. For fixed-line services, concessions 
were granted to two private operators, True and TOT. For 
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mobile phone services, in 1990, TOT granted the 
concession to AIS, while CAT granted a concession to 
UCOM (later TAC and DTAC). The two private companies 
have since established themselves as leaders in the mobile 
phone market.
Recently, the market has been penetrated by foreign 
telecommunications companies. In December 2005, the 
Telecommunications Business Law was amended, 
effectively increasing the limit of allowable foreign 
ownership from 25% to 49%. In 2006, the two largest 
mobile phone operators, AIS and DTAC, were bought by 
Singapore-based Temasek and Norway’s Telenor AS 
respectively.
ForeIgn InFluenCe
According to Section 7 of the Private Participation in State 
Undertaking Act, B.E. 2535 (1992), if a PPP project entails 
fund or assets exceeding five billion THB, the project 
agency must hire a consultant who must prepare a 
separate report with the particulars as prescribed by the 
NESDB. Thus, use of foreign consultants is quite common 
in Thai PPP projects. In practice, these foreign consultants 
usually form teams with domestic consultants. 
ConCluSIonS
The use of PPP in infrastructure project development has 
been gradually increased since the 1980s, starting with 
transport infrastructure projects, and expanding to energy 
and telecommunications projects during the 1990s. There 
has only been a very limited use of PPP in the water utility 
sector despite that sector’s urgent need for investment 
and further development to address serious underlying 
social and economic problems. 
The main providers of financial resources for PPP projects 
in Thailand are the government budget, domestic loans, 
and foreign loans. Most infrastructure development in 
Thailand has been responsive to demand rather than 
being planned strategically. The availability of PPP is no 
longer challenged but the country needs to focus more on 
the quality of service delivery, management, and 
regulation. Most importantly, Thailand needs a clear policy 
framework and strategic development direction formulated 
by the government and based on reliable information.
The Thai PPP regulatory and legal framework still has 
many flaws that might diminish the benefits of the PPP 
implementation (Valentine 2008). Critical weaknesses of 
the Thai PPP framework are:
an incomplete and obsolete legal framework•	
institutional and regulatory fragmentation•	
undue political intervention.•	
The existing legal framework for PPP regulation in 
Thailand is derived from the Private Participation in State 
Undertakings Act, B.E. 2535 (1992), which was originally 
enacted by the government to ensure transparency in the 
undertaking of large-scale PPP projects whose amount 
exceed one billion THB. The law outlines the internal 
processes of the government to prevent corruption and 
does not stipulate the necessary components of a 
regulatory and institutional framework for PPPs. Only 
certain types of PPP projects (eg BOT and BTO schemes) 
are covered by this Act whereas several other schemes, 
including those developed since 1992, are not covered 
(eg BOO and turnkey PPP models). Owing to the 
incompleteness of the Act, many PPP projects that have 
been developed and implemented since 1992 have been 
able to use several different loose interpretations of the 
law. The 1992 Act does not address risk management for 
PPP projects. 
There is no official guidance on standardisation of PPP 
contracts in Thailand and contracts are drafted for specific 
projects, subject to approval by the Attorney General.
The institutional frameworks for infrastructure in Thailand 
are different for each sector and present a fragmented 
hierarchy where different bodies have assumed various 
responsibilities across several sectors.
In order to resolve these problems, short-term and long-
term strategies have been proposed. The short-term 
strategies include creation of a national PPP unit, 
legislative amendments and human resources 
development. In the longer term, the development of a 
comprehensive PPP framework is envisaged. It remains to 
be seen if the current National Development Plan (2007 
– 2011) will address these issues as promised.
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InTroduCTIon 34
The UK’s experience with the privately financed supply of 
infrastructure for the delivery of public services is now 
mature. The policy inaugurated with the White Paper on 
the Channel Fixed Link (CFL) in 1984 and formalised as 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in 1992 now has a 
substantial track record of delivery. This chapter presents 
a narrative of this policy development and provides an 
assessment of its costs and benefits to date. 
The SoCIAl And PolITICAl ConTexT
When the Conservative government arrived in power in 
1979 all utilities and transportation in the UK were in 
public sector ownership. Similarly, the public sector owned 
and operated the vast majority of hospitals, schools and 
other public service providers. The private sector was 
largely restricted to the supply of infrastructure, while 
finance came from general taxation and service provision 
was by public sector employees. The new administration 
set about privatising the utilities and by 1997, the end of 
its long period in office, vast areas of the former public 
sector were in the private sector in terms of finance, 
ownership and operation. Where users had traditionally 
paid for the service provided, privatisation was broadly 
effective. 
Where the public was not already used to paying directly 
for the service provided direct privatisation was not 
possible, largely for political rather than technical reasons. 
For instance, a commitment to health services and school 
education free at the point of use was a political imperative 
throughout the period. Similarly roads, with the occasional 
exception of bridges and tunnels, are technically difficult to 
toll and there is significant public opposition to the 
imposition of payments for use. This left two perceived 
alternatives. The first was outsourcing of service delivery in 
areas such as catering, waste disposal and IT. Where 
significant capital investment was required and service 
delivery was to be retained in the public sector, the second 
innovative solution was private finance. While the details of 
arrangements vary, the private financing of public 
infrastructure essentially involves the formation of a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV), which raises capital to 
develop the infrastructure and is then reimbursed by 
payments from either users or the government. These 
processes of reform were taken up enthusiastically when 
the Labour Party came to power in 1997, and the new 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition 
administration of 2010 appears to have no principled 
objection to the use of private finance although it is facing 
pragmatic challenges. 
34. I am grateful to Graham Ive and Dennis O’Keefe for their constructive 
comments on this chapter. Neither, of course, bears any responsibility for 
the final version.
The uk exPerIenCe WITh PrIvATe FInAnCe
We can identify four eight-year phases of the UK 
experience:
tentative steps with concessions 1984–91•	
additionality through PFI experimentation 1992–99•	
seeking value for money in public procurement 2000–07•	
retrenchment and reflection from 2008 on. •	
The private finance policy was launched with a small 
number of infrastructure projects during the 1980s where 
the user reimbursed the SPV directly – a radical innovation 
in the UK context (Marcou 1992). The first was the 
Channel Fixed Link (CFL) swiftly followed by the Dartford, 
Severn, and Skye toll bridges. Emboldened by this success, 
in 1992 the Conservative administration launched PFI, 
where the SPV is not paid directly by users, but 
reimbursed by the relevant public sector agency through a 
unitary charge for facility availability and service provision. 
Progress was slow at first, as both the government and 
potential suppliers learned how to put together PFI deals; 
in this they were aided from 1993 on by the Private 
Finance Panel (PFP), initially chaired by the chief executive 
of the SPV for the CFL. In 1994, the design–build–finance–
operate (DBFO) method of procuring roads was launched: 
a method which relied for income upon shadow tolls paid 
by the government rather than on charges to road users. 
The Public Private Partnership Programme (4ps; now 
Local Partnerships) was set up in 1996 to extend the 
initiative to local government. In areas such as health and 
schools, legal problems regarding the status of health 
trusts and local authorities delayed deals while, more 
generally, the bidding procedures were widely criticised as 
costly and time-consuming, and the public sector 
displayed a lack of expertise in this challenging new area. 
Despite some high-profile successes in achieving deals in 
the transport and prison sectors, PFI was in difficulty by 
the time of the election in May 1997. 
The incoming Labour administration acted swiftly by 
abolishing the PFP and launching a full review of PFI. As a 
result of the Bates review, published in June 1997, bidding 
procedures were overhauled, and legislation was 
introduced to clarify the status of National Health Service 
trusts. A Treasury Taskforce was established to promote 
what were now called public private partnerships (PPP), 
and in 1998 deals with a capital value of £2085 million 
were signed, a major increase in the rate of deal 
completion. In order to address further outstanding 
problems, a second Bates review was established and the 
results published in July 1999. One outcome was the 
establishment of Partnerships UK in 2000 as a promoter 
of private finance at national level to complement 4ps. 
These reviews formed the basis of the subsequent strong 
development of private finance during the third phase. 
13. Thirty years of private finance in the united kingdom
graham m. Winch, manchester Business School 36
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Research conducted by HM Treasury (2003) found that 
88% of construction projects were on time or completed 
before the planned date for facility availability. In just over 
20% of cases, the unitary charge payment increased 
against budget, but in all cases this was due to changes in 
user requirements by the public sector. The report 
concluded that PFI was delivering certainty in 
infrastructure asset acquisition for the public sector. 
Complementary research by the National Audit Office 
(NAO 2003), which was focused on the construction 
phase, reported in similar terms: 76% of projects were 
available for use on time or early and only 8% were 
delayed more than two months; 70% of facilities had no 
increase in unitary charges and the majority of increases 
were due to either changes in user requirements or 
regulatory issues. Nonetheless, HM Treasury identified two 
problem areas.
Information technology projects had a much poorer •	
record of delivery, and most of the successful IT 
projects had renegotiated their contracts and moved 
away from the private finance model. 
Smaller projects – defined as those worth less than •	
£20 million – tended to suffer from very high 
transaction costs. While delivery of these projects was 
satisfactory, the existence of significant economies of 
scale in deal negotiation meant that smaller deals 
carried proportionally higher transaction costs.
As a result of this research, the report recommended that 
privately financed deals be abandoned for IT facilities, and 
that smaller deals such as schools and primary health care 
facilities be bundled into programmes called strategic 
partnerships, serving an administrative area. 
Despite these restrictions, the use of private finance 
continued to grow, peaking in value (over £7 billion) of 
deals signed in 2006 before beginning to fall away sharply. 
There would appear to be a number of reasons for this 
change in growth pattern.
Many of the viable opportunities for larger deals on 
greenfield sites had already been taken and brownfield 
projects are generally less viable for private finance.
There was growing awareness of the limits to private •	
finance, particularly in the provision of so-called soft 
facilities management such as ‘hotel’ services in 
hospitals, which also tended to be a focus for trade 
union opposition to proposed projects.
Changes in HM Treasury policy in the context of a more •	
benign environment for public finances meant that 
public finance became more readily available. This was 
reinforced by revised HM Treasury guidelines on value 
for money (VfM) in 2005.
There were some spectacular failures, such as the •	
termination of the contract during construction for the 
National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in 2004, the 
abandonment of the Paddington Health Campus PFI in 
2005, and the bankruptcy of Metronet (one of the 
London Underground PPP suppliers) in 2007. 
HM Treasury again reviewed its position in 2006 (HM 
Treasury 2006), now focusing more on operational issues, 
and reaffirmed its commitment to using private finance for 
the provision of public infrastructure where appropriate. 
Nonetheless, developments in the financial markets during 
2007 and 2008 have greatly reinforced the downward 
trend. Private finance in the UK is usually provided in 
ratios of around 90% debt finance and 10% equity 
finance. Debt financiers charge the sum of interest at the 
reference rate, which represents general market risks plus 
loan margin; the latter represents project-specific risks. 
Debt on larger projects was typically sold as bonds, which 
were then rated by credit rating agencies. The purchase of 
credit insurance then made these bonds acceptable to 
long-term investors such as pension funds. In late 2007, 
confidence in the providers of credit insurance collapsed 
and made it difficult to sell bonds. The non-bond source of 
debt finance had been syndicated bank loans, with the 
banks often drawing the sums required from the wholesale 
money markets, but the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
late 2008 led to a very difficult period for debt capital from 
banks. 
These crises in the financial markets dried up the sources 
of debt that had enabled the UK boom in private finance, 
as loan margins doubled rendering many projects 
unaffordable. The NAO (2010b) has calculated that these 
increases in financing cost on the outstanding £13 billon 
pipeline of projects are raising annual charges by around 
7% – this means, for instance, around £200,000 extra 
each year for a typical school project. Some ‘shovel ready’ 
projects were still allowed to go ahead despite increased 
financing costs during 2009 because of the economic 
stimulus that they would generate, but the number of 
projects agreed in 2009 was less than half that of 2006. In 
July 2010, the new administration cancelled all ‘Building 
Schools for the Future’ projects that had not already 
reached financial close, on value for money grounds. 
Similarly, 7 of the 18 municipal waste PFI projects that had 
not yet reached financial close were cancelled in October 
2010.
ISSueS In PrIvATe FInAnCe: The leSSonS From The 
uk
The UK has built up considerable experience in the private 
finance of public infrastructure. It has seen a cycle from 
the depths of the recession in the early 1980s through the 
long boom starting in the early 1990s to the present 
return to recession. Many lessons have been learned, and 
the UK has actively promoted its expertise across the 
world. The aim of this section is to provide a review of 
some of the principal lessons. The account here will take a 
pragmatic position; the deeper issues around the private 
finance of public infrastructure are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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ProJeCT PerFormAnCe
The NAO has reported twice on PFI performance in the 
construction sector (2003; 2009a). The summary data 
presented in Table 13.1 on the percentage of projects 
experiencing overruns come from an NAO-sponsored 
survey of PFI project teams; an earlier survey of 
government clients commissioned by HM Treasury 
provides the conventional data for 1998 and a survey of 
larger non-PFI projects by the NAO provides the 
conventional data for 2008. The NAO cautions against 
reading too much into these figures because there are 
differences in the project mix between the four surveys 
and weaknesses in the method of the earlier studies 
(Pollock et al. 2007). It also notes that none of the PFI 
projects experienced the kind of serious schedule and 
budget problems that it had reported on for conventional 
projects. The overall message here is that PFI does 
improve project performance, particularly as all the budget 
increases on the PFI projects in both surveys were due to 
changes initiated by the public sector. Respondents to 
those surveys agreed that a clear output specification was 
the key to good schedule and budget performance. 





































Budget increase 73% 22% 35% 46%
Schedule overrun 70% 24% 31% 37%
Source: NAO 2003, 2009a.
This improvement in delivery performance has not 
generally been at the expense of quality of conformance to 
specification – the NAO reports general satisfaction in this 
respect. Even so, questions were raised regarding the 
quality of conception (design values) and specification 
(fitness for purpose) in some early PFI schools (Audit 
Commission 2003; Northern Ireland Audit Office 2004). As 
a result, the Commission for Architecture and the Built 
Environment developed guidance in 2002, and in 2007 
was funded to provide designs reviews for SPV proposals 
under the BSF programme. NAO data (2009a) suggest 
that satisfaction with the design quality of facilities 
procured increased between 2002 and 2008. 
InnovATIve FACIlITIeS
During the early phases of the advocacy of private finance 
it was suggested that this procurement route would 
stimulate innovation, particularly with respect to whole-life 
costs of the facility. There is little evidence, however, that 
this is indeed happening, although innovation rates do 
appear to be higher where the whole service including the 
core is outsourced, such as with DBFO roads and detention 
facilities (CIC 2000). A set of case studies of innovation in 
PFI hospitals (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser 2008) supports 
this conclusion. Reasons for this include (NAO 2009b):
lack of available data on whole-life costing that would •	
allow informed decisions to be made on specifications 
to achieve better whole-life costs of the facility
risk-averse financiers (banks and bond holders) •	
perceive that innovation increases project risk on all 
three dimensions of budget, schedule, and quality
lack of experience on the commissioning side within •	
government and difficulties in writing the output 
specification
separation between designers and users mediated •	
through the SPV
poor arrangements for learning from project to project•	
de-scoping of the project to achieve affordability •	
criteria.
These data, however inadequate, suggest private finance is 
not any more successful in stimulating innovation than 
public finance of infrastructure assets. This is an important 
conclusion, because innovation is one of the principal ways 
by which efficiency savings can be made that will offset the 
higher cost of capital to privately financed projects.
oPerATIonAl PerFormAnCe And FlexIBIlITy
One of the principal differences between procurement of 
infrastructure though conventional public finance and 
through private finance is that the SPV retains operational 
responsibility for ensuring the delivery of the services 
provided by the asset for the life of the contract – often up 
to 30 years. Operational performance, complemented by 
the possibility of flexibility in the required performance to 
meet changing operational needs, is therefore essential. 
For the local authority sector, 4ps (2005) examined the 
operational performance of 30 privately financed facilities 
and found general satisfaction with operational 
performance. Research by KPMG (2010) suggests that the 
patient environment and cleanliness of PFI hospitals on a 
standard self-assessed protocol are better than for 
conventionally procured ones of a similar age. A review of 
the operational performance of PFI hospital contracts by 
the NAO (2010a) concluded that operational performance 
is satisfactory – service levels are generally as agreed in 
the contract. Where there are problems, these are typically 
due to labour shortages in places such as London, which 
would also affect non-PFI hospitals. The NAO also found, 
however, that while performance was perceived to be a 
little better than in non-PFI hospitals, operational costs 
were no lower. Lower catering costs tended to be 
counterbalanced by higher maintenance costs that 
resulted from the higher standards written into the 
contract within the unitary charge. Market testing of ‘hotel’ 
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or ‘soft facilities management (FM)’ costs (catering, 
portering, and cleaning) every few years or so is typically 
allowed under the contract, but this rarely achieves 
savings. The NAO also notes that mechanisms to enable 
continuous improvement in maintenance costs were rare 
in the contracts. 
These findings are important – although the achieved 
service levels are as expected, they are no cheaper than 
for non-PFI facilities. Where operational efficiencies can be 
achieved, they flow to the SPV rather than the public 
sector (NAO 2010a). Greater private sector efficiency is 
another potential source of savings to offset the higher 
cost of capital, yet it does not appear to be generally 
achieved. Moreover, the SPV has the incentive to protect 
the integrity of its asset so the public sector is locked in to 
relatively high hard FM costs and cannot make savings by 
cutting back maintenance levels. Many SPVs are currently 
refusing to renegotiate this aspect of their contracts during 
the current round of expenditure cuts in the health sector, 
putting even greater pressure on publicly funded areas of 
service delivery (Financial Times 2011a, 2011b). 
Turning now to flexibility, one-third of the respondents to 
the 4ps (2005) research expressed concern about the 
future flexibility of the contract although they had 
generally found it possible to negotiate changes in the 
contract as requirements evolved. NAO research (2008b) 
shows that while there was general satisfaction with 
flexibility to make changes as requirements evolved, the 
public sector is typically paying over the market rate for 
those changes. In some cases it is not feasible to invite 
competitive tenders for the changes, but even where this is 
feasible, this was not often done. In addition to the cost of 
the actual works associated with the changes, SPVs were 
charging fees to manage the changes and amend the 
life-cycle cost model of the facility. The NAO was moved to 
describe some of these additional costs as ‘not always 
justifiable’. The NAO analysis suggests that flexibility is 
more expensive under PFI than conventional procurement, 
and is, therefore, an additional cost that needs to be 
counterbalanced by benefits elsewhere.
TrAnSACTIon CoSTS
Cost of capital is not the only additional cost incurred by 
private finance; transaction costs are also significantly 
increased: see Winch (2010) for a review of the theoretical 
issues. HM Treasury accepts that transaction costs will be 
higher on privately financed projects owing to the much 
greater rigour required in writing the output specification 
compared with an input one, and the much greater costs 
of tendering and associated contract negotiation. Indeed, 
the principal reason for excluding projects valued at under 
£20 million from PFI was their inability to support the 
transaction cost overhead. 
Project promoter and bidder costs tend to disappear into 
overheads, but the extended length of the procurement 
period for privately financed projects suggests that these 
will be higher than for conventional procurement. NAO 
(2007) states that the average private finance contract 
took 34 months to close, roughly double the time for large 
conventional projects. It may be inferred that transaction 
costs were around double as well. Many public authorities 
underestimated the resources that would be needed in 
negotiations and overspent on their budgets for advisers; 
opportunity costs for internal staff were not costed in the 
research. So far as identifiable transaction costs are 
concerned, the NAO (2007) puts the figure for third-party 
advisers at an average of 2.6% of project costs for projects 
closed between 2004 and 2006. The heavy reliance on 
third-party advisers raises broader issues than transaction 
costs because, as Shaoul and her colleagues (2007) note, 
these advisers largely come from the ‘big 4’ accounting 
firms, which have a vested interest in the further 
development of the use of private finance and they often 
act as both advisers on and evaluators of the project 
development process, biasing the system towards private 
rather than public finance. 
In principle, such costs are counterbalanced by the 
production cost savings, which suppliers are encouraged 
to share with clients through ‘competitive tension’ in the 
supply market, but growing difficulties have been 
experienced in maintaining competitive tension. NAO 
(2007) states that many projects received only two serious 
bids, and extensive negotiations have often taken place 
after the selection of the preferred bidder, leading to 
repricing in the absence of competitive tension. The 
problem here is that competitive tension is the principal 
mechanism for reducing ‘opportunism’ by suppliers. The 
evidence on flexibility discussed above suggests 
opportunism by some SPVs when making changes during 
operation; it is likely that final negotiations with preferred 
bidders also experience such opportunism. 
vAlue For money And rISk TrAnSFer
The cost of capital for a private sector enterprise is almost 
always greater than that for a sovereign government such 
as the UK. Ceteris paribus, an investment funded using 
private capital will cost more than one using public capital 
because it will have to cover higher capital charges. If the 
use of private capital is to be value for money, savings 
must be found elsewhere in the business case for the 
investment to offset the higher cost of capital. This is 
usually achieved through ‘risk transfer’ to the private 
sector. The analysis of value for money tends to be 
confounded with the issue of additionality – that is the 
availability of capital within the public sector budget for a 
particular project. 
Value for money is achieved by comparing the bids 
received from the SPVs against a public sector comparator 
(PSC). If the offer by the SPV makes savings against the 
PSC, then the offer can be considered value for money and 
the private finance deal can go ahead. From where do the 
savings come to counteract the higher cost of capital 
raised by the SPV? They typically come from the transfer 
of risks to the SPV that under conventional procurement 
would have to be borne by the public sector client. 
Broadly, for any project risks lie in three areas.
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1.  The business case for the investment: the appropriate 
investment decision needs to be made – the problem of 
‘doing the right project’. 
2.  The execution of the project: the project phase of the 
infrastructure development needs to be managed 
effectively against the figures in the original business 
case – the problem of ‘doing the project right’. 
3.  The facility through life: the infrastructure has to be 
maintained at an appropriate level of availability 
through its life and subsequently demolished or 
otherwise disposed of when that life comes to an end. 
The first area of risk cannot be transferred. If the outturn 
balance of income stream against expenditure stream in 
the investment appraisal is fundamentally flawed, then the 
public sector will have to provide additional funds to 
maintain facility availability, regardless of the detail of the 
contract, or it will face the default of the SPV and loss of 
facility availability. A significant proportion of early private 
finance projects ran into problems due to poorly 
structured deals that caused the public sector to incur 
significant additional costs and loss of services to the 
public (CPA 2003). It is argued, however, that the greater 
due diligence inherent in the process of negotiating a 
privately financed deal does reduce the risk of poor 
investment appraisal (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). In practice, 
this risk has been reduced in the UK by removing the 
projects where the risks of poor investment appraisal are 
greatest – information systems – from the private finance 
programme. There does not appear to be any comparative 
data on the quality of investment appraisal for publicly and 
privately financed infrastructure investments.
The second area is central to risk transfer. Under public 
finance, the public sector client makes monthly interim 
payments to the contractor for the facility during project 
execution while receiving no benefits from its use until 
handover. Under private finance, no payment is made until 
the facility is available for use and the costs of project 
execution are bundled in the unitary charge. As indicated 
in Table 13.1, the project execution risks appear to have 
been effectively transferred to the private sector for 
infrastructure delivery; nonetheless, in the rare case of 
spectacular delivery failure such as at the NPL, then the 
public sector again has to step in at considerable 
additional expense. 
The third area covers the risks associated with the facility 
through life. Here, the private sector is taking little risk 
except for latent defects in the original design because the 
FM contracts are typically open for periodic renegotiation. 
Should user requirements – and hence the original 
business case – change, however, then private finance 
costs are higher. The risks associated with changes to 
requirements are therefore higher for the public sector 
under private finance, yet these are not deducted from the 
public sector comparator. The treatment of residual value 
of the asset at the end of the contract is also important 
and is highly sensitive to the discount rate used (Heald 
2003). 
AddITIonAlITy
Like all organisations, the public sector has a finite limit to 
its ability to raise finance and hence invest. This is typically 
set as a limit on the public sector net debt (PSND) as a 
proportion of overall economic activity. Policy may loosen 
or tighten this constraint but it is always there. In order to 
maximise investment in infrastructure that provides 
socially useful public services it is tempting to find ways 
around the limit, and private finance can offer one option. 
Here the accounting treatment discussed below is vital – if 
the investment in the new asset can be treated as being 
‘off balance sheet’ then the investment made does not 
count towards the PSND and so is not subject to the policy 
constraint. An alternative, of course, would be to relax the 
constraint, but this option is beyond the scope of this 
analysis and we will assume here that the PSND constraint 
is appropriate. 
In the two phases up to 1999, the PSND set a tight 
constraint on public sector investment, and it can be 
argued that private finance provided significant – around 
10% – additionality to public finance. Even if an investment 
could be made from public funds, the use of private 
finance releases public funds for use on other projects that 
cannot be structured to attract private finance. For 
instance, 11 DBFO roads, significant extensions to the 
Docklands Light Railway, and 20 hospital projects were 
signed prior to 2000. It is likely that only a few of these 
would have gone ahead without private finance. HM 
Treasury relaxed the PSND constraint in 2000, and 
insisted that, henceforth, value for money was the only 
criterion for investment appraisal, yet much departmental 
guidance on PFI continued to stress the advantages of 
private finance for reasons other than value for money, and 
the incentive to keep liabilities out of PSND remained 
despite the implementation of IFRS (NAO 2009b). Severe 
constraints on PSND have now returned.
Thus, the impression still lingered in the public sector for 
some years that private finance was the only option 
available for projects. This led to significant distortions of 
the investment appraisal process (NAO 2009b) such as 
the following.
Budgetary processes can make private finance appear •	
more affordable even though the cash flows are 
identical.
There is a transfer of risks, such as demand side risks, •	
which are not within the ability of the SPV to manage, 
yet this ensures that the facility is off balance sheet 
under generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP).
Contract provisions that would increase flexibility and •	
market testing of lifecycle costs are minimised because 
again this would not transfer risk to the SPV under 
GAAP.
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The WorkIng CondITIonS oF STAFF
Continuing concern has been expressed by the UK’s 
principal trade union for public sector employees, 
UNISON. The issue arises because staff previously 
employed by the public sector – most frequently in the 
soft FM ‘hotel’ services – are typically transferred to the 
SPV in many, but certainly not all, private finance projects. 
Particularly for lower-paid workers, employment terms and 
conditions are often superior to those in the private sector. 
Such transfers are, however, covered by European Union 
employment legislation – the Transfer of Undertaking 
(Protection of Employment) (TUPE) regulations – which 
provide protection for such employees. 
Of more concern are those people hired following the 
transfer who are not protected, and pensions, which are 
not covered by TUPE. Newly hired employees with some of 
the early SPVs did appear to have been disadvantaged. In 
a series of policy steps between 2001 and 2005, the 
government moved to the position that newly hired SPV 
employees should be offered broadly comparable terms 
and conditions, including pensions, to those who were 
transferred. In practice, many newly hired employees, 
particularly in the hard FM areas, are better paid than 
those transferred (NAO 2008a) reflecting labour market 
conditions. 
overvIeW
From this review, we can conclude that the reduced risk of 
additional costs on average associated with project 
execution and improved business case need to outweigh 
the additional costs of PFI that arise on average from the 
cost of capital, transaction costs, and flexibility. So far as 
we are aware, no data are available which would allow a 
calculation of this balance sheet to be made (c.f. CPA 
2011). It may be tentatively concluded from this analysis 
that the general case for private finance is not proven; the 
benefits gained from additionality, risk transfer and 
improved decision making are too nebulous to allow 
certainty that they are outweighing the known additional 
costs indicated by the minus signs in the same table. 
It can also be argued, as can be seen from Table 13.1, that 
the performance of publicly financed projects has 
improved significantly over the last 10 years (NAO 2001, 
2005) thanks to innovative arrangements such as NHS 
Procure 21+. This is hardly surprising because, almost 
simultaneously with the launch of PFI, the Conservative 
government started a programme of ‘conventional’ 
procurement reform that was sustained by the Labour 
government (Winch 2000) and symbolised by the 
establishment of the Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) in 2000. The OGC was absorbed into HM Treasury 
in 2010 but continues to function as a change agent for 
government procurement. Although it has an advisory role 
rather than a mandatory authority, it does appear to have 
made real progress in strengthening the ability of the UK 
public sector to procure infrastructure (NAO 2004) even if 
much more remains to be done (NAO 2009c).
Arguably, even if advantages of private finance arising from 
the quality of the business case come from the much 
greater due diligence in the project insisted upon by the 
banks, there is no apparent reason why the public sector 
cannot achieve similar gains. It is perfectly possible to 
transfer project execution risks to the supplier under 
traditional procurement, so long as the client is capable of 
overseeing the project. Even if we accept that there are 
benefits here, they come at a high transaction cost and it 
is not clear why the public sector client cannot improve its 
own internal decision-making process to mitigate the risk 
of a poor business case. 
ACCounTIng TreATmenT oF PrIvATe FInAnCe
The basic accounting regime for private finance within 
public sector investment at the start of our period of 
review was established by the so-called Ryrie rules of 
1981, which stated that:
a value-for-money (VfM) test should demonstrate that •	
the private finance was more cost-effective than public 
finance through comparison with the public-sector 
alternative
privately financed projects should count against the •	
PSND.
The problems with these rules were that restrictions on 
PSND levels meant that projects could not be funded, yet 
the theoretical public sector alternative came out cheaper 
in the VfM test owing to the lower cost of capital obtainable 
by the public sector. The first rule was relaxed in 1989 to 
allow a comparison with doing nothing, which had the 
effect of enhancing the benefits side of the equation, and 
an allowance for the value of risk transfer, which made 
bolstering the forecast cost of the public sector option 
much easier. The second was relaxed with the launch of 
PFI in 1992, which started the active promotion of private 
finance by the UK government. 
Nonetheless, the problem that the Ryrie rules had 
attempted to tackle in 1981 remained. Recommendations 
from the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) published in 
September 1998 raised serious questions about the 
viability of private finance deals. The issues revolved 
around what was actually being provided: an asset, a 
service, or a combination of the two, and the allocation of 
the risks associated with the investment. Traditionally, the 
state has procured assets and then delivered services, 
such as custody, health, and transport, by exploiting those 
assets themselves. The key to the broader growth of 
private finance was the argument that the government was 
procuring a service, not the asset that enabled that service 
provision. 
New accounting rules for PFI projects were published in 
response to the ASB concerns. These rules turned on two 
tests of where risks lay in the contract:
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whether the asset was separable from the service •	
provided; if it were, then the asset need not be taken 
into the public sector’s accounts as an asset
if not separable, whether the ‘demand risk’ lay with the •	
SPV; it lay with the public sector if fluctuations in the 
use of the facility were in any way compensated by 
paying for unused parts of the facility, or favouring the 
use of the privately financed asset as part of the total 
portfolio of assets operated by the public sector. 
This generally agreed accounting practice (GAAP) 
supported the rapid expansion of private finance during 
the 2000s, but the UK government adopted the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
2009. This adopts a control test, rather than a risk test, for 
inclusion of an asset on the public balance sheet (NAO 
2009b), in circumstances where the public authority:
exercises effective control over the services provided by •	
the privately financed asset in terms of to whom it 
must provide them and their price, and
controls the residual price of the asset at contract end •	
through, for instance, an option to purchase at 
previously agreed price.
At first sight, these new standards would appear to render 
the fiscal attractiveness of most private finance, other than 
tolled concessions, to be of little value (McQuaid and 
Scherrer 2010). Accounting treatment is not, however, the 
same as statistical treatment (NAO 2009b). The UK Office 
of National Statistics uses the European System of 
Accounts (ESA 95) to prepare the UK national accounts, 
which adopt the type of risk-based assessment used by 
GAAP and, in 2009, HM Treasury announced that 
government departments would follow ESA 95, and not 
IFRS in departmental budgeting. The effect of this decision 
is that the accounting and statistical treatments of assets 
have moved apart – having been consistent under GAAP 
– and that many privately financed infrastructure assets 
will still not appear in calculations of PSND. 
ConCluSIonS
The use of private finance to create public infrastructure 
assets has been a remarkable policy experiment over the 
last 30 years. The first phase saw a radical shift from the 
traditional privatisation/nationalisation dynamic in UK 
infrastructure. While energy, telecommunications and 
water infrastructure were simply privatised, transport 
infrastructure presented greater challenges and private 
finance became an attractive way of providing the types of 
infrastructure that were traditionally tolled in any case, 
such as estuarine crossings.  
The success of these early projects prepared the basis for 
PFI in 1992. The apparent benefits of additionality during 
a period of tight restraint on PSND encouraged project 
promoters to put forward a wide variety of different types 
of infrastructure project, some of which were more 
appropriate for private finance than others. This period 
saw some significant successes, many projects with mixed 
results and some spectacular failures, such as many of the 
information systems infrastructure projects.
The incoming Labour government of 1997 quickly 
assuaged the doubts about private finance it had 
expressed in opposition and moved to learn from the 
experimental projects. It began the process of tightening 
up on a number of areas of practice ranging from the 
standardisation of contracts to clarifying the employment 
terms and conditions of transferred workers. In 2000 it 
relaxed the PSND constraint and oversaw a remarkable 
expansion of private finance of public infrastructure. Many 
of the problems that challenged the second, experimental, 
phase projects were addressed and new forms of private 
finance arrangements were developed. While value for 
money was the official policy, project promoters 
continually expressed concerns that they were being 
pushed into privately financed procurement for 
additionality reasons.
The flow of deals peaked in 2006 and then started to fall 
away rapidly from 2008 on. As more and more projects 
moved into the operational phases, it became clear that a 
high proportion of facilities were delivering on the 
expectations of their users, but that few additional benefits 
were being achieved. Difficulties in raising finance started 
to become apparent, and the private sector’s appetite for 
new projects apparently became sated. The number of 
privately financeable projects dropped as value-for-money 
criteria became tighter – a trend that was reinforced with 
the adoption of IFRS in 2009. 
Thus by late 2010, the private finance of public 
infrastructure was moribund in the UK. If capital market 
conditions improve, we may see the revival of some 
projects, but the value-for-money issues that have been 
the focus of so much criticism have not really been 
resolved. The use of additionality in a very tight period for 
government spending might be attractive, but is 
constrained by the adoption of IFRS. The most viable 
candidates for private finance remain those that 
dominated phase one, tolled infrastructure, but a country 
such as the UK with mature infrastructure offers relatively 
few opportunities for that kind of investment. Where 
investment is still need in areas such as urban transit, 
private finance is difficult to justify, and where it is needed 
in areas such as education and health affordability criteria 
will set a low cap on activity.  
In sum, a number of conclusions may be drawn from the 
UK experience with private finance over 30 years.
Private finance can deliver considerable benefits for the 
provision of public infrastructure in appropriate conditions 
but it can be difficult to establish with confidence any 
value for money in the investment appraisal.
Making private finance the only option for public 
procurement can lead to rampant strategic 
misrepresentation and, hence, the private funding of 
inappropriate projects with inevitable consequences later 
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on. Private finance can only ever be one of a number of 
procurement options for public infrastructure.
Accountability is essential for the improvement in policy. 
The role of the NAO’s careful research since 1997 – far and 
away the largest source of data on privately financed 
projects anywhere in the world – has been central to the 
development of the policy. Mediated through the House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, these data have 
continually pushed HM Treasury to develop its policy 
regarding private finance.
The commercial skills on the public sector side have 
remained weaker than required throughout the period. 
Although much has been learned since the experimental 
phase 1992–9, there still remain significant weaknesses in 
the public sector client’s ability to define what it wants and 
to negotiate effectively with the private sector to achieve it 
(NAO 2009c).
The Conservative Liberal coalition is currently seeking 
alternative models of infrastructure finance to those used 
over the last 30 years. These include a Green Investment 
Bank to use public funds in a focused way to stimulate 
private investment in green infrastructure; tax increment 
financing (TIF), which allows public authorities to borrow 
against future receipts from increased taxes on the 
economic activity stimulated by the investment of the 
borrowed funds in infrastructure; and, in a nice reversal of 
the principle behind PFI, the possible finance and 
construction of infrastructure by the public sector with a 
view to leasing it to the private sector, as with High Speed 
2. Within the UK’s devolved governments, Scotland has 
been particularly innovative. In 2008, it set up the Scottish 
Futures Trust, which mobilises a variety of private finance 
routes, such as a non-profit distributing model and TIF, as 
well as developing public finance routes. These projects 
are then carried out through a nationwide framework 
agreement called ‘hub’. The provision of infrastructure in 
an advanced economy constrained in its ability to borrow 
to finance all viable infrastructure projects is a pervasive 
problem. The UK’s remarkable experiment with the role of 
private finance in such provision has been bold; lessons 
have been learned and new avenues are currently being 
explored. 
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